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It is the central argument of this thesis that the cost
.-r

med i cal care has been the most salient political
;ideration in the evolution of certificate of public need
virginia.

certi f icate of need is a regulatory mechanism

that public officials use to achieve health planning goals by
controlling medical facility capital expenditures .

This

thesis sets the development and implementation of certificate
of need in Virginia against the broad background of medical
facility public policy in this country, as well as
significant political movements in Virginia.
Several themes are evident from this analysis. Over time,
the center of medical facility planning and assistance has
shifted from the private sector to state and local
governments, and then to the federal government.

More

recently, governmental activity in this area has reverted to
the states . Secondly, the nature of this activity has changed
ii

from health facility construction assistance to health
planning, and finally to health facility regulation.

Group

interaction has played an important role in the
overall development and administration of the certificate of
public need in Virginia.

The review process itself has

numerous points of entry for public participation.

Finally,

several facets of the ever-changing healthcare environment
have influenced and are influenced by Virginia's certificate
of public need program.
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CHAPTER 1
FORMATIVE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

Major changes in the provision of hospital services have
occurred during the twentieth century.

Gone are the days when

visits to the hospital were remedies of last resort. Significant
advancements in medical technology, and in the training of
medical professionals have transformed the hospital into the
centerpiece of the American medical system.
Over the years, various social, political,and economic
factors have led to greater governmental involvement in the
hospital sector.

What had once primarily been the domain of the

nation's charitable and philanthropic organizations, hospital
care has become increasingly influenced by all levels of
government.

Government's role in hospital care evolved in this

century in response to the needs as perceived by various groups
in society, and by the various levels of government. Hence, the
goals of the various legislative remedies that have been put
forth have changed to reflect the concerns prevailing at a given
time.
Just as the goals of governmental policy have changed over
time, so too, have the policy instruments that government has
developed. During the early decades of this century, governmental
activity consisted primarily of the disbursement of construction
and operating assistance funds by the federal government, while
state and, especially local governments initiated local hospital
1

2

planning authorities to insure the viability of these
institutions.

With the end of World War II, health officials

renewed their efforts to increase the nation's stock of hospital
beds.

At this time the federal government took the leading role

by initiating a hospital construction program.

By the mid-

1960's, the federal government instituted a comprehensive health
planning program as a means of integrating medical facility and
physician services.

Also at about the same time, New York and

several other states began to experiment with a little-known
regulatory instrument known as certificate of need, which
required prior state approval

for medical facility capital

expenditures as a means of implementing health planning goals.1
By the early 1970's the costs for health care were rising
dramatically.

Federal and state officials were especially

concerned because of their burgeoning fiscal burdens under the
Medicare and Medicaid programs.

In an effort to stem the rise in

costs Congress passed a national health planning program which
included a certificate of need provision.

Already concerned

about rising medical bills, the Virginia General Assembly
instituted its own certificate of need program.

In so doing,

Virginia and Congress transformed what had previously been

1 Most of the early hospital planning activities, and literature
pertaining to those activities, focused on acute care, general
hospitals. However, later medical facility planning and regulatory
efforts in the post-war period incorporated other types of facilities,
such as nursing homes and intermediate care facilities for substance
abuse. Therefore, except when referring to a particular type of
facility, the terms health care facility and medical facility
shall refer to the range of facilities covered under a particular
program.
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essentially private decisions regarding medical facility
expansion and service changes into inherently political
decisions.
Certificate of need continued to be a federal, state and
local health planning and regulatory mechanism through the early
1980's. However the Reagan Administration's anti-regulatory
posture resulted in the gradual reduction and ultimate
dissolution of the federal health planning program. Virginia and
other states are once again free to alter or abolish their
individual health planning and regulatory programs, should they
choose to do so.

Indeed, the Virginia General Assembly is

currently considering alterations to its certificate of need
program.

At issue is the proper role for government in the

medical facility industry.

What follows is essentially a case

study of medical facility planning and regulation through
certificate of need in Virginia, set against the broader
historical and political evolution of medical facility public
policy in the U. S. generally.

Particular attention will be paid

in chapter 2 to the health care environmental factors that
influenced the emergence and evolution of certificate of need in
Virginia.

The third chapter shall focus on Virginia's

certificate of need review process and the opportunities for
political influence that it offers.

The fourth chapter provides

an overview of the health care environment in which Virginia's
certificate of need currently functions.

And, the final chapter

focuses on the broad political and social themes that have shaped

4

medical facility public policy nationally and in Virginia, as a
means of ascertaining the current status of medical facility
public policy in Virginia.

Private Sector Initiatives in Hospital Planning and Assistance

Private sector initiatives to render assistance to hospitals
evolved at about the same time as local government efforts.
Philanthropic foundations, such as the Commonwealth Fund, based
in New York City, the Duke Endowment,headquartered in Durham,
North Carolina, and the Kellog Foundation of Battle Creek, Michigan, rendered financial and organizational assistance to
hospitals.

While they did act as a stabilizing influence to many

institutions, the expansion of this experience on a wider scale
was not considered feasible by health care professionals at the
time. 2
A number of voluntary affiliations arose by which smaller
hospitals bepame affiliated with larger hospitals through
interlocking directorates.

These affiliations facilitated the

flow of personnel and services from large hospitals to small
hospitals, while patients tended to gravitate toward large
hospitals.

Voluntary affiliations also permitted the flow of

information between hospitals of various sizes.3

These

2commission on Hospital care, Hospital Care in the United
States (New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1947), p. 351.
3 commission on Hospital Care, p. 352.
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arrangements appear to have been designed to instill a measure of
stability.
In spite of these efforts to improve the general condition
of hospital care in the United states, it became apparent to
professionals within the health care field, as well as concerned
private citizens, that further action would be necessary.

Hence

in 1942, the American Hospital Association (AHA) organized the
Commission on Hospital Care to analyze the then-current hospital
situation,and to make recommendations for remedying these inadequacies4. The Commission's findings and recommendations would

4v.M. Hoge, "Hospitals and Health Centers, the Federal
Government Role in Providing Financial Aid For Hospital Construction
Since 1946," Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science (January 1951) p. 35. Members of the Commission
were: Thomas S. Gates of the University of Pennsylvania, chairman;
vice-chair, Edward L. Ryerson, chairman of the board of Inland
Steel co.; Sarah Gibson Blanding, president of Vassar College;
Katharine J. Densford, R.N., Director of the School of Nursing,
University of Minnesota; Albert W. Dent, president of Dillard
University; Joseph W. Fichter, Master of Ohio State Grange;
Clinton s. Golden, assistant to the president, United Steelworkers
of America; Evarts A. Graham, chairman, Department of Surgery,
Washington University School of Medicine; Wilton L. Halverson, M.
D., Director of Public Health, State of California; Herbert
Hoover, trustee, Stanford University; Charles F. Kettering, vice
president and director, GMC; Ada Belle Mc Cleery, R.N., former
administrator of Evanston Hospital, Evanston, Ill; James Alexander
Miller, M.D., professor of Clinical Medicine, Columbia University;
Leroy M.S. Miner, M.D., D.M.D., former dean, School of Dentistry,
Harvard College; Claude W. Munger, M.D., director, St. Luke's
Hospital, New York City; Rt. Rev. Msgr. Thomas O'Dwyer, director
of Catholic Charities and Hospitals, Archdiocese of Los Angeles;
William F. Ogburn, Ph. D., chairman, Department of Sociology,
University of Chicago; Clarence Poe, editor,Progressive Farmer;
Willard c. Rappleye, M.D., dean, College of Physicians, Columbia
University; J. Barrye Wall, editor, Farmville Herald (VA), president,
Southside Community Hospital; Frank J. Walter, administrator,
Good Samaritan Hospital (Portland, OR); Matthew Woll, vice president,
American Federation of Labor.
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set the tone for subsequent legislative developments.
The Commission analyzed the status of American hospitals
from a variety of perspectives, and the Commission's membership
reflected this diversity.

The Commission was composed of twenty

experts representing the fields of hospital administration,
medicine, nursing, farming and labor, the general public, and
included a professional support staff .5
The primary focus of the study was the evaluation of the
nation's hospitals at that time, and the recommendation of
reforms.

It was decided that a census of hospitals and public

health facilities was necessary, in order to evaluate their
condition.

Criteria for evaluating the condition of and need for

hospitals were also developed.

A national hospital plan was

devised, along with strategies to implement that plan.

A review

of historical and more recent trends in hospital development, as
well as a survey of administrative procedures, was included as
well.6
The Commission on Hospital Care concluded that there were
serious shortcomings with respect to the availability and quality
of American hospitals.

The study revealed that some hospitals

were in poor condition, and that there was a general shortage of
beds, particularly in rural areas.

To remedy these problems, the

Commission recommended the initiation of a federal hospital
construction program, and the development of regional hospital
5 Hoge, p. 36.
6commission on Hospital Care, p. 5.
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plans, within which hospitals would be constructed.7

The

continuation of need surveys by the individual states was
considered a means by which more accurate assessments could be
made.

Stimulating local, public support for this planning

process was considered essential.a

This was a tacit

acknowledgement that, no matter how well planned whatever kind of
system emerged would be dependent upon public support if it was
to have a chance of being truly successful.

State and Local Government Hospital Sector Activity

· During the 1930's state and local governments became active
in the medical facility sector of the health care industry.
Activity at the state level consisted largely of providing funds
for facility construction while localities, especially municipalities, experimented with hospital planning.
Although there was little, if any, conformity among state
agencies with respect to administrative responsibility for
dispensing construction assistance, ·funds were made available.
Often, states assigned responsibility for dispensing construction
aid according to the types of facilities that existed.

For

instance, most states placed tuberculosis hospitals under the
jurisdiction of state health departments, although Indiana
assigned this responsibility to its welfare department and,
7Hoge, p. 36.
8commission on Hospital Care, p. 6.
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Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, Michigan, Louisiana, and
New Hampshire created special commissions to oversee these
facilities.9

The scope of duties assumed by these bodies ranged

from regulation to the direct operation of facilities.lo
There was also inconsistency among states with respect to
the manner in which state funds were allocated to health care
facilities.

In some cases, state legislatures made direct grants

to hospitals, while other states funneled funds to facilities
through local health or welfare departments.

Hospital

construction assistance represented the largest portion of state
aid for health activities. over eighty percent of the funds for
health activities came from state sources.11
While state level activity in the hospital industry was
largely confined to the distribution of funds, local, and
especially, municipal governments, took the lead in hospital
w.

planning.

Indeed, local planning efforts have their origin in

the early 1930 1 s.12

Nationally, county governments contributed

operating and construction assistance amounting to ninety-eight
cents per capita in 1943.

Large cities subsidized patient care

9Joseph Mountin and Evelyn Flook, "Distribution of Health
Services in the structure of State Government," Public Health
Bulletin, 3d ed., no. 184, (Washington, D. c. : Government
Printing Office, 1943), pp. 7-12.
lOcommission on Hospital Care, p. 557.
llcommission on Hospital Care, pp. 557-558.
12u. s. Department of Health and Human Services, Health
Resources an Services Administration, Bureau of Resources Development,
Office of Health Planning, The Changing Role of Health Planning,
(Washington, D. c. : Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 10.

9

in voluntary, non-profit hospitals, with particular emphasis on
providing funds for patients requiring specialized care.13
Cities also created voluntary, city-wide hospital councils to
improve hospital care.

While successful on some fronts, these

local planning efforts had their shortcomings.

city-wide

hospital councils improved communication between hospitals but,
they were not very effective at assuring high quality of care, or
at attaining their planning goals.14

Nonetheless, it was at the

local level of government that the first efforts at health
facility planning occurred.

National Hospital Policy Activity Prior to World War II

Although the impetus for the health facility planning
movement occurred at the local level of government prior to World
War II, the federal government also played a role in medical
facility industry.

This role had consisted primarily of the

provision of construction and operating assistance funds.

The

level of federal assistance during the pre-war period tended to
ebb and flow with the level of economic prosperity of the times.
During the first two and a half decades of this century, the
number of hospitals grew considerably,as a result of rapid

13cornrnission on Hospital Care, p. 563.
14paul L. Joskow, Controlling Hospital Costs: The Role of
Government Intervention (Cambridge: MIT, 1981), p. 77.
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advances in modern medicine and general economic prosperity.15
From 1909-1941 the number of all types of hospitals increased 45
percent, while the number of beds increased 300 percent. The
marked increase in the supply of beds was due to additions to
existing facilities, and to the fact that most of the newer
facilities were larger than those that existed previously.16
However, a closer examination of the evidence indicates that
these increases were not constant through this period.

The

number of public-sector hospital beds increased seventy percent
over the period 1928-1941, while there was only a slight increase
in the number of beds in private, non-profit hospitals. There was
even a slight decrease in the number of beds in private,forprofit(propriety) hospitals.17

In fact, from 1929-1937 over 700

hospitals were forced to close their doors, largely due to a
shortage of funds during the Depression,and to problems of
duplication and poor distribution of facilities and services.18
Thus, the Depression had a considerable negative impact on
hospitals overall.
That negative impact is also reflected in the levels of
federal aid that were available to hospitals during this period.
Prior to the onset of the Depression, federal aid was on the
rise.

From 1923-1928,total federal contributions to all types
15commission on Hospital Care, p. 63.
16commission on Hospital Care, p. 2.
17commission on Hospital Care, p. 55.
18Hoge, p.34.
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of hospitals averaged $200 million per year. By 1930, however,
that average fell to $132.5 million.

And, the total amount of

federal aid for the period 1929-1933 was only $450 million.19
Congressional appropriations for hospitals during this period
tended to be directed toward specific facilities or specific
types of facilities.

For instance, Congress appropriated $10

million in 1925 for Veterans' hospitals,20 and another $25
million in 1931 for Veterans' hospitals.21
Even though federal aid to hospitals during the Depression
experienced a general decline, aid to non-profit hospitals
actually increased.

Under the auspices of the Public Works

Agency, Works Progress Administration, and the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation, the federal government made loans for the
construction of new hospitals, and for additions and renovations
to existing facilities.22

Most of this aid resulted in the

enlargement of existing facilities.23

Thus there appears to have

been a bias in the distribution of federal aid during this period
toward existing, voluntary, non-profit hospitals.

Voluntary,

19u.s. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical
Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, pt. 2,
Series N-60 (Washington, D.C.: U. s. Department of Commerce), p.
621.
20(P. L. 68-587) statutes at Large, vol. 43, 2nd sess., ch.
469, pp. 1212-1213, (1925).
21(P. L. 72-361) Statutes at Large, vol. 49, pt. 1, 3d
sess., p. 1551, (1931).
22commission on Hospital Care, p. 530.
23Hoge, p. 35.
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non-profit hospitals were largely dependent upon private
contributions, and were therefore viewed in a more benevolent
light than public or proprietary hospitals.

National Hospital Policy Developments During the War Years

Concern in the federal government about hospital care in the
United States began to mount during the late 1930's and early
1940's. It was during this period that federal involvement began
to overshadow state and local medical facility planning efforts.
Among the first concrete examples of this concern at the federal
level is a message to the Congress from President Roosevelt in
January 1940.
There is still need for the Federal Government to
participate in strengthening and increasing the health
security of the Nation •.• I now propose for the consideration of the Congress a program for the construction of
small hospitals in needy areas of the country,especially in
rural areas of the country not now provided with them.
The provision of hospitals in the areas to which I refer
will greatly improve existing health services, attract
competent doctors, and raise the standards of medical care
in these communities ••• These hospitals should only be
built where most needed; in the poorest communities which
cannot afford to maintain their own. The operation of these
hospitals should be a local responsibility with the Federal
Government holding the title. Treatment is to be made
available to those unable to contribute to their own
expenses.24

2 4 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President of the United States,
"Message From the President of the United States Transmitting
Recommendations For Enabling Legislation and an Appropriation For
the Public Health Service," H. Doc. No. 604, 76th Congress, 3d
sess., 30 January 1940.
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Although the bill that was under consideration at the time of
this message was not enacted, this message laid important
conceptual and ideological groundwork for future federal legislation.

As shall be seen shortly, many of the ideas expressed in

this communication, such as the emphasis on hospitals for poor,
rural areas, would be incorporated into later legislation.

The

list of witnesses appearing before a subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Education and Labor attests to its wide appeal.
Among those appearing before the subcommittee, or submitting
documents in support of this bill were representatives of the
various hospital associations, the National Education
Association, and federal and state health officials.25
The onset of World War II prompted the passage of an act
which, although not focused on hospital services, did contain a
provision related to the enhancement of hospitals in the u. s.
Title II of the amendments to the Lanham Housing Act (P.L. 77137) provided for the construction of hospitals, as well as
other community projects in those areas where the population was
growing substantially during the war, as a result of population
25u.s. Senate, Subcommittee of Committee on Education and
Labor, 76th Congress,3rd, Hearings on A bill to promote national
health and welfare through appropriation of funds for construction
of hospitals. March 18-19, 1940 (Washington, D.C.: Governemnt
Printing Office, 1940) III-IV. Some of the witnesses appearing
before the subcommittee were Dr. Reginald M. Atwater, secretary
of the American Public Health Association; Dora Barney, Director
of Education, Oklahoma Farmers Union; Nelson H. Cruikshank, American
Federation of Labor; D. K. Este Fisher, Jr., American Institute
of Architects, Dr. George s. Stevenson, National Commission on
Mental Hygiene; Dr. Thomas Parran, Surgeon General of the United
States; Dr. Victor Johnson, secretary, Council on Medical Education
and Hospitals, AMA.
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relocation efforts.26

In this instance, then, hospital care was

not only linked with the betterment of health for the medically
needy, but also with national defense.
The federal government played the major role in financing
and administering P.L. 77-137 .

Administered by the Federal

Works Agency (FWA), the program required applicants for
assistance

(governmental or nongovernmental entities) to submit

applications to the FWA. Upon receipt of an application, the FWA
requested the Public Health Service to conduct a need study in
the area to be served.

The need criteria were based on the

occupancy rate and the additional usable beds that were available
in general and special (disease or condition-specific) hospitals.
Final authority for the approval of requests was vested in the
Executive Office of the President.27
The federal government not only assumed administrative
responsibility for Title III of the Lanham Housing Act, but most
of the financial burden as well.

The federal government assumed

100 percent of the construction costs for federally-owned
projects, while the hospital title was vested in the federal
government, and leased to the applicant.

Non-federally-owned

projects were eligible to receive up to seventy-five percent of
their construction costs from grants or loans made under

26Lanham Hous ing Act Amendments,(P. L. 77-137) Statutes at
Large, vol. 55, Title II, p . 363 (1941).
27commission on Hospital Care, p. 534.
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amendments to the Lanham Housing Act.28
While assistance for the construction of hospitals was but
one of the provisions of the Lanham Act, it had considerable
impact on the hospital supply. From June 1941 when the law was
enacted, through June 30, 1945, 810 hospitals were substantially
or entirely completed. Total expenditures for these hospitals
amounted to $118,063,638, of which the federal government
contributed

$91,327,540.

virtually completed.29

By July 1, 1946, 851 hospitals were

These figures indicate that while federal

assistance languished under fiscal constraints during the
Depression, the advent of World War II helped to spur significant
federal activity in this area.
The Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946
At the end of World War II, the nation was able to devote
more of its energy to domestic concerns.

While the hospital

construction that had been undertaken pursuant to the Lanham Act
had resulted in some improvements in the supply of hospitals, it
had become evident that still more needed to be done.

Thus, the

movement for a hospital reconstruction program was rekindled.
Legislation was introduced in Congress in 1946, to address
this very issue.

There seems to have been a connection between

the Commission on Hospital care study and the introduction of
national hospital construction legislation.

Although this

28commission on Hospital Care, p. 535.
29commission on Hospital Care, pp. 534-535.
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legislation was introduced after the Commission had completed its
report, the Commission attempted to anticipate federal
requirements, sensing that federal legislation would be
forthcoming. 30
The Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946 (HillBurton Act) established a federal-state partnership as a means
of assisting states in determining their hospital needs, and in
providing assistance toward addressing those needs.

States were

required to devise a comprehensive hospital plan to be approved
by the U.S. Surgeon General, who,in conjunction with a National
Advisory Committee, was responsible for devising a national
hospital plan.

Congress, in 1946, appropriated three million

dollars in federal grants to fund the state surveys, to be
allocated among the states according to a state's population. 31
Factors that were often considered when determining the
suitability of existing facilities included obsolescence,
improper design, fire and health hazards.32

Once these surveys

were conducted and the plans approved, states became eligible to
apply for construction assistance.
The initial federal hospital construction appropriations
were considerable.

Congress appropriated seventy-five million

dollars for each of the first five years of the program.

The

federal assistance was apportioned so that the neediest areas
30commission on Hospital Care, p. 12.
31Hoge, p. 37.
32 Hoge, p. 39.
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received the greatest amount of money.

The amount of money that

each state received was determined by utilizing a weighted
formula that took into account population and per capita
income.33
The U.S. Surgeon General of the Public Health Service
developed a set of criteria for determining

11

need 11 •

This formula

was based on five-year population projections, current
utilization and occupancy rates, and a predetermined standard of
bed adequacy.

Researchers generally established a figure of

approximately four beds per 1,000 population as being adequate.34
Congress hoped that this formula would ensure that the largest
amounts of construction funds would be channeled to areas where
the need was greatest.
The federal government stipulated that funding priority was
to be given to poor, rural areas, where the need was perceived to
have been the greatest.

Along with improving the distribution of

hospital facilities, Congress hoped that the new facilities would
help attract physicians to these underserved areas.35
The Hill-Burton Act enjoyed wide, bipartisan support in
Congress.

The initial proposal for a hospital construction came

from President Truman as part of a five-point national health
33paul A. Brinker and Burley Walker, The Hill-Burton Act
1948-1954, 11 Review of Economics and Statistics 44 {May 1962), p.
208.
34Hoge, p. 37.
35Judith Lave and Lester Lave, The Hospital Construction
Act: An Evaluation of Hill-Burton Programs: 1948-1973
(Washington,
o. c. : American Enterprise Institute, 1974), p. 10.
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program that he transmitted to Congress on November 19, 1945. 3 6
As was the case with the hospital construction legislation
originally proposed by President Roosevelt in 1940, the list of
witnesses appearing before the Senate Education and Labor
Committee reveals a similarly wide base of support.
support, while widespread, was not universal.

This

There was a great

deal of concern expressed during the hearings about the powers of
the surgeon General and the Federal Advisory council.

The size

of federal expenditures was also worrisome to members of
Congress.37

In general, the fear seems to have been that the

federal government would dominate what was to have been a
federal-state partnership.
With the passage of the Hill-Burton Act, the nation embarked
on a new era in health care policy.
been dispensed before.

Federal aid to hospitals had

However, the Hill-Burton Act represented

the first attempt to create a coordinated, national hospital
plan.38
over the next eighteen ye ars, from 1946-1964, a number of
amendments were made to the Hill-Burton Act.

Most of these

36congressional Quarterly (2) 4 (October-December 1946),
(Washington, o. c. : Congressional Quarterly, Inc.), p. 658
37u.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on Eduction and Labor,
Hearing: A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to authorize
grants to the states for surveying their hospitals and public
health centers, and for planning construction of additional
facilities, and to authorize grants to assist in such construction.
Feb. 26, 27, 28, and Mar. 12, 13, 14, 1945. 79th Cong., 1st sess.
,p. 21.
38Grace Budrys, Planning For the Nation's Health (New York:
Greenwood Press, 1986) p.14.
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amendments expanded the scope of the program.

In 1954, the Act

was broadened to include outpatient diagnostic and treatment
centers, chronic and long-term care facilities, and
rehabilitation centers.39

An amendment enacted in 1964

prohibited funds from going to areas where the bed supply equaled
or exceeded those which were needed, as determined by the Public
Health Service formula.

The 1964 amendment also permitted funds

to be used specifically for facility modernization, in some
cases. 40

This was an effort to allow greater flexibility in the

allocation of Hill-Burton funds, so as to reflect changes in the
nature of patient care.

Impact of the Hill-Burton Act

The Hill-Burton Act had a substantial impact on the
provisionof medical services in this country, although the nature
of these effects tended to change over time.

Initially, general

hospitals accounted for seventy-five percent of the Hill-Burton
assistance applications, while public health centers claimed
sixteen percent, and chronic disease centers accounted for less
than one percent.41

By 1971, however, this relationship had

39Medical Facilities Survey and Construction Act of 1954,
(P. L. 83-482) Statutes at Large, vol. 68, secs. 641-654, p. 461,
(1954).
40Hospitals and Medical Facilities Amendments of 1964,
(P. L. 88-443) Statutes at Large, vol. 78, sec. 602, p. 448 (1964).
41H oge, p. 37.
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changed. General hospitals' share of the total percentage of
projects had fallen to almost fifty-four percent; although the
proportion of Hill-Burton funds devoted to projects in this
category (70.9 percent) was still quite high (see Figure 1.1).42
These figures suggest that, while the reduction i n the number of
general hospital projects was considerable, the dollar value of
those projects was still much greater than the dollar value of
projects for other facilities.

This may have been due to the

technologically sophisticated equipment found in g e neral hospital
facilities,

as compared to other types of facilities.

The Hill-Burton Act was definitely a factor in the general
increase in the number of hospital beds in this country.
Brinkley and Walker observed that, by 1954, the total number of
hospital beds had i ncreased to such an extent that the "percent
of need met" ratio

had increased considerably.43

This rati o

represents the total number of acceptable beds in existence
divided by the total bed need, as determined by need surveys.
The 388,144 beds in existence in 1948 represented fifty-nine
percent of the total bed need.

By 1954, however, the total

number of acceptable beds had risen to 515, 934, which
represented seventy-three percent of the total bed need.44
However not all of this increase was directly a ttributable
to the Hill-Burton Act.

During this period, Hill-Burton funds

42Lave and Lave, p. 14.
43Brinker and Walker, p. 210.
44Brinker and Walker, p. 211.
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accounted for twenty-three percent of the total value of all nonfederally-owned medical facility construction projects.
and Walker felt

Brinkley

that " •.• it would be proper to conclude ..• that

Hill-Burton money was an aid in the construction of more hospital
facilities, and that such aid was partially instrumental in
providing for a more adequate hospital system in 1954 than we had
in 1948.1145

Thus, while the Hill- Burton Act did not contribute

a majority of the hospital funds from 1948-1954, federal
contributions still represented a substantial portion of hospital
construction funds.
Conclusions reached by observers of the hospital scene
during the early 1970's also suggested that the Hill-Burton funds
had a considerable impact on health facility construction.

By

1971, 10, 748 total projects, valued at $3.7 billion, had been
approved

(See Tables 1.1

and 1.2).

While the initial emphasis

had been on the construction of hospitals, the late 1960's saw
greater emphasis on long-term care facilities, mental hospitals,
and rehabilitation facilities. There was also a shift away from
the construction of new facilities toward the modernization and
renovation of existing facilities.46

These findings are further

evidence of the flexibility of the Hill-Burton program.
It will be recalled that another of the Hill-Burton Act's
original goals was to focus on hospital and health facility needs
in poor, rural areas.

This goal appears to have been adhered to

45srinker and Walker, p. 211.
46Lave and Lave, pp. 13-14.
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_HILL~BURTON
PROJECTS
APPROVED, BY . TYPE, 1 JULY 1947-30 JUNE 1971
.
.
.

Total Projects
Number Pe rcent

· Outpatient and
Inpatient Care Other Health-Care
Beds Provided Facility Projects
Number Percent Number Percent

Type of Facility

10,748
Short-term hospitals
5,787
Long-term .care
1,]'.33
u·nits. i.ri hospitals
1,097.
Nursi ng homes
528
Chronic disea.se hospitals
1.08
Mental hospitals
198
Tube rcu losis ho~pitals
78
,Outpatient .f~cili ties c
1,078
.Rehabilitati on facilities
552
Public health centers
1,281
State health l aboratories
41
Total
..

100.0
-

53.8
16.1
10.2·
. .4.9
1.0
1.8
.7
10.0
5.1
11.9
.4

470,329
100.0
-73.2
344,453
97,358 b 20.7
11 .1
51 ,98~
37,884
.8.1
7,491
1.6
21,034
4.5
7,484
1.6

-

-

-

3,083
131

-

-

-

1,078
552
1,281
41

a

100.0
4.2

-

-

-

-

35.0
17.9
41.6
1.3

Cost
Hill-Burton funds
Total
($ thousands)

12,765,900
9,322,392
·1,s13,000
904,409
511;051
138,342
246,734
75,228
798,952
440,019
28~.649
69., 718

.Pe rcent
A mount
($ thousands)

3,717,979
2,635,494
523,111
312,499
171,648
38,964
78,493
?7,661
204,083
·135,010
99,689
14,438

.100.0
-70.9
14.1
8.4
4.6
1.0
2.1
.7
5.6
3.6
2.7
.4

•Public health centers built in combination with short-term hosplt_
als and not rep_orted as separate. projects.
Excludes 7,209 long-term care beds built in conjunction with · short-term and other hospital ..·projects, tor whi ch funds cannot be
separated from ·total project costs. Th·ese beds are reporte('I . in the following catego ries of facilitie~: general hospitals:--7, 113 beds,
.
mental hospitals-..60 beds, tuberculosis hospitals-36 beds.
c F!rEJ'(iously ·des.ignated "dia gn os~ i c or treatment centers." ·
~~.S~ Department of Health, Education and Welfare, HU/-$urton P;oject Register (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing
~72),p.. 2
.
b

Table

t.:2

HILL-BURTON AS A SOURCE OF CONSTRUCTION
FUNDS, SELECTED )'EARS, 1949-:-70
Medical Facility
Construction

Hospital Construction

Year

1949
1953
1957
1960
1962
1966
1968
1969
1970

% of total
financed by
Hill-Burton
grants

% of
Hill-Burton
pcojects
financed
under
Hill-Burton
program

679
686
879
1,005
1,322

6.0
10.6
8.9
15.5
13.9

18.2
26.5
28.8.
47.2
38.6.

1, 101
1,250

"14.5
14.7

Total
cost
($ millions)

Total
cost .
($ millions)

1,382
1,960
2,260
3,056
3,420

% supported ·
by
Hill-Burton
grants

12.4
8.5
11.4
7.2 .
5.6

Source: Hospitals data for 1949-62 from U.S. pepartment of Health, Education and
Welfare, Trends (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 35;
data for 1968 from R. Foster and 0. McNeil, "How Hospitals Finance Construction,"
Hospitals, Journal of the American Hospital Association, vol. 45 (July 1, 1971),
p. 47, and for 1969 from "AHA · Research Capsules No. 5," Hospitals, vol. 46
(March 1, 1972). The data for 1968 and 1969 were obtained from a survey of
hospitals and underestimate the total value of hospital construction. The researchers
asked for percent of total construction costs covered by federal grants, not
necessarily Hill-Burton grants. The Hill-Burton grants program is, however, by far
the most important federal grant program.
Medical facilities data.were obtained directly from the Hill-Burton agency.

Taken from: Judith Lave and Lester Lave, The Hos1ital Constru
Act: .An Evaluation of the Hill-Burton Pro ram:
948-1973
Washington, D.·c.: AEI , 197 4 ,p. 1 •
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The Compr ehensive Health Planning Act of 1966 .

Further impetus was given to the movement toward the
expansion of local health planning efforts in 1966.

This

movement was motivated, not only by concern about the provision
of hospital services specifically, but also the improvement of
health services general ly.

Greater emphasis was placed on the

need for a more centralized approach to health planning, in the
wake of the rapid escalation of public-sector health care costs.
Thus the Comprehensive Health Planning Act of 1966 (CHP) (P.L.
89-749), was passed as an amendment to the Public Health Service
Act.

Also passed at about the same time was the Heart Disease,

Cancer, and Stroke Act (P.L. 89-239).

The passage of P.L. 89-

239 was prompted by recommendations of the President's Commission
on Heart Disease, Cancer and Stroke.

This Commission advocated

the regionalization of medical services in an effort to combat
these and other diseases.

Each region was to be centered around

a major university medical facility, which was to serve as the
regional focal point for medical research and care.

Fifty-six

regions were created nationwide, and were sponsored by university
institutions, non-profit organizations, and me dical societies . 51
However this program was largely overshadowed by the CHP .
The primary intent of the CHP was to deve lop local health
planning programs according to local and regional needs, subject

51sudrys, pp. 16-17.
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to federal approval. 52

By passing this law, Congress hoped to

address some of what it perceived to be inadequacies, such as
lack of comprehensive health services coordination, and poor
intergovernmental

cooperation.

To that end, the Act provided

for the establishment of a system of regional areawide planning
agencies, statewide agencies, and a national advisory counci1.53
The decision to create areawide agencies that did not conform to
existing political boundaries was an acknowledgement that health
related problems did not conform to political boundaries.54
The areawide planning agencies were intended to be
independent of other local political institutions.

They were

essentially independent, non-profit corporations, which were
largely dependent upon federal funding.

The areawide agencies

received at least one-third but not more than two-thirds of their
funding from the federal government, depending upon the area's
per capita income.55

The rest of the money came from local

sources, often hospitals themselves. 56
52 West Publishing co., U.S. Comprehensive Health Planning
and Public Health Service Amendments of 1966,U.S. Congressional
and Administrative News, 89th Congress, 2nd session, vol. 3, p.
3832.
5342 u.s.c.A. sec. 246.
54west Publishing co., Comprehensive Health Planninq and
Public Health Service Amendments of 1966,p. 3833.
55 Arthur Jacobs and Richard Froh, "Significance of PL 89749 and Comprehensive Planning," New England Journal of Medicine
279 (12 December 1968) p. 1315.
56Budrys, pp. 52-53.
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During the early years of the CHP program,lawmakers and
health officials paid a great deal of attention to the
composition of the state and areawide policy-making boards.
Budrys asserts that the social agitation for greater political
participation during the late 1960's was a factor in the
stipulation that consumers be represented on the areawide
councils.57

Lewi observed that lawmakers made a conscious effort

during the 1960's to include ordinary citizens and the poor in
the political process.SS While there were concerns that consumers
might be intimidated by providers, due to consumers' lack of
expertise, there were also fears that health care professionals
might feel threatened by apparent challenges to their expertise
and interests.59

In spite of these concerns, however, there

appears to have been a conscious effort by Congress to create a
planning system based on group participation as part of a larger
political movement to expand participation in the political
process.
Before long, interagency conflicts surfaced at the state and
local levels of government, involving the areawide agencies.

In

many states, planning under the CHP was subordinate to the state
health department's overall planning agenda.

Other states placed

57Budrys, pp. 52-53.
58Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York:
Norton and Co., 1969), p. 69.

W. W.

59william Curran, "Present at the Creation: Health Planning
and the Inevitable Reorganization," Health Care Management (1) 1
January 1976), p. 35.
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CHP responsibility within the domain of comprehensive state
planning agencies.

Disputes often arose between state health

departments and the planning bodies.60
While state and local government relations were, at times,
tense, the federal government also added to the confusion.

Under

the CHP, federal authorities were inclined to place greater
emphasis on the needs of metropolitan areas, so as to maximize
the impact of its support.

However metropolitan areas frequently

experienced difficulty in organizing their local planning
efforts, and in raising the necessary share of local funds. This
difficulty may be attributed to a lack of commitment to health
planning among various groups, especially in light of vague goals
and limited federal funding.61

Impact of the Comprehensive Health Plan on Hospitals
In addition to the problems noted above, there were a number
of other factors that combined to mitigate the impact of the CHP
on hospital planning and regulation. Vague federal guidelines
hampered the efforts of the areawide agencies.

Indeed, federal

officials of the Bureau of the Budget and the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare still did not feel that the states
and localities had the capacity to plan effectively; a fact which
60curran, pp. 36.
61symond R. Gottlieb, "A Brief History of Health Planning
in the United states" in Regulating Health Facilities Construction,
Clark c. Havighurst, ed. (Washington, D.C. : American Enterprise
Institute, 1974), p. 21.
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resulted in the stipulation that these agencies be established on
a voluntary basis, and that their approval of projects was not
mandatory.62

This weakened the areawide agencies' authority

considerably.

That lawmakers and health officials focused much

of their attention on the structural aspects of the CHP program
diverted attention away from the specification of health planning
activities and goals.63
Relations between health facilities and the area CHP
agencies were often close.

However, the areawide agencies'

control over the supply and distribution of health facilities was
essentially limited to the allocation of Hill-Burton funds to
applicants.

It will also be recalled that these agencies were

partially dependent upon local funding sources, many of whom were
hospitals.

This dependency provided a major justification for

health facilities to strengthen ties with the area CHP agencies.
Additional factors that diluted the impact of this law were the
dominance of providers on the planning boards, and the absence of
sanctions against those who violated

areawide health planning

decisions.64
While it would be tempting to conclude that the
Comprehensive Health Planning Act of 1966 was largely
ineffectual, certain factors should be borne in mind.

In

addition to poorly articulated federal guidelines, a frequent
62curran, p. 34.
63Gottlieb, p. 19.
64Joskow, p. 78.
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criticism was that federal funding for the area and statewide
agencies was woefully inadequate, given the enormity of the
task. 65

That there was little federal interest in area health

planning efforts also hindered the CHP.66

Finally, it should be

realized that the CHP was not intended to supplant existing
planning efforts, such as the Hill-Burton program.

Rather, it

was to provide a means for the imposition of order in the
provision of health care services.67

Thus, the focus of this

legislation was still on the provision of adequate health
services for as great a number of people as possible.
However the rapid escalation of public outlays for health
care toward the end of the 1960's raised the issue of health care
cost control.

The growing concern over health expenditures,

especially incurred under the Medicaid and Medicare programs,
provided the impetus for the passage of the Social Security Act
of 1972 {PL 92-603).68

Of particular relevance to the hospital

sector was section 1122 of this act.

This legislation provided

for an optional mechanism for the review of hospital capital
expenditures, under the belief that unnecessary capital
expenditures were at least partly to blame for the rapid rise in
medical costs.

Those services not receiving prior approval from

65curran, p. 35
66Joskow, p. 78.
67Budrys, p. 18.
68social security Act of 1972,(P. L. 92-603) Statutes at

Large vol. 86, Title III, p. 1386 (1972).
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area and statewide health planning agencies were denied capital
cost reimbursement for services rendered under the auspices of
the Medicare, Medicaid, and Maternal and Child Health programs.69
States were still not required to adopt section 1122.
By the late 1960's a relatively new regulatory and planning
scheme was emerging at the state level that would ultimately
influence national health care cost control efforts - especially
hospital costs.

This new regulatory scheme came to be known as

the certificate of need.

By the early 1970's fifteen states had

already enacted their own certificate of need statutes. 7 0

Discussion of Certificate of Need
General nature and scope
Certificate of need (CON) is a mechanism by which
government may control the supply, cost, quality, and
distribution of health facilities, their services and equipment.
Such control is maintained by requiring prior approval from a
regulatory/planning agency for any construction of new
facilities, modifications to existing facilities, purchases of
equipment, or addition of new services,the cost of which exceeds
a statutorily prescribed threshold, or expands the bed capacity
of existing facilities beyond a threshold.
69social security Act of 1972, sec.282,

Those projects that
PP· 1386-1388.

70chayet and Sonnereich, P.C., Certificate of Need: An
Expanding Regulatory concept (Washington, D. c. : Medicine in
the Public Interest, 1978), p. 5.
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do not meet or exceed the statutory threshold are not required to
undergo review.

CON is a regulatory mechanism with which health

officials strive to achieve health planning goals.
All of this is not to say that a great deal of uniformity
has existed among the various state CON programs.

Initially, CON

laws applied to hospitals, nursing homes, diagnostic
laboratories, and outpatient clinics.71

However the breadth of

coverage generally expanded over time, covering a wider range of
facilities.
Since these CON reviews are regulatory in nature, and occur
in a planning setting, the process is one in which various groups
have a voice in the approval and disapproval of projects.72
As shall be seen shortly, this fact forms the basis for one of
the central criticisms of the CON process.
Theoretical perspectives

At the heart of the debate over the merits of the
certificate of need process is the question of whether health
care resources would be most equitably, efficiently, and
inexpensively allocated in a market setting, or in the
regulatory/planning arena.

In a free-market setting, consumers

would be able to choose from among various providers and
71oavid s. Salkever and Tim w. Bice, Hospital Certificateof Need Controls: Impact on Investment, Cost and Use (Washington,
D. c. : American Enterprise Institute, 1978), p. 5.
72salkever and Bice, p. 5.
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services, based on their individual needs and resources.

In a

regulatory or planning setting, individual choice is reduced, as
the regulatory or planning process becomes the arbiter for
reconciling the differences between competing interests.
Proponents of the certificate of need process argue that,
unlike many goods and services, medical services do not respond
to traditional market forces.

The existence of substantial

third-party payment systems, which rest on cost-based
reimbursement is said to insulate hospitals and health facilities
from the consequences of inefficient, uneconomical, or
ineffectual investment decisions.73

It has also been postulated

that the mere existence of hospital beds and sophisticated
technology generates its own demand - the so-called "Roemer
effect. 11 74

In their attempts to lure physicians' services,

hospitals have become overly concerned with facility size and the
acquisition of extravagant services and equipment. 7 5

This

insulation of hospitals and health facilities from market forces
provides the principal rationale for certificate of need
programs.

If, through certificate of need, medical facility

resource expansion can be controlled, then government officials
would be able to check the unwarranted growth of facility
73clark c. Havighurst, Deregulating the Health Care Industry, Planning for Competition (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Co.,
1982), p. 54.
74c1ark c. Havighurst, "Regulation of Health Facilities and
Services By Certificate of Need," Virginia Law Review 59 (October
1973), pp. 1158-1159.
7 5Havighurst, "Regulation of Health Facilities," p. 1162.
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resources, and thereby exert some measure of control on medical
facility care costs.
Advocates of CON hope that certificate of need programs
will address these deficiencies.

By placing the authority for

the location of health facilities and services within the public
policy arena, health care providers should become more sensitive
to consumers' needs, and the needs of the community as a whole.
Regulatory control over the supply of facilities and services may
result in the more efficient use of existing facilities, by
rationing them to the neediest patients, and providing incentives
for other consumers to utilize less expensive alternatives.76
Even opponents of the CON process concede that resources would be
diverted away from poorly conceived, or unnecessary plans.77

In

essence, then, proponents of CON regulation and planning argue
that the political arena will allocate health facilities and
services more efficiently and equitably than an unfettered free
market.
However, it is the political nature of the CON process that
its opponents find most disturbing.

There is an implicit

assumption in the arguments for certificate of need that the
political arena will gravitate toward optimal solutions.
However, dominance by health care providers, and the incremental
nature of the political bargaining process would supposedly
result in the maintenance of the status quo; or at best,
76salkever and Bice, pp. 11-13.
77 Havighurst,"Regulation of Health Facilities," p. 1221.
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incremental changes.78
An even more fundamental criticism of the CON process is
that it combines two mutually incompatible tasks - planning and
regulating.

Planning is said to require the "authoritative use

of authority, law, choice, priorities, and moralities 11 ,79 while
"regulation is a political process involving political actors
seeking political ends. 11 80

If CON agencies become dominated by

health care providers, they may become overly concerned with the
welfare of existing providers, or "captured 11 .8l

If this were to

occur, new providers could experience difficulty in entering the
market, and regulators/planners may lose sight o f the public
interest.
In addition to concerns about the political rami f ications of
the CON proces s, there are also concerns about the costs that
this mechanism imposes.

Perhaps the most obvious cost is that

which is incurred in the administration of the program.

Project

delays resulting from the various stages of the CON process are
said to inhibit the rate of technological innovation, and the
responsiveness of providers to changes in market forces will be
reducea.82

These arguments depict a cumbersome, stifling,and

78Havighurst, 11 Regulation of Health Facilities," p. 1215.
1198.

79Havighurst, "Regulation of Health Facilities,"

pp. 1197-

80Kenneth J. Meier, Regulation: Politics, Bureaucracy, and
Economics (New York: St. Martin's, 1985), p. B.
8 lsalkever and Bice, pp. 14-15.
82Havighurst,"Regulation of Health Facilities," pp. 1221-1225.
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sluggish process whose potential for rationalizing the health
care industry would seem to be outweighed by inhibitive effects
on health care.

However, as shall be seen below, certificate of

need did indeed become a part of the public health policy fabric
of this country.
Emergence of Certificate of Need
The emergence of the certificate of need was not the result
of a momentous piece of federal legislation.

Instead, it was the

product of a movement at the state level in the late 1950's
toward health planning with regulatory sanctions.

The

culmination of this early movement was the passage of the
Mccloskey-Metcalf Act of 1964 by the New York legislature.

This

law required mandatory certificate of need approval prior to any
new construction, renovation, or modifications to new or existing
hospitals or nursing homes.

In making decisions on CON

applications, the Health Commissioner was to consider the
availability of alternatives, the possibility of joint ventures,
and existing utilization rates.83
At its inception, certificate of need was warmly received
by medical and political leaders.

Regulating hospitals and

health facilities was regarded as a stabilizing influence, and a
means of assuring the orderly development of physical plants and

83Edward H. Forgotson, "1965: the Turning Point in Public
Health Law," American Journal of Public Health 57( June 1967) p.
942.

35
equipment.84

Certificate of need was also regarded as a radical

departure from prior concepts related to the organization and
regulation of health services,85 since many governmental
interventions in health care were organized to combat specific
diseases or conditions.
Certificate of need gathered momentum during the late
1960's.

In 1968 and 1969 Connecticut, Rhode Island, California,

and Maryland also enacted CON statutes.86

The spread of the

certificate of need concept was largely due to increasing concern
over the growth of state health care budgets.87

However CON was

hardly met with unbridled enthusiasm within the health planning
community. Some health planners feared that this regulatory
scheme would result in a litigious atmosphere, as providers and
consumers would contest agency decisions.

Of equal concern was

the idea that this process would divide the agencies' attention
between planning and regulation.8 8

In spite of these concerns,

however, the movement toward a new health planning and regulatory
apparatus featuring CON continued to grow.
By the late 1960 1 s, changes in the utilization of health
care began to emerge.

Ambulatory (outpatient) facilities became

increasingly popular with consumers.
84 Forgotson, p. 942.
85 Forgotson, p. 943.
86 Havighurst, p. 1151.
87 salkever and Bice,

PP· 4-5.

88 salkever and Bice, pp. 4-5.

Tensions had also been
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growing between urban and rural areas over the allocation of
Hill-Burton funds.

As a result of these changes in the health

care environment, Congress amended the Hill-Burton Act in 1970.
These amendments stipulated that impoverished areas, and requests
for assistance in the construction of diagnostic and ambulatory
facilities be given the highest priority.89
Changes were also occurring within the CHP and RMP programs.
In 1970, Congress enacted legislation that encouraged
"cooperative arrangements" between these two programs, by
permitting the CHP agencies to review RMP proposals.90

There

seems to have been an effort to consolidate these programs by
allowing the CHP to, at least partially, absorb the RMP.
However the impression that these programs were not
effectively addressing the health facility cost, accessibility,
and quality issues become more evident to members of Congress.
In 1972, the Government Accounting Office and the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) concluded that federal
guidelines and oversight efforts of the CHP agencies needed to be
intensified, and the staffing and funding levels of these
agencies needed to be increased. 91

Presidential regard for the

89Public Health Service Act Amendments, Statutes at Large
vol. 84 Title I, sec. 101-102, p.337 (1970).
90west Publishing Co., National Health Planning and Resources
Development Act of 1974, U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative
News, vol. 4, 93d Congress, (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co.,
1974)' p. 7854.
9lwest Publishing co., National Health Planning and Resources
Development Act of 1974, pp. 7852-7853.
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RMP was clearly on the wane, when, in preparing his budget for FY
1974, President Nixon failed to request renewed funding for the

RMP.

Although Congress appropriated funds sufficient to continue

the program into 1974, HEW recommended phasing out the RMP in
1975.9 2

These events suggest that federal policy-makers were
becoming increasingly cognizant of the problems in the health
care industry, and particularly, the hospital sector.

Even

though programs existed to correct the imbalances and
inadequacies within the hospital industry, it had become clear to
Congress that these measures alone would be insufficient.

A

renewed emphasis in Congress was placed on the creation of a
strong, centralized planning and regulatory apparatus to correct
deficiencies within the health care industry.

The stage was set

for the creation and enactment of the next major piece of heal1
legislation.

The National Health Planning and Resources Development
Act of 1974

The effort to create a newer, stronger health planning and
regulatory apparatus attracted support in both houses of
Congress.

In fact, both the House and the Senate passed similar

bills that had to be reconciled in conference committee. 93

The

92west Publishing co., National Health Planning and Resources
Development Act of 1974, p. 7854.
93 Curran, p. 38.
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final outcome was the National Health Planning and Resources
Development Act of 1974 (PL 93-641).
The legislative history of P. L. 93-641 suggests that many
of the concerns mentioned above surrounding the provision of
health care in this country impelled Congress into action.

While

bills were introduced in each house of Congress, it was the
Senate version that was finally adopted.
Labor and Public Welfare's

The Senate Committee on

fundamental justification for this

legislation was the concern that"··· the health care industry
does not respond to marketplace forces. 11 94

The highly technical

nature of health services, the prominence of third-party payers,
and the notion that high-technology services create their own
demand, all contributed to the Committee's finding.

While a

longer-term trend toward increased use of outpatient facilities
was evident, the Committee was alarmed by more recent indications
of a reversal of this trend.95

Economic factors clearly played a

major role in prompting Congress to take this legislative action.
Added to the economic arguments for new legislation, was the
acknowledgement of the shortcomings of previous federal
legislative efforts in this area.

The inadequacies in health

planning activities at the time were attributed to vague
congressional mandates, insufficient funding, and inadequate
implementation authority.

Also, a number of evaluative studies

94west Publishing Co., National Health PLanning and Resources
Development Act of 1974, p. 7878.
95west Publishing co., National Health Planning and Resources
D.evelopment Act of 1974, pp. 7897-7898.
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conducted during the late 1960's and early 1970's provided
evidence of rising health care costs.96

While all of these

factors provided the most conspicuous justifications for renewed
legislation, members of Congress had also hoped that a strong
national health planning system might ultimately lead to a
national health insurance program.97

Health care was once again

a national issue.
As enacted, PL 93-641 provided for a three-tier health
planning system that was to control the distribution, quality,
and cost of health facility services, in addition to coordinating
a variety of other health activities.

Agencies were created at

the federal, state, and regional levels to perform these
functions.

This new plan supplanted the Comprehensive Health

Plan, Regional Medical Plan, and the Hill-Burton Act.98

P. L.

93-641 also altered the conception of the health care problems by
declaring that its purpose was to ensure "equal access to quality
health care at a reasonable cost. 11 99

This marked the first time

that health care costs had factored explicitly into federal
health planning legislation.
The legislation even went so far as to establish a list of
96Budrys, pp.

56-59.

97west Publishing co., National Health PLanning and Resources
Development Act of 1974, p. 7879.
98west Publishing co., National Health Planning and Resources
Development Act of 1974, pp. 7842-7843.
99National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of
1974, Statutes at Large, vol. 88, pt. 2, sec. 2, p. 2226 (1974).
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national health priorities.

A review of these priorities reveals

that the emphasis on meeting the basic health needs of those
citizens in economically depressed areas was still a major
concern to Congress.

For instance, the statute specifically

identifies the provision of medical services for rural or
economically depressed areas.100

There was also considerable

interest in consolidating and coordinating existing health
resources through voluntary arrangements between institutions,
promoting preventive education, the training of physicians'
assistants, and the establishment of a geographically-centered
strata of health activities.

This appears to have been a major

effort to construct a unified health planning system.
In order to achieve such a goal, the law created a threetiered planning system.

At the national level, the National

Council on Health Planning and Development was created to advise
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare(HEW) on matters
pertaining to the development and implementation of national
guidelines.101

The Council's function was largely advisory,

since policy-making authority was vested in the HEW Secretary.
Council membership included federal officials (all non-voting
members), health providers, areawide agency representatives, and
representatives of the state Health Coordinating Councils.

There

seems to have been an effort to create a body representative of
lOONational Health Planning and Resource Development Act of
1974, sec. 1502, p. 2227.
101National Health Plannina and Resource Development Act of
1974 sec. 1503, p. 2228.
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the national health care community.

By mandating a diverse

membership for the commission, Congress realized that health care
concerns affect people in different settings and people are
affected by health care issues in many different ways.
At the state level, the Act contained provisions for
creating a policy-making body and an advisory body.

The governor

in each state were authorized to designate State Health Planning
and Development Agencies (SHPDA), which were governmental bodies
charged with administering state plans pertaining to the quality,
cost, and distribution of health facilities, and to gather and
analyze data from the areawide agencies.

These state plans were

to be submitted annually to the HEW Secretary for approva1.102
This law established a system of accountability to the federal
government by authorizing the HEW Secretary to withhold federal
health planning funds until he had received and approved each
state health plan.
The SHPDAs were assisted in their tasks by the State Health
Coordinating Councils (SHCC).

These councils served in an

advisory capacity, and were comprised of health care providers
and consumers from within the state, as well as representatives
from each areawide agency within the state.103

The SHCCs were

responsible for annually reviewing and coordinating Annual
Implementation Plans so as to realize the goals set forth in the
102National Health Planning and Resource Develo2ment Act of
1974, sec. 1523, p. 2246.
103National Health Planning and Resource Develo2ment Act,
1974, sec. 1524, p. 2248.
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State Health Plan.104

Essentially then, two statewide bodies

were created to review and coordinate area plans, so as to affect
a balanced statewide health resources plan.
At the focal point of the new health planning system were
205 regional health systems areas whose health plans were
developed by health systems agencies(HSA).

These areas did not

necessarily conform to existing political boundaries, except in
the case of some of the larger metropolitan areas. Instead, the
health systems areas were drawn by the governor of each state to
conform to the geographic characteristics of each state, just as
the areawide agencies under the CHP had been.
Congress intended that the HSA's assume the place of the CHP
areawide agencies.

However, the governor of each state was given

the authority to alter these boundaries if it were deemed
necessary to do so.105

HSA boundaries were drawn to include from

one-half to three million people, and a major medical
facility.106

HSAs were charged with developing five-year Health

System Plans, as well as yearly Annual Implementation Plans,
based on a survey of the area's health care needs and

104National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of
1974, sec. 1524 (b) (2) (A), p. 2248.
105west Publishing Co., National Health PLanning and Resources
Development Act of 1974, p. 7883.
106National Health Planning and Resources Development Act
of 1974, sec. 1511 (a) (3), p. 2232.
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resources.l07

HSAs were conceived as public or private, non-

profit entities that were independent of any other political
body, and whose sole purpose was health planning.108

congress

did not want the HSAs to become co-opted by local or state
governments.
Each HSA was supported by a professional staff .109

The

statute provided for governing bodies in each HSA, ranging in
size from fifteen to thirty members, to oversee the individual
HSA's operation.llO

In some respects, then, the new program

retained some of the features of the CHP program. However, there
were important differences.

The most important difference was

the provision for certificate of need program.

CON was intended

to be a tool with which to achieve state health plans.
Therefore, Congress vested authority for administering state CON
programs in the SHPDA.111 Approvals or denials of CON requests
were to be made within the context of each area plan, and the
penalties for violating CON decisions were left up to the states.
Failure to enact a CON statute would result in the HEW Secretary
withholding federal funds for health programs.

By allowing for

107National Health Planning and Resources Development Act
of 1974, sec. 1513 (b) (2), p. 2236.
108National Health Planning and Resources Development Act
of 1974, sec. 1512 (b) (1)-(2), p. 2232.
l09curran, p. 40.
llONational Health Planninq and Resources Development Act
of 1974, sec. 1512 (b) (3), p. 2232.
lllNational Health Planning and Resources Development Act
of 1974, sec. 1523 (b) (4) (A), p. 2246.
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the imposition of sanctions, and by threatening to withhold
federal funds, Congress sent a message that the health care
industry's problems had become too severe to allow for laxity.
While the new health program was not mandatory, states had to be
willing to forego federal assistance if they chose not to
participate in the health planning program.
Whereas the federal guidelines under the CHP were vague,
general standards for the construction and maintenance of
facilities and equipment, and for triggering the CON review
process were more explicit.

Initially, a threshold of $150,000

for capital projects, or a ten percent change in bed supply were
established for triggering the CON review process.112

States

were free to strengthen these standards by lowering the
thresholds, but were not allowed to raise them.
As was the case with the CHP, the composition of the various
planning boards attracted much attention.

Once again, Congress

feared provider dominance on these committees.

To address this

issue, Congress stipulated that there be consumer majorities on
all HSA and SHCC boards.

"Providers" were defined as any medical

care provider, or anyone receiving at least ten percent of their
income from a provider.113

Provider dominance was one of the

oft-cited weaknesses of the CHP program.

Providers were still

fearful of a loss of autonomy under the new health planning
11 2 Budrys, p. 20.
113National Health Planninq and Resources Development Act
of 1974, sec. 1512 (b) (3) (A), p. 2232.
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program, however.114

In fact, medical interest groups lobbied

Congress quite heavily on substantive and structural issues,
such as HSA governing board composition.115
Another departure from the CHP relates to funding.

Under

the CHP, area agencies were partially dependent upon private
sources for their funding, often resulting in hospitals
supporting the very bodies that were responsible for local health
planning.

Under PL 93-641, HSAs could still get private sector

funding. However, the new law precluded them from receiving funds
from individual or institutional providers.116

The Act

established federal funding for HSAs at a minimum grant of
$175,000 and a maximum grant of $3,750,000 per HSA, depending
upon the population of the HSA.117

HSAs were to be as free as

possible from undue provider influence, in terms of funding as
well as membership.
P.L. 93-641 was intended to address many of the perceived
deficiencies that had existed in prior health planning
legislation.

State and local health officials had made Congress

aware of many of the problems that existed in the provision of
114curran, p. 42.
115G. Gregory Raab, "National/State/Local Relationships in
Health Planning: Interest Group Reaction and Lobbying," in Institute
of Medicine, Health Planning in the United States: Selected
Policy Issues, vol. 2, (Washington, D.C.: National Academy
Press, 1981), p. 122.
116National Health Planning and Resources Development Act
of 1974, sec. 1512 (5), p. 2235.
117National Health Planning and Resources Development Act
of 1974, sec. 1516, p. 2241.
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health care, and especially health facility services.

Rather

than let one level of agencies assume all of the burden, responsibility was shared among federal, state, and local health
planning bodies.

This division of responsibility in pursuit of a

national health planning agenda marked yet another milestone in
the development of American health and health facility planning
as all three levels of government and the quasi-public HSAs
collaborated and cooperated to form a national health planning
program.
Conclusion
Public sector intervention in the provision of health care
facilities and services underwent a number of phases in this
century.

Each phase represented a change in the way in which

policy-makers and interested groups perceived the deficiencies
within the hospital and health facility industry at a given time.
Initially the problem was simply characterized as inadequate
health facility resources.

The subsequent legislative response

was a major infusion of medical facility construction funds.
Some twenty years later lawmakers redefined the relevant
issues.

Health facility resources were still considered

inadequate.

However, the issue of health facilities resources

was placed within the context of health planning generally, as
consumers began to change their utilization patterns.
The locus of medical facility planning and construction
assistance activity also shifted over time.

Private sector
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philanthropic organizations and voluntary hospital planning
bodies defined early hospital planning and construction efforts.
During the war years, the federal government assumed the leading
role in hospital sector activity as large amounts of federal
funds were allocated for medical facility construction.

The

Hill-Burton Act represented the first governmental attempt to
provide an orderly hospital planning and construction system.
Amendments to the Hill-Burton Act in the 1960's, and the federal
Comprehensive Health Planning Act gave new credence to the notion
of comprehensive health planning at the local level, although the
CHP's implementation was hampered by such factors as vague
federal guidelines, and minimal federal funding.

Section 1122

and the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of
1974 provided a health planning enforcement mechanism through
certificate of need and concentrated health planning and
regulatory authority at the state level.
The evolution of the certificate of need helped to reshape
the public policy debate once again.

People were no longer

solely concerned with the quality and distribution of hospitals
and health facilities.

Health care costs had become a major

factor by the late 1960 1 s.

In an effort to restrain these

escalating expenditures, and to impose a sense of order and
stability on the health care industry, Congress included a
certificate of need provision, as part of a national health
planning program.

states developed their own certificate of need

programs within federal guidelines.
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It is beyond the scope of this study to examine CON programs
in all of the states.

Therefore the remainder of this paper

shall be devoted to an examination of Virginia's CON program from
its inception to the present.

CHAPTER 2
ENACTMENT OF VIRGINIA'S CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC NEED LAW

The high cost of health care began to overshadow concern for
the provision of health care during the late 1960's.

With the

implementation of Medicare and Medicaid, federal health
expenditures rose dramatically from approximately $40.5 billion
in 1965 to $71.5 billion in 1970.1

Expenditures for these

programs helped shift public discussion away from simply the
provision of health care, toward health care cost containment.
Concern over the high cost of health care was not limited to the
federal government.
State governments also served as forums for public discourse
relating to health care costs.

Not only was there an increase in

public expenditures, but also in the sums spent by individuals
and private insurers.

Private sector expenditures, including

direct, out-of-pocket expenditures and health insurance benefits,
rose from $27.47 billion in 1965 to $40.4 billion in 1970.2

It

was in this environment that the Virginia General Assembly
confronted the issue of high medical costs in the Commonwealth.
Although not intended by Virginia lawmakers to deal

lu.s. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical
Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to the Present
pt. 1, Series B 221-235, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
Commerce, 1975) p.73.
2 Bureau of the Census, series B 236-247, p. 74.
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exclusively with health care costs, or to be the sole instrument
with which to

comb~t

high medical costs, certificate of need

(CON) was one of a number of public policies designed to address
problems within the health care industry.

Utilizing the existing

health planning administrative framework, certificate of need was
incorporated into the health planning system, with authority concentrated in the Virginia Health Commissioner's office.
The Commission to Study Prepaid Health Care Plans
and Costs of Medical, Surgical, and Hospital Services
The operations of Virginia Blue Cross gained national
attention in 1971.

In January 1971 the U.

s. Senate Judiciary

Committee, subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly held hearings
to investigate alleged improprieties in the operation of the
nation's Blue cross plans.

At the center of attention were

questionable practices by officers of Virginia Blue Cross.
Congressional investigators contended that there was considerable
waste and mismanagement, which contributed to soaring
administrative costs for the plan.
Some of the practices directly involved high-ranking Blue
Cross officials, while other abuses were of a more general
nature.

In one instance, a rental car fleet contract bid that

was $30,000 higher than the low bid was accepted over the low
bid.

Blue Cross of Virginia also bought furniture from a company

in which a Blue cross board member had a major financial
interest.

The subcommittee also found that Blue Cross board
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members charged private club membership dues to Blue cross.3
Chaired by Senator Philip Hart (D-Michigan), the
subcommittee members also sought to discern the effect that Blue
Cross had on hospital costs.

There appears to have been a bias

during the hearings toward the enhancement of competition.

Said

Senator Hart at the outset of the hearings:" ... the general thrust
of these hearings is to see how competition can be put to work to
lower the almost staggering costs, costs that went up almost
fifteen percent last year. 11 4 Thus the subcommittee was not only
investigating alleged improprieties at Blue Cross, but also, the
relationship between Blue Cross and rising hospital care costs.
Indeed, Congress may have used the administrative scandal as a
vehicle for exploring Blue Cross' effect on health care costs.
During the hearings, doubts were raised on the notion that
Blue Cross played a significant role in constraining hospital
costs.

The fact that Blue Cross routinely paid whatever

hospitals charged, and that the boards of directors of local Blue
Cross plans were dominated by physicians and medical facility
administrators undermined claims of cost containment potential.
Also disclosed during the hearings was the fact that
hospitalization costs had risen approximately thirty-eight

3u.s. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee
on Antitrust and Monopoly,The High cost of Hospitalization, pt.
2-i.. Blue Cross, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 26 January 1971, pp.31-33.
4u.s. Congress, Senate 1971, p. 2.
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percent over the five years prior to 1971.5

senator Hart went so

far as to suggest that "when the Blue Cross board is heavily
loaded with hospital-oriented representatives ••• one wonders if
those boards can go into a bargaining session with the
aggressiveness that consumers would expect if indeed they were
representing the consumer. 11 6

Concern over Blue Cross practices

was not limited to the national stage, however.
Revelations during the Senate Subcommittee hearings about
improprieties in the operation of Virginia Blue Cross prompted
Virginia lawmakers to more closely examine Virginia Blue Cross.
On January 28, 1971, Governor Linwood Holton ordered a staff
investigation of the charges made before Senator Hart's
subcommittee.
take action.

Virginia General Assembly members were anxious to
Strong sentiment existed in both houses for

extending the regulatory jurisdiction of the State Corporation
Commission to include Virginia Blue Cross, and Governor Holton
also gave this idea consideration.?
In February, 1971, the General Assembly passed Senate Joint
Resolution 20,

This resolution created a commission "to study

certain organizations such as Blue Cross-Blue Shield and the
rates of insurance therefore. 11 8

There is little doubt that the

5u.s. Congress, Senate 1971, p. 2.
6u.s. Congress, Senate 1971, p. 263.
7Hank Burchard and Helen Dewar, nstricter Blue Cross Control
Proposed", Washington Post, 29 January 1971, B-1.
8 Virginia Acts of Assembly (1971) Senate Joint Resolution
20, p. 557.
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General Assembly was at least partly motivated by the activities
of Senator Hart's subcommittee.

11 • • •

Recent events have raised

serious questions as to whether such plans [Blue Cross] operate
on an efficient and economical basis ..• 11 9.

The General Assembl y

was clearly sensitive to the notion that operational
irregularities within insurance plans impacted upon medical
costs, and that these costs were on the rise.
The General Assembly regarded the stabilization of the
health care industry as an important task.

To that end, the

Commission to Study Prepaid Health Care Plans and Costs of
Medical, Surgical and Hospital Services (hereafter referred to as
"the Commission") was empowered by legislators to review not only
administrative practices, but the means by which health care
costs were established, as well.lo

The members of the General

Assembly seemed to be sending a signal to the health care
industry that the price increases of recent years had become
intolerable.
Commission membership consisted of three members from each
house of the General Assembly, as well as three members appointed
by the Governor, who could be state or local officeholders.11

9virqinia Acts of Assembly (1971) Senate Joint Resolution
20,p. 557.

lOvirginia Acts of Assembly (1971) Senate Joint Resolution
20, p. 558.

llThe following individuals served on the Commission:
Senator Edward E. Willey (D-Richmond); Senator Adelard Brault (DFairfax); Senator Henry E. Howell, Jr. (D-Norfolk); Delegate
Junie L. Bradshaw (D-Richmond); Delegate Donald Mc Glothlin, Sr.
CD-Grundy); Delegate Richard J. Ryder CR-Annandale); E. Leo
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The Insurance Commissioner was an ex officio member, and was
responsible for providing support staff.

A sum of $10,000 was

appropriated from the General Assembly contingency fund to cover
expenses.

SJR 20 directed the Commission to complete its

investigation, and to present its findings and recommendations to
the Governor and the General Assembly by December 1, 1971.12
Throughout 1971, the Commission held a series of meetings
and hearings in an effort to obtain as many opinions and points
of view as possible regarding perceived deficiencies within the
Virginia health care industry.

Present at these hearings were

representatives of Medicare, Medicaid, Blue Cross-Blue Shield,
private insurance companies, and health care providers.13

While

Blue Cross was the focal point of attention, the Commission
addressed a range of issues relating to the provision of health
care services.
Most of the Commission's recommendations dealt with
enhancing consumer participation and administrative
responsiveness with respect to health care reimbursement
practices.

These recommendations included the establishment of

voluntary hospital rate review boards, the introduction of health
Burton (Roanoke); Frank A. Schwalenberg (Newport News); Robert
Carter (Richmond).
12virginia Acts of Assembly (1971) Senate Joint Resolution
20, p. 558.
13virginia General Assembly, Commission to Study Prepaid
Health Care Plans and Costs of Medical, Surgical and Hospital
Services Therefor, The Cost and Administration of Health Care
Services in Virginia, Senate Document No. 14, in Senate Journal
(Richmond, Virginia: Commonwealth of Virginia, 1972) ,p. 3.
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maintenance organizations (HMOs), the submission of quarterly
financial statements by health insurance plans to the state
Corporation Commission, the stipulation that consumer majorities
exist on health care plans' boards of directors, and "the
establishment of certification of need prior to the establishment
or extension of hospital facilities. 11 14

Viewed in this context,

it seems that lawmakers perceived CON as but one policy
instrument to be implemented in a series of health policy
initiatives intended to correct problems within the health care
industry.

The most significant of these problems was the high

cost of medical services.
The Commission relied upon arguments similar to those
espoused by CON proponents, summarized in chapter 1, in reaching
its conclusions.

The central factor influencing the Commission's

recommendations seems to have been that "in many areas of
Virginia there are hospital beds in excess of those needed," and
that excess beds contributed to high costs.1 5

The city of

Richmond had one of the highest ratios of hospital beds to
population in the nation at that time.

The Commission found that

excess beds were often filled with patients not requiring
hospitalization, thereby raising the cost of care for the public
at large.

Since excess beds existed, the Commission reasoned,

administrators and doctors had no financial incentive to release

14commission Report, p.3.
15commission Report, p. 8.
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patients at the earliest possible date.16

Although the existence

of excess hospital beds was a source of concern to commission
members, they also seem to have been influenced by experience
with CON elsewhere.
Certificate of need had been implemented in a number of
states by 1971.

In its report, the Commission observed that:

Other states have solved this problem [excess beds and
high costs] by enacting legislation providing for certification of need prior to the establishment or expansion of hospital facilities . . . It is critical that
Virginia enact such legislation.17
This statement suggests that the Commission placed considerable
weight on the experience of other states that had CON regulation.
Certificate of need was only one of a number of measures
promoted by the Commission to address problems within the health
care industry.

Each recommendation addressed a particular facet

of the industry. However, all of the issues and concomitant
recommendations revolved around the themes of greater efficiency
and cost control in the health care industry.

By this time, the

cost of health care had begun to overshadow concerns about the
quantity and quality of health care resources.

Although created

in the aftermath of the Blue Cross scandal, the Commission
addressed issues well beyond the administrative improprieties at
Blue Cross.

16commission Report, p. 5.
17commission Report, p. 6.
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Enactment of the Virginia Medical Care Facilities
Certificate of Public Need Statute
The debate in Virginia surrounding the high cost of health
care did not take place in a vacuum.

The federal Hill-Burton

and Regional Medical Plan programs were still in existence.

In

addition, Virginia had voluntarily implemented health planning at
the state and regional levels as part of the federal
Comprehensive Health Plan.

All of these programs were designed

to ensure that adequate, accessible health facilities were
available to the public.

While medical facility resource

planning was gaining prominence under these programs, they were
not concerned ostensibly with cost containment.
Of course, one federal program that was concerned with cost
containment was the federal Economic Stabilization Program.
Price controls were established by the federal Cost of Living
Council for a wide range of goods and services throughout the
economy, including health care.

A national Committee on the

Health Services Industry was appointed by President Nixon to
formulate price control guidelines that would not stifle
innovation.18

18c. Jackson Grayson, Chairman of the Cost of Living Council,
Washington, D. c., letter to Governor Linwood Holton, Richmond,
Virginia, 17 January 1971, Executive Papers, Virginia State
Archives, Richmond. The Economic Stabilization Program was implemented
pursuant to Title II of the Defense Production Act (Statutes at
Large, 1970, 9lst Congress, 2nd sess., vol. 84, pt. 1, pp. 799800), which authorized the President to sign Executive Order No.
11615, Providing for Stbilization of Prices, Rents, Wages, and
Salaries, u. s. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 92nd
Congress, 1st session, 1971, vol. 2, pp. 2575-2577.
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In spite of the federal programs in existence, Virginia
lawmakers seized the opportunity to implement their own cure for
the high health care costs that plagued Virginians.

To that

end, Senator Adelard Brault (D-Fairfax co.) and Senator Edward
Willey (D-Richmond) introduced CON legislation in the Virginia
Senate during the 1972 session.
by a vote of 24-12.

The CON bill passed the Senate

Upon reaching the House of Delegates, the

General Laws Committee voted to carry the bill over to the 1973
session.19
Support for CON in Virginia was widespread.

Organizations

in favor of a CON program included the Virginia Medical Society,
Virginia Hospital Society, Virginia Nursing Home Society,
Virginia Nurses Society, and Virginia Blue Cross-Blue Shield.
However the Virginia Comprehensive Health Planning Council, the
state's highest health planning council, expected opposition from
some private physicians.20

The State Comprehensive Health

Planning Council had itself voted unanimously to endorse CON
legislation as early as January 1972.21
Having passed the Senate during the previous session with
19senate Journal (1972) vol. 1 (Richmond, VA: Commonwealth of
Virginia, 1972), p. 485.
20virginia Comprehensive Health Planning Council, meeting,
Minutes, 6 December 1972 (Richmond, Virginia), p. 5. Executive
papers of Governor Linwood Holton, Virginia State Archives,
Richmond, Virginia.
2lvirginia Comprehensive Health Planning Council, meeting,
Minutes, 12 January 1972, (Richmond, Virginia), p. 6. Executive
papers of Governor Linwood Holton, Virginia State Archives,
Richmond, Virginia.
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relative ease, the certificate of need bill encountered more
strident opposition in the House.

Opponents of the bill viewed

CON as an unreasonable extension of state authority.

Delegate

Edwin H. Ragsdale (D-Richmond) felt that certificate of need
created a monopoly for existing hospitals.
sentiment, Delegate George F. Allen,Jr.

Sharing this

(D-Richmond) argued that

there was not a problem of excess capacity, and he felt that new
development should be encouraged.

While Delegate Samuel

Glasscock (D-Nansemond) conceded that the bill might restrict
free enterprise, CON was still a reasonable approach "because
empty beds drive up medical costs. 11 22
When put to a floor vote in the House, the CON measure was
defeated by a vote of 49-49.
defeated.

However, the bill was not to be

Exerting his considerable influence as president pro

tempore of the Senate, Senator Willey helped resurrect the
moribund CON bill by directly confronting a number of delegates
after the vote was taken.

one of those delegates to change his

mind was Delegate Allen, who later commented that he would have
voted in favor of the bill initially "if I had just known it was
the Senator's [Willey's] bill. 11 23

In the end, the measure passed

the House by a vote of 50-44, and the Senate agreed to the House
amendments, having already passed the measure by a margin of 2313.

Although CON in other states tended to pit urban areas that

22c1aude Burrows, "Deadlock Defeats Hospital Bill," Richmond
Times-Dispatch, 16 February 1973, A-8.
23nsenator Willey Aids House Passage of Hospital Bill",
Richmond Times-Dispatch, 17 February 1973, B-1.
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generally opposed CON against rural areas which favored CON, the
voting on this bill in both houses did not reflect such a
pattern.24

Legislators from rural and urban regions in both

houses were rather evenly divided on the bill.

Virginia's Original Certificate of Public Need Statute

The enactment of the Medical Facilities Certificate of
Public Need (COPN) law provided the Commonwealth with an
additional policy instrument to facilitate health planning and
constrain health care costs.25

Whereas the other health

planning mechanisms that existed in Virginia as of 1973 were of
federal origin, this program was a creature of the Commonwealth.
While the General Assembly could have created an entirely new
administrative apparatus, it did not.

Instead, authority was

vested in existing agencies created pursuant to the federal
Comprehensive Health Plan, thereby signalling a desire to
incorporate COPN into the existing health planning framework.
Administrative authority under the COPN law was quite
24 11 urban" and "Rural" designations are based on 1970 U.S.
Census Bureau data as applied to Virginia senatorial and delegate
districts.
The record of the initial House vote may be obtained
from Journal of the House (1973) vol. 1, p. 809-810. The second
vote in the House may be obtained from Journal of the House (1973)
vol. 1, pp. 826-827. The roll call vote record for the Senate
vote may be obtained from Journal of the Senate, (1973) vol. 1,
p. 485.
25For the purposes of this and subsequent chapters the
acronym COPN shall refer to the Virginia certificate of public need
program specifically, while CON shall refer to the certificate of
need as it applies to the general concept.
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centralized.

This centralization of authority was in keeping

with the general thrust of Virginia government reorganization
efforts that were underway during the early 1970's.26

Virtually

all decision-making authority was vested in the office of the
Commissioner of Health.

Statewide and areawide health planning

bodies were given little more than advisory status.

The

Commissioner was authorized to prescribe rules and regulations,
and to require any reports or investigations deemed necessary by
him to administer the program.

It was the Commissioner's respon-

sibility to designate a statewide body to administer the program
at the state level.

The Commissioner was also directed to

consult with the State Comprehensive Health Planning Council and
the Advisory Hospital Council.

However these bodies could only

perform advisory and consultative functions.27
In contrast to the broad powers conferred upon the Health
Commissioner, the five areawide planning councils received only
the briefest mention in the enabling statute.

The areawide

councils were directed to provide "advice or assistance" to the
Statewide Comprehensive Health Planning Council, which, in turn,

26Thomas R. Morris and John T. Whelan, "Gubernatorial Management
of State Government in Virginia," in Virginia Government and
Politics, Thomas R. Morris and Larry Sabata, eds. (Charlottesville,
VA: Virginia Chamber of Commerce and the University of Virginia,
1984), p. 130. See for this piece for a more complete discussion
of the move to consolidate gubernatorial authority in Virginia.
27virginia Acts of Assembly,
211.6 (8) (a).

(1973) vol. 1, ch. 419, sec. 32-
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was to render advisory recommendations to the Commissioner.28
Responsibility for the determination of COPN applications rested
with the Commissioner of Health.
The scope of the initial statute was quite broad.
Institutions which were within the purview of the COPN program
included general hospitals, sanitaria and sanitoria, intermediate
and extended care facilities, nursing homes, health maintenance
organizations, and mental health and mental retardation
facilities.

However, physicians' offices and emergency first aid

stations were specifically exempted from review.29
Not every project undertaken by a health facility was
subject to review.

Only those projects that could legitimately

be classified as capital expenditures were within the scope of
the COPN program.

Furthermore, a project had to have resulted in

a capital expenditure in excess of $100,000, or a change in the
facility's bed capacity, or a significant change in the clinical
services offered by a facility, in order to warrant a COPN
review.30

Taken in total, the statute's scope appears to have

been sufficiently broad to encompass a wide range of medical
facilities and services.
To guide the Commissioner in reaching decisions on COPN
28virginia Acts of Assembly:, (1973) vol. 1, ch.419,
211.7.

sec. 32-

2 9 virginia Acts of Assembly:, (1973) vol. 1, ch. 419, sec. 32211.5 ( 6) •
30virginia Acts of Assembly:, (1973) vol.1, chap. 419, sec.
32-211.5 (7).
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applications, the General Assembly enumerated seven decisionmaking criteria in the statute.

The Commissioner was directed to

take into consideration the recommendation of the State
Comprehensive Health Planning council regarding a COPN
application, although he was not legally bound by this
recommendation.

The Commissioner was to determine that the

proposed project would contribute to the "orderly development and
proper distribution of adequate and effective health services in
the area to be served. 11 31

In order to help the Commissioner

determine the needs of the area to be served, the Commissioner
was directed to take into account the "size, population, and
growth of the area to be served by the proposed project. 11 32
The final four decision-making criteria were concerned
primarily with the integration of a proposed project with
existing health care resources.

The number and type of existing

or planned facilities similar to the proposed project, and the
availability of existing or planned resources which may serve as
alternatives or substitutes to the proposal were also to be
factored into the Commissioner's decision.3 3
While there was considerable attention paid to existing
health resources, the Commissioner had to determine the
31virginia Acts of Assembly,
32-211.6 (b) 1-2.

(1973) vol.1, ch. 419, sec.

3 2 virginia Acts of Assembly,
211.6 (b) 3.

(1973) vol.1, ch.419, sec. 32-

33virginia Acts of Assembly,
32-211.6 (b) 4-5.

(1973) vol. 1, ch. 419, sec.
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availability of qualified manpower to staff a prospective project
when considering a COPN application.34

After all, there was no

sense approving a project if qualified personnel to staff it were
unavailable. Whereas the preceding criteria dealt with the
proposed project's impact on the area to be served, the final
criteria were more concerned with the project's impact at the
statewide level.

Specifically, the Commissioner was to ensure

the "compatibility of the proposed project with the comprehensive
State plan including the State Hospital Construction program. 11 35
Health planning seems to have been of particular importance to
the General Assembly.

The statute placed special emphasis on the

goal of integrating proposed projects with the existing health
care environment.

However the areawide agencies were given

little opportunity for input into the planning process.
Responsibility for the administration of the COPN program
rested with the Health Commissioner.

Anyone wishing to initiate

a health facility project was required to submit an application
to the Health Commissioner.

Determining what information would

be necessary for the completion of the application form itself
was left to the commissioner's discretion.

It was then the

Commissioner's responsibility to see that copies of each
application were forwarded to the State Comprehensive Health
Planning Council (State CHP Council).

The statute provided that

34virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) vol. 1, ch. 419, sec.
32-211.6 (b) 7.
35virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) vol.1, ch. 419, sec. 32211.6 (b) 6.
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the State CHP Council had forty-five days during which to review
the application, and make its recommendation to the Commissioner.
In doing so, the CHP Council was permitted to solicit "advice and
assistance" from the area-wide health planning council in whose
area the project was to be located.

These recommendations were

not binding on the Council or the Commissioner.

Once the

Commissioner received the CHP Council's recommendation, he was
required to reach a decision regarding the application within
forty-five days of receiving the CHP Council's recommendation.
However, no more than ninety days were to elapse from the date
the application was initially submitted until a final decision
was rendered.36
The centralization of administrative authority that was
referred to earlier seems to be evident here also.

The Health

Commissioner was responsible for establishing administrative
procedures not enunciated in the statute.

Although the statute

gave the State CHP Council the task of reviewing COPN
applications, the Council had no authority to enforce its
conclusions.

Area-wide health planning agencies were to assist

the CHP Council, but could only render advisory assistance.

So

as not to be unduly burdensome to applicants, a time frame of
ninety days was established for the completion of the entire
review process.

As a result, applicants would have a definite

timetable around which to formulate their own plans.

36virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) vol. 1, ch. 419, sec.
23-211.7.
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Further accommodations were afforded applicants to ensure a
fair hearing, and adequate opportunity for judicial review, if
necessary.

Hearing procedures were to be governed by the

Virginia General Administrative Agencies Act, and the
Commissioner was to preside over the hearings.

An applicant who

was denied an application could appeal the Commissioner's
decision to the State Board of Health.37

If, however, an

applicant was dissatisfied with the State Board of Health's
ruling, there was yet another avenue of recourse.
An applicant dissatisfied with the decisions of the Health
Commissioner and the State Board of Health was entitled to seek
judicial relief.

In order to be eligible for appeal, an

applicant had to file for an appeal with the Circuit Court in the
City of Richmond, or in a circuit court whose jurisdiction
encompassed the area where the project was to be located, within
thirty days after receipt of the Board of Health's decision.

It

was then the Board of Health's responsibility to forward all
appropriate papers and records to the court having
jurisdiction.38

Upon examination of the appropriate documents

and materials, courts were free to affirm, overturn or modify the
Board's decision.

Should a court find that sufficient need

existed to warrant the granting of a certificate, the Health
Commissioner was then obligated to grant a certificate. If any
37virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) vol.1, ch.419, sec. 32-211.8
38virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) vol.1, ch. 419, sec. 32211.9.
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party to the appeal wished to do so, a further appeal to the
Virginia Supreme Court was provided for in the statute.

The

Supreme Court was the court of last resort, however.39
Procedural fairness seems to have been a primary component
of the original COPN statute.

To the extent that certain

administrative provisions were mandated by the Virginia General
Agencies Act, the authors of this statute had little choice but
to provide for administrative hearings.

The COPN statute went

much further, however, providing ample opportunities for
judicial, as well as administrative relief.
Of course, the certificate itself was not an ambiguous
document, allowing for open-ended interpretations.

Indeed, the

COPN statute established very definite parameters to govern the
form and the issuance of individual certificates.

Each

certificate was to be valid for the specific project for which it
was requested.

Once the Health Commissioner granted a COPN, it

was valid for a period lasting no longer than two years, at which
time the applicant could request a renewal of the certificate.40
Even though there were ample provisions to ensure that review
proceedings were fair, and that certain administrative procedures
were adhered to, the authors of this legislation took a less than
benevolent view of those who failed to comply with the statute.
Hence the statute also contained provisions for sanctions against
39virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) vol. 1, ch. 419, sec.
32-211.9.
40virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) vol.1, ch. 419, sec.
32-211. 11.
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those who violated the law.

Any legal entity which chose to

undertake a project without first obtaining a COPN was guilty of
a misdemeanor, and subject to a fine ranging from $50 to
$1,00o.41

Upon petition by the Health Commissioner, Board of

Health, or the Attorney General, the court having jurisdiction
over the area where the project was to be undertaken was given
the authority to enjoin "any project which is constructed,
undertaken, or commenced without the required certificate of
public need as referred to herein. 11 42
Although the COPN statute was drafted ostensibly to control
health facility expansion, the final section of the Act had very
little to do with this purpose.

Instead of discussing health

facility expansion, this section addresses the issue of
unjustifiable termination of, or exclusion from, employment of
qualified personnel in a licensed health facility. Failure to
provide adequate justification that the action in question was
related to institutional rules and regulations, or the quality of
patient care, was considered unacceptable under the statute.
Therefore, institutions found to be in violation of this
provision were subject to license suspension or revocation,
pending appea1.43

That such a provision was included in a

measure designed to regulate health facility expansion may
4 1virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) vol. 1, ch. 419, sec.32211.13.
42virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) ch. 419' sec. 32-211. 12.
43virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) ch. 419, sec. 32-211. 16.
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possibly be attributed to efforts occurring nationally during
this period to prohibit employment discrimination.

Amendments to the Statute

The original COPN statute has undergone numerous changes
since its enactment.

Many of the amendments to the statute were

undoubtedly the product of federal requirements stemming from the
federal CON statute, passed in 1974.

over time, the regulatory

scope and administrative structure has been altered, as has the
character of the decision-making process. Changes that have
occurred with respect the decision-making process have generally
streamlined the process while providing greater opportunities for
input from the public than had existed under the original
statute.
Final authority has remained at the state level.

Although

the Health Commissioner retained decision-making authority, other
entities were given more prominent roles.

For instance, the

General Assembly required that areawide health planning agency
recommendations be considered by the Commissioner when rendering
a COPN application decision. 4 4

In the initial statute, the

Commissioner's consideration of these recommendations was
optional.

In 1982, the General Assembly transferred

responsibility for the promulgation of COPN rules and regulations

44virginia Acts of Assembly,
32-211.6-8.

(1975) vol. 1, ch. 220, sec.
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from the Health Commissioner to the state Board of Health.45
Beginning in 1977, the General Assembly incorporated changes
in the COPN program that were mandated by the federal National
Health Planning and Resource Development Act (P. L. 93-641).
Although retaining their functions, the designation of the
areawide health planning agencies was changed to Health Systems
Agencies, and the geographic areas that they represented were
henceforth referred to as Health Systems Areas, and the Statewide
Health Cooordinating Council replaced the State Comprehensive
Health Planning Council as the executive branch body responsible
the statewide health and medical facilities plans.46

It was also

the SHCC's responsibility to review and make recommendations to
the Commissioner regarding individual COPN applications.

However

the General Assembly rescinded this vestige of responsibility in
1984.47

A year later, the Virginia Department of Health was

designated as the State Health Planning and Development Agency
(SHPDA), with responsibility for administering the COPN
program.48

The General Assembly made two attempts to

strengthen statewide health planning capabilities by enhancing
the tools that were at the Commissioner's disposal. In the 1977
4 5 virginia Acts of Assembly:,
32-102.2.

(1982) vol. 1, ch. 388, sec.

4 6 virginia Acts of Assembly:,
211.5 (a) .

(1977) vol.1, ch. 575, sec. 32-

47virginia Acts of Assembly:,
4 8 virginia Acts of Assembly:,
32-211.21.

(1984) ch. 740, sec. 32-102.6.
(1978) vol.1, ch. 454, sec.
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amendment to the COPN statute, the SHCC was given the task of
formulating the State Health Plan (SHP), and the more specific
State Medical Facilities Plan.

Also, the standard review period

for reaching decisions on COPN applications was extended from 90
to 120 days.49

The number of criteria that the Commissioner used

as a guide in determining the suitability of proposed projects
was expanded from seven to twenty factors.50

These changes seem

to have been designed to integrate local needs and statewide
concerns.

For instance, the relationship of a project to local

support and ancillary services, as well as the project's
relationship to training programs and facilities for health care
professionals in the area, were to be taken into consideration by
the Commissioner.
Amendments to the original COPN statute also altered the
scope of the COPN program.

The types of facilities subject to

COPN review were expanded in 1977 and 1982. 51

Health Maintenance

Organizations (HMOs) and non-profit nursing homes were also
exempted in 1982.52

And in 1985, COPN requirements were lifted

49virginia Acts of Assembly,
32-211.6 ( 6) •

(1977) vol. 1, ch. 575, sec.

50 virginia Acts of Assembly,
32.1-102.3 (B) •

(1982) vol. 1, ch. 388, sec.

51virginia Acts of Assembly, (1977) vol.1, ch. 575, sec. 32211.5-9, 12, 17. Also, Virginia Acts of Assembly, (1982) vol. 1,
ch. 388, sec. 32- 102.1.
52virginia Acts of Assembly,
32.1-96.1.

(1982) vol. 2, ch. 659, sec.
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from home health agencies.5 3

The capital expenditure thresholds

for triggering the COPN review process were raised in 1977,
1982.54

Thus while some amendments expanded the types of

projects subject to COPN review, other amendments raised the
thresholds and exempted certain types of projects, essentially
restricting the program's coverage.

Conclusion

Certificate of need in Virginia was a policy borne of a
perceived crisis.

Skyrocketing health care costs and an excess

of hospital beds, accentuated by questionable administrative
practices at Virginia Blue Cross-Blue Shield helped provide the
catalyst for change in the health care arena.

Of course, public

policies relating to the provision of health care were already in
effect.

The federal Hill-Burton program had been providing

hospital construction funds for twenty-five years, and the
Regional Medical Plan and the Comprehensive Health Planning Act
established a health planning framework at the regional and
statewide levels of implementation.
It was within this environment that certificate of need in
Virginia evolved.

Rather than create wholly new, independent

53virginia Acts of Assembly,
32.1-102.1 (11).

(1985) vol. 1, ch. 513,

sec.

54virginia Acts of Assembly, (1977) vol. 1, ch. 575, sec.
32-211.5(5)., Virginia Acts of Assembly, (1982) vol. 1, ch. 388,
sec. 32.1-102.1 (6) (a).
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planning bodies, the authors of this legislation chose to
delegate responsibility for its implementation to the Health
Commissioner, and to the state- and areawide health planning
councils created pursuant to the Comprehensive Health Planning
Act.

COPN was thereby incorporated into the existing health

planning structure.
Administratively, attention was focused at the state level.
In fact, most of the authority was vested in the Health
Commissioner's office through relatively broad delegations of
authority and responsibility.

This concentration of authority

may well have been part of a larger movement occurring in
Virginia government at the time which stressed the consolidation
of authority at the cabinet level of government.

Meanwhile, the

areawide planning councils and the state Health Planning Council
occupied largely advisory roles.

Nonetheless, regional as well

as statewide needs were to be taken into account when rendering a
decision on a COPN application.

If the Commissioner's decision

regarding a particular COPN application resulted in a denial,
there were ample provisions for appeal.

These procedures were

clearly enumerated in the statute, in contrast to the broad goals
and delegations of authority that were to guide the program.
Several themes are evident in this legislation.

First,

there is the emphasis on the utilization of health planning in
the furtherance of other goals, such as cost containment.

By

doing so, the authors of this legislation lent credence to the
stated goal of enhancing health planning capabilities in the
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Commonwealth.

Secondly, the concentration of authority at the

state level suggests that statewide health planning goals were
to take precedence over area needs, since the areawide agencies
were to act only in an advisory capacity.

Applicants were to be

treated fairly, and violators of the statute's provisions were
subject to rather small fines, although there was the potential
for license revocation.
In the fifteen years since its passage, the statute has been
amended eight times. The statute that exists today has changed
considerably from the statute as it was originally drafted.
These alterations are reflected in a number of policies and
procedures that differ from those in the original statute.

The

nature and implications of these changes for the implementation
of the COPN program shall be discussed subsequently.

CHAPTER 3
THE VIRGINIA CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC NEED PROCESS

With the passage of the Medical Care Facilities Certificate
of Public Need statute in 1973, the Commonwealth of Virginia
entered a new phase of health care policy.

Certificate of Public

Need (COPN) represented the Commonwealth's attempt to rationalize
the health facility sector of the health care industry by
constraining health facility development, except where it was
deemed to be "needed."

To that end, Virginia established a

regional and statewide health planning system to gather
information concerning state and regional health facility needs.
These data were used at the state level to determine, within a
regulatory environment, the efficacy of a proposed project.

COPN

provided Virginia health officials with a vehicle for controlling
medical facility resource allocation.
Regulation is an inherently political process. 1

By creating

the COPN program, Virginia policy-makers transformed what had
been largely private decisions regarding health facility projects
into often very political decisions.

Decisions as to the

efficacy of health facility projects were no longer primarily
private concerns.

Instead, final authority regarding the

worthiness of projects was vested in state officials (most
notably the Health commissioner) who were required to adhere to

1 Meier,
.
p.8.
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legal and regulatory guidelines, and were often subject to
political pressure.

Also, the promulgation of rules and

regulations provided opportunities for public input into the COPN
process.
The evolution of the COPN process over the last sixteen
years has not been a tranquil period.

As noted in the previous

chapter, the original statute has been amended numerous times,
and there have been many non-legislative changes adopted by state
Health Department officials.

Not long after Virginia enacted its

COPN statute, the federal government enacted a national health
planning statute (P.L. 93-641), which included a provision that
each state create its own certificate of need program.

P.L. 93-

641 provided federal funds to states for the establishment of CON
programs, which were subject to broad federal guidelines.
Through this federal health planning program, the federal
government also influenced Virginia's COPN program, if only in a
broad oversight capacity.
Virginia's COPN program encourages public participation.
Over the last sixteen years, the COPN process has become less
restrictive with respect to the groups or individuals who may
play a role in the process.

Virginia politics has not always

been characterized by openess, however.

The public participation

that legislators and health department officials incorporated
into the COPN process coincided with a broader movement in
Virginia politics during the early 1970's to open the political
process to greater levels of scrutiny and participation than had
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existed previously. 2

Health care providers, third party payers,

business groups and governmental agencies are just some examples
of the participants in the COPN process.

The participation by

these and other parties has helped politicize the process, and
there are particular features of the process that are especially
susceptible to political forces.

Alford has suggested that the

rational objectives of CON are mitigated by the political
activity common to the regulatory process.3

The notion that

health care should be responsive to the public's needs,4
contributes further to the politicization of the COPN process.

The Certificate of Public Need Process

The COPN process that exists today is quite different from
the process created in the original statute.

Amendments to the

statute, as well as subsequent regulatory changes adopted by
Health Department officials have altered the complexion of the
COPN

process.

These changes allowed the program to adapt to the

evolving health care environment.

2Thomas R. Morris, "From 'Old Virginny' to the 'New Dominion':
Two Decades of Public Policymaking in Virginia," in A Virginia
Profile: 1960-2000, Assessing current Trends and Problems, John
V. Moeser, ed. (Pallisades Park, NJ: Commonwealth Books, 1981),
p. 76.
3Robert R. Alford, Health Care Politics (Chicago:
of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 204.

University

4virginia Department of Health, Division of Resources Development, Certificate of Public Need Biennial Report, 1983-1984,
(Richmond, Virginia: Virginia Department of Health, 1984), p.1.
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When discussing the COPN process the most important thing to
recognize is that there is not a single COPN review process.

As

it currently exists, the COPN program consists of three review
processes, and an appeal process.

The Standard Review process is

designed to handle COPN reviews for most of the projects that
meet the criteria for reviewability.

An abbreviated

Administrative Review process facilitates the review of projects,
such as parking garages, which meet some, but not all of the
criteria for a Standard Review.

Then there is an Exemption

Review process which provides COPN applicants with the
opportunity to demonstrate that their project should not have to
undergo a review.

Figure 3.1 provides a diagrammatic overview of

the major elements of each review process and, the time frames in
which each review process occurs. Figure 3.1 also illustrates
some of the procedural differences between each process.

There

is also an appeal process, which provides avenues of remedial
recourse for those parties dissatisfied with the outcome of a
project review.

The appeal process includes provisions for

administrative, as well as judicial relief.
Each of the review processes operates within its own time
frame.

Due to the greater amount of time between steps in the

process, 120 days are required to complete a Standard Review.
Administrative and Exemption Reviews are simpler processes,
requiring thirty-five and fifteen days, respectively, for the

Applicant files
Review

~x~mption

R"equei:it ·

Commissioner renders
d:e;i::Hi).on by day 15

ti

~

DRD notifies

DRD notifies applicant

applicant of
review schedule
upon receiving
application

of beginni.ng of review
cycle on 10th day of
each month

l

:g_.
--,

!
\.11

HSA holds public

l::l

bearing,bRD:.and

~

RSA

recommenda~

tions by day 30
Commissioner's
decision by day
35

-

~

!

0
(J)

·t1

c+

I-'·

H;i
I-'•
()

>

Ill
c+

:::1

::;::

H

en

z

1-3

H

en

1-3

:cu
>
1-3

H

;j

HSA holds public hearing(s) and develops it~

recommendation by .60th
day of review cycle

~

oo
llJ :»« ~
CTI

o~

<
H

t=j

!l:'!

DRD develops and for-

•.>1ards its report and
recommendations and
the HSA recommendations to Commissio~er
by ?0th day.
If necessary, IFFC is
held between ?1st and
90th days

~a
a
~Erj

'-< I-<:

(J)

0

1-b

~

o'

1-1

~

()

CD

!:z:

\.>

I-'•

(J)
(J)

p.

d

!;:d

-l

I-'·

~

(J)

~

(J)

<:
t:j

;-)

~

()

\.0

1-1

0

(D

Cll

Commissioner renders
decision by 120th
day

tl

~

I\)

0

'-..;
I-'

t1

•--'

79
completion of these review cycles.5

These time frames permit the

expeditious handling of less significant projects, while
providing considerably more time to review larger, costlier
projects that would probably have a greater impact on the cost
and provision of health care.

While it is unnecessary to

delineate every step of each review process, highlighting
important stages of each review process can be helpful in
understanding the process, and may also provide a basis for
comparison.
The first step in each of the review processes occurs when a
prospective applicant files a Letter of Intent with the Division
of Resources Development(DRD), the state agency responsible for
administering the program.

Those seeking an exemption from the

COPN process under the Exemption Review procedure must submit an
Exemption Review Request form to the DRD.

A Letter of Intent

must identify the owner of the facility in question, the nature
and scope of the proposed project, the project's location and
costs.6

The information required on the Exemption Review Request

is much more detailed.

Applicants must identify not only the

owners of the facility, but also, the type of ownership
(proprietary, non-profit, public, etc.), and the operator of the
5Division of Resources Development, Certificate of Public
Need, Annual Report 1985-1986, (Richmond, Virginia: Virginia
Department of Health), p. 7.

6virginia Department of Health,Division of Resources Development, "Description of certificate of Public Need Procedures,"
Presentation to the Commission on Medical Care Facilities Certificate
of Public Need, February 16, 1987 (Richmond: Division of Resources
Development) pp. 1, 6.
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facility.

The applicant has to provide a brief description of

the project, including its capital and financing costs, and the
proposed method of financing the project.

A statement estimating

the project's impact on the facility's rates, and a projection of
revenues and expenditures for the first two years of operation is
also required.

The final element of the Exemption Review Request

is a schedule for completion of the project. 7

It should be noted

here that both the Standard Review and the Administrative Review
processes afford applicants the opportunity to consult with
Health Systems Agency (HSA) or DRD officials prior to the
submission of the application concerning community health
facility needs, and the opportunity to provide general assistance
in completing the applications, which are available upon request
from the Health Commissioner.
Once an applicant files the Letter of Intent or Exemption
Review Request with the Health Commissioner, the application is
completed by the applicant and submitted to the DRD for a
completeness review.

The DRD has fifteen days to make certain

that all pertinent information has been included on the
application.a

When the application has been deemed complete, and

it has been filed with the DRD and the appropriate HSA, the
7"Description of certificate of Public Need Review Procedures," p. 10.
Bvirginia Department of Health, Office of Health Planning
and Resources Development, Rules and Regulations of the Board of
Health, Commonwealth of Virginia, Virginia Medical Facilities
Certificate of Public Need, (Richmond, Virginia: Department of
Health, January 22, 1986) secs. 6.1 and 7.1, respectively.
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formal review process can then begin.

Standard Review

The longest, most complex process is the Standard Review
process (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2).

Lasting 120 days, the

Standard Review provides ample opportunity for review at the
state level, as well as the solicitation of public comment on
individual applications.

After the DRD has received and approved

the application, the applicant receives notification that the
review is about to commence.

The tenth day of each month is the

beginning of the Standard Review cycle, and constitutes the first
day of the 120 day process.9
All medical care facility projects that do not qualify for
Administrative Review are subject to a Standard Review, unless
they are declared exempt through an Exemption Review.

Facilities

that are subject to review include general hospitals, nursing
homes, extended care and intermediate care facilities,
specialized out-patient clinics, mental health and mental
retardation facilities.

Projects that are subject to Standard

Review include capital expenditures of at least $700,000 that
also result in an increase in bed capacity and the introduction
of new clinical health services.

Equipment purchases costing at

9virginia Department of Health,Division of Resources Development
Virginia Medical Care Facilities Certificate of Public Need
Program, Biennial Report, 1985 and 1986,( Virginia Department of
Health: Richmond, Virginia, 1987), p.11.
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least $400,000 are also subject to standard Review.10

These

expenditure thresholds have increased substantially over time, as
noted in chapter 2.
The HSAs play a major role during the first sixty days of
the Standard Review process.

It is during this time period that

the HSA must hold at least one, but not more than two hearings on
an application, allowing applicants the opportunity to respond to
issues or questions that individuals or medical facility
spokesman may raise during the hearing.11

In addition to

notifying the applicant of the review schedule, the HSA must
notify other health care providers in the area who may be
affected by the project, as well as identifiable interest groups.
Notice of a hearing must be published in an area newspaper nine
days prior to the hearing.12

The HSA has sixty days in which to

conduct the hearing(s), review the application, and make its
recommendation to the Health Commissioner.13

These initial

activities constitute the HSAs' role in the process.

However,

the Commissioner does take into consideration the HSA review and
recommendation when rendering a decision.
Public input into the early stages of the process appears
lOcertificate of Public Need Biennial Report 1985-1986, pp.
6-7.
llcertificate of Public Need Rules and Regulations, sec. 7.6
(A) •

12certificate of Public Need Rules and Regulations, sec.
7.6. (B).
13certificate of Public Need Rules and Regulations, sec. 7.6(A).
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to be confined to the public hearings.

It is during these public

hearings that conflicts often arise, to be resolved by the
antagonists through bargaining and negotiation.14

These

conflicts may involve competing applicants with similar project
requests, or the conflict may be between an applicant and members
of the HSA governing board or staff.
While the HSA conducts its review, the DRD simultaneously
conducts its own review.

The DRD completes its staff report by

the seventieth day of the review cycle.

An important change in

the Standard Review process came in 1984, when the statewide
Health Coordinating Council (SHCC), which was originally
authorized to review COPN applications was removed from the
review cycle through an amendment in the COPN statute.1 5

Even

though the removal of the SHCC had no effect on the overall
length of the review cycle, it did seem to streamline the process
from an administrative standpoint.
When the DRD finishes its review, it forwards both the HSA
report and recommendations, and the DRD report and
recommendations to the Commissioner.

If, by the seventieth day

there is opposition to a project, an Informal Fact-Finding
Conference (IFFC) is held by the DRD Director. The DRD notifies
the applicant and any other interested parties of the date of the
14orew Altman I Richard Greene, and Harvey M. Sapolsky,
Health Planning and Regulation: the Dec1s1on Making Process
(Washington, n. c. : AUPHA Press, 1981), p. 150.
I

15virginia Acts of Assembly,
32-102.6.

•

•

(1984) vol. 2, ch. 740, sec.
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hearing.

This date had actually been predetermined in the

initial communication from the HSA, which allowed time for an
IFFC in the initial review timetable.
an IFFC, a party must show that:

In order to participate in

a) significant relevant

information was not presented at the public hearing, or,b)
significant changes in factors relating to the application have
occurred since the public hearing, or, c) there was a serious
mistake in fact or law in the DRD's staff report, or the HSA's
staff report.16
These conferences are conducted by the DRD Director.

The

HSA and Interested Parties present their positions on the
project, and the applicant is given the opportunity to respond to
comments and criticisms.

Based on the record of this hearing,

the DRD Director makes a recommendation to the Health
Commissioner regarding the COPN application in question.

This

recommendation takes into account the HSA and the DRD staff
reports, as well as the informal fact-finding conference
record.17

Since the IFFC must be conducted between the seventy-

first and ninetieth days of the review cycle, the Commissioner
has at least thirty days in which to arrive at a decision before
the 120-day review period expires.

Thus the IFFC provides yet

another opportunity for public input into the Standard Review
process by providing all parties to the original public hearing
l6 11 oescription of certificate of Public Need Review Procedures,"
pp. 2-3.
17 11 oescription of certificate of Public Need Review Procedures,"
p. 3.
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the opportunity to participate in the IFFC.

However the

presence of a definite timetable within which the IFFC must
occur would seem to curb any tendency to prolong the process
unnecessarily.
The standard Review process provides ample time and
opportunity for all of those who wish to comment on a COPN
application to do so.

Marmor and Marone have suggested that time

constraints, together with conflict, combine to make the review
process inefficient.18

While the Standard Review cycle

facilitates public input into the review process, this input may
result in delays if an IFFC should be necessary.
delay is not necessarily to be condemned.

However, such

Delay is inherent in

the regulatory process as regulators try to be responsive to the
actions of those involved.19 In the final analysis, regulatory
delay may represent a trade-off for procedural fairness.20

Administrative Review

An alternative review process exists for those projects that
meet some of the COPN review criteria, but do not meet all of the
criteria for a standard Review.

For those projects that do not

18Theodore R. Marmor and James A. Marone, "Representing
Consumer Interests: Imbalances Markets, Health Planning and the
HSAs, 11 Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly/Health and Society (58) 1
(Winter 1980), p. 160.
19Bruce M. Owen and Ronald Braetigan, The Regulation Game
(Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Co., 1978), p. 20.
20 Meier, p. 279.
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involve a major service, facility change, or capital expenditure,
the Administrative Review process exists to expedite the issuance
of COPNs (see Figures 3.1 and 3.3).
In order to be considered under the Administrative Review
process, certain criteria must be met.

These criteria have been

adjusted over time to reflect changes in the health care sector
as well as inflationary trends.

Projects that are eligible for

Administrative Review include any capital expenditure of at least
$700,000, but not more than $3 million, that does not result in a
change in bed capacity or the addition of a new clinical health
service.

COPNs may also be issued under Administrative Review if

the project involves a capital expenditure of less than $700,000,
but does result in the addition of a new clinical health service,
or if the project involves a change in bed capacity, or the
replacement or relocation of at least ten percent of the existing
bed capacity, or ten beds, whichever is less. 2 1
The primary advantage of the Administrative Review over the
Standard Review is that the Administrative Review is less time
consuming.

Whereas the Standard Review occurs within a 120-day

time period, the Administrative Review lasts no more than thirtyfive days.

Less time elapses between the various stages of the

Administrative Review as compared to the Standard Review.

As

with the standard Review, applicants must request application
forms from the Health Commissioner, and applicants may request a
pre-consultation conference with representatives of the
21certificate of Public Need Rules and Regulations, sec. 6.1.
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appropriate HSA.22
Once the applicant has submitted copies of the application
form to the DRD and the appropriate HSA, the Administrative
Review can commence.

Within thirty days of receipt of the

completed application, the HSA must hold a public hearing, such
as is required in the Standard Review process.

Should the HSA

fail to hold such a hearing within this time limit, the project
in question shall receive an automatic recommendation for
approval from the HSA.23

The DRD also contacts the applicant

once the application has been received in order to establish a
review schedule, which includes a tentative date for an IFFC.
Assuming that there is no need for an IFFC, both the HSA and the
DRD recommendations must be transmitted to the Health
Commissioner by the thirtieth day of the review cycle. 2 4

The

Health Commissioner then has five days in which to render a
decision.
If an IFFC is necessary, the decision-making timetable is
automatically extended.

The justifications for holding an IFFC

are the same under the Administrative Review process as under the
Standard Review process.

The IFFC is usually held in Richmond,

within seven days of the decision by the DRD that such a
conference is warranted.

The Health Commissioner then has at

22certificate of Public Need Rules and Regulations, sec. 6.2.
23certificate of Public Need Rules and Regulations, sec.
6.4.
24Biennial Report, 1985-1986, p. 10.
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least two weeks to arrive at a decision, pending the conclusion
of the IFFc.25
There are many similarities between the standard Review
process and the Administrative Review process.

In fact, the

critical difference between the two processes seems to be that
the timetable for an Administrative Review is considerably
shorter than for a standard Review, and thus does not allow as
much time for the consideration of a project by the Health
Department. It also does not give opponents or advocates of a
project as much time to marshal support or opposition to a
project that is being reviewed under this process.

Both

processes are characterized by a great deal of communication
between the applicant, the HSA, the DRD, and various Interested
Parties.

All of this often contributes to the need for review

extensions and the devotion of Health Department resources to
resolve disputes.26
It seems only natural that the Administrative Review period
would be considerably shorter than the Standard Review period,
since the projects covered by the Administrative Review are not
as significant financially.

The creation of this abbreviated

review schedule for projects that do not involve significant
alterations in the provision of care allows Health Department
officials to control health facility activities that may still
have an impact on overall facility costs, even though they do not
25Biennial Report, 1985-1986, p.10.
26Biennial Report, 1983-1984, p. 30.
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involve a significant capital outlay.

Decision-Making Criteria

By the time a COPN application finally reaches the Health
Commissioner's desk, a great deal of information regarding the
proposed project is available to the Commissioner.

Factors that

the Commissioner must consider when rendering a decision are
specified in the COPN statute and in the Certificate of Public
Need Rules and Regulations.

This list of factors has changed

over time in response to changes in the health care environment,
and the concerns of lawmakers and health officials.

Since agency

heads are often the focal point of group intervention, it is
important that legislative goals and grants of authority delegate
as much authority as possible to these individuals. 2 7

By

providing a list of decision-making criteria, the General
Assembly seems to have been cognizant of the importance of
specific criteria.
Initially, there were just seven factors that the
Commissioner had to consider. These factors stressed the
compatibility of the project with statewide health planning goals
(identified in the state Health Plan and the State Medical
Facilities Plan) .

In fact, the Commissioner is legally bound to

consider the state Health Plan (SHP) and the State Medical
Facilities Plan (SMFP).
27Meier, pp. 16-18.

It is here that all of the need
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projection methodologies and inventories of existing health care
facility resources are contained.

Also to be considered in the

initial list of criteria were the availability of less costly and
more efficient alternatives to the proposed project, and the
proposed project's relationship to the facility's long-range
plans.28

These factors seem to have been designed to facilitate

the incorporation of the COPN program into an orderly, rational
health planning scheme.
In the fifteen years since the enactment of the COPN
statute, thirteen additional factors have been added to the list
of considerations that the Commissioner must take into account
when reviewing COPN applications.

Where the seven original

factors stressed state and regional planning goals, more recent
additions to the list focus on the efficacy of the project, and
on certain specialized segments of

health care, such as health

maintenance organizations, and research-oriented projects.

The

eighteenth factor on the list is an acknowledgement of changes
that have occurred in the financing of health care, since it
encourages competitive forces, quality assurance, and costeffectiveness. 29

The emphasis on competition is especially

significant, since competition in the health care marketplace was
not as prominent in 1973 as it is today.

In light of these

factors it should be noted that each project is evaluated on its
28virginia Acts of Assembly, (1973) ch. 419, sec. 32-211.6
(b) •

29virginia Acts of Assembly, (1984) vol. 2, ch. 740, sec.32.1102.3 (B).
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own merits. 30

However, the Commissioner does have some

flexibility in the application of these criteria (particularly
the SHP and the SMFP).

The Commissioner is permitted to deviate

from the SHP and the SMFP, but he must provide written
justification for such departures.

The Health Commissioner is

thus afforded some latitude in reconciling COPN applications
with these health planning documents.
It would appear that the Health Commissioner's decisionmaking criteria have evolved in response to changes in the health
care environment.

This is especially true of those criteria

that focus on specific segments of the health care industry,
such as reimbursement practices and specific types of health care
services.

As the health care industry became more complex, these

criteria seem to have been altered to accommodate changes that
were occurring.

However, throughout the life of the COPN

program, the Health Commissioner has frequently borne the brunt
of political pressure being exerted by competing applicants and
HSAs who try to influence his decision on a COPN application. 31
Indeed, since he has sole decision-making authority on COPN
applications, the political pressure may, at times, be especially
acute.

However the effects of this activity may be mitigated by

fairly unambiguous decision-making criteria.

30Marilyn west, Director of the Division of Resource Development, interview by author, 21 September 1988, Virginia Department
of Health, Richmond, Virginia.
31west interview.
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Exemption Review

In addition to the two review processes designed to handle
most health facility projects, a .third review mechanism - the
Exemption Review - is also available to review health facility
projects that may not meet the criteria for Standard Review or
Administrative Review.

The Exemption Review allows medical care

facilities to circumvent the project review process if the
project in question meets certain criteria, and does not meet all
of the Standard or Administrative Review criteria.
Projects that satisfy any of the four Exemption Review
criteria which are specified in the Certificate of Public Need
Rules and Regulations are eligible for a COPN exemption.
Clinical health services involving a capital expenditure less
than $700,000 and having operating costs in the first two years
less than $300,000 are exempt unless they involve specialized
services, such as CT scanning.

Also exempt from the review

process are equipment expenditures less than $700,000, unless
this equipment results in the introduction of a new service.

A

capital expenditure less than $1.5 million for construction that
does not result in new health services is exempt from the COPN
review process.

Finally, any capital expenditure that is

necessary to meet an emergency situation which threatens patients
. or staff is exempt if so certifie
. . d b y th e

c ommissioner.
. .
32

32certificate of Public Need Rules and Regulations, sec.
5.1 (A)-(D).
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Compared to the Standard and Administrative Reviews, the
Exemption Review process is very simple (see Figure 3.4).

In

order to initiate an Exemption Review, an applicant need only
file an exemption review request with the ORD and the appropriate
HSA.

This request form must specify the name and ownership of

the facility, the nature of the project, its costs and its effect
on the facility's charges for services, the proposed financing
method, projected revenues, and a timetable for the project's
completion.33
No hearings are required for an Exemption Review, and the
review is conducted entirely at the state level.

The ORD reviews

the exemption request to make certain that all relevant
information is included, and then forwards the request to the
Health Commissioner.

The Commissioner must render a decision

within fifteen days of the initial submission of the request.
Although the ORD forwards a copy of the review request and the
Commissioner's decision to the appropriate HSA, the HSA is not
actually involved in the process.34
The Exemption Review process is much more streamlined than
the other two review processes.

However, if an exemption request

is denied, then the applicant must file a COPN application, and
undergo one of the two project review processes.

Unlike the

other review processes, the Exemption Review process does not
allow for public input regarding prospective projects.

This fact

33certificate of Public Need Rules and Regulations, sec. 5.2.
34certificate of Public Need Annual Report, 1985-1986, p. 9.
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undoubtedly helps facilitate the rapid completion of Exemption
Reviews.
Actors in the Certificate of Public Need Process

Over the years, the number of participants in the COPN process
has expanded.

Today there are numerous potential actors in the

COPN process (Figure 3.5).

However the roles of state and

regional officials have remained essentially unchanged.

Each HSA

is responsible for reviewing every COPN application submitted by
an applicant within its geographic jurisdiction, or Health
Systems Area. The HSA reviews the application for completeness,
and makes a recommendation as to the appropriateness of the
proposed project.

At the state level, the Division of Resources

Development, is responsible for processing and evaluating all
COPN applications, conducting hearings, and providing
administrative support to the Health Commissioner, the State
Board of Health, and the Statewide Health Coordinating Council
(SHCC).

The SHCC develops the state Health Plan and the State

Medical Facilities Plan. 3 5

The State Board of Health promulgates

the rules and regulations that govern the day-to-day operation of
the COPN

program.

Final decision-making authority on COPN

applications rests with the Commissioner of Health.36
Throughout much of the Virginia COPN's existence the federal
35certificate of Public Need Biennial Report, 1985-1986, pp.

3-4.
36certificate of Public Need Biennial Report, 1985-1986, pp.

4-5.
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government has overseen the program's implementation.

As noted

in the first chapter, Congress appropriated federal funds for the
establishment and continuing operation of the HSAs, as well as
assistance to the SHCC and the Department of Health.

This

funding was contingent upon the approval of the State Health Plan
by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (later the
Secretary of Health and Human Services).
The federal government's involvement has not been pervasive.
Federal activities were intended primarily to ensure compliance
with broad federal health planning guidelines and goals.

The

federal government did not control the daily operations of
Virginia's COPN

program.37

Virginia was had considerable

autonomy in the administration and implementation of its COPN
program.
Participation in the COPN program is not limited to
government officials.

Private sector groups and individuals have

a voice in the program.

The list of those parties who are

permitted participate in the COPN program has grown over the
years.

The most obvious participant is the actual applicant, who

may represent an existing facility, or a concern wishing to
establish a new facility.

Interested Parties Demonstrating Good

Cause may present information to the effect that changes in the
nature or circumstances surrounding a project have occurred since
the application was originally submitted.

Third party payers who

provide coverage to at least five percent of the residents in the
37west interview.
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applicant's service area are eligible to participate in the
informal, fact-finding conference.38

Public hearings conducted

by the HSA's on all COPN applications afford the general public
the opportunity to comment on individual proposals.

These

opportunities are not limited to the decision-making and rulemaking processes.

Certificate of Public Need Appeal Process

After the Health Commissioner has rendered a decision on a
COPN application, it is possible to have the decision
reconsidered.

The original COPN statute provided for an appeal

process, and this element of the program was subsequently
incorporated into the Rules and Regulations.

The appeal process

allows for the administrative reconsideration and judicial review
of decisions.
The initial stage of the appeal process is a formal,
evidentiary hearing, conducted by the Health Commissioner within
thirty days of receiving such a request. Parties who have
standing to request such an appeal are the applicant, the HSA,
persons demonstrating good cause, as defined previously, and
third-party payers who provide insurance to at least five percent
of the people within the facility's geographic service area.39
38certificate of Public Need Biennial Report, 1985-1986, p.

7.
39certificate of Public Need Rules and Regulations, sec. 9.1.
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This hearing essentially involves a reconsideration by the Health
Commissioner of the various factors and points of view presented
during the initial review process.

The list of those parties who

may request an appeal has grown considerably since 1973, when the
statute granted only the applicant the right of appeal before the
Board of Health.40
If any parties to the evidentiary hearing are dissatisfied
after a formal reconsideration of the decision, they may request
an appeal to the circuit court in whose jurisdiction the project
is located.

Once the DRD has transmitted all pertinent records

to the court, the court then either upholds, overturns or
'modifies the Commissioner's decision.41

Any party to the

proceeding that is dissatisfied with the circuit court's ruling,
may appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court. 42

By expanding the

list of parties who may request an appeal, Virginia seems to have
enhanced the political nature of the COPN process in yet another
way.

The appeal process also increases the likelihood of delay

in the project's completion, since an applicant would not be able
to initiate a project until the project is no longer contested.

40virginia Acts of Assembly,
9.2.

(1973) ch. 419, sec. 32-211.9.

41certificate of Public Need Rules and Regulations, sec.
(C).
42certificate of Public Need Rules and Regulations, sec. 9.2

(D) •
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Certificate of Public Need Conditions and Characteristics

There are certain elements that are common to all COPNs,
regardless of the means by which they are granted.
valid for the same period of time - one year.43

All COPNs are

If requested by

the applicant, COPNs may be extended beyond this time period.
Once a COPN has been granted, it is the Health Commissioner's
responsibility to monitor projects to make certain that the
original timetable and cost estimates are being met.
Health Commissioner should find that:

If the

a) "substantial and

continuing progress" has not been made, or, b) the capital
expenditure limit for the project has been exceeded, or, c) the
applicant "willfully or recklessly misrepresented intentions or
facts" in order to obtain a COPN, then the Health Commissioner
may revoke a COPN.44

Other situations that would provide

justification for the Commissioner to revoke a COPN include the
applicant's failure to file periodic progress reports with the
Health Department;

making unapproved changes in a project;

or,

the applicant's failure to initiate a project within two years of
the issuance of a COPN.45

These measures represent the

Commonwealth's effort to ensure the prompt completion of a
43virqinia Acts of Assembly,

(1984) ch. 740, sec.32.1-102.3

(B) •

44virginia Acts of Assembly,
32.1-102.4.

(1984) vol. 2, ch. 740, sec.

45certificate of Public Need Rules and Regulations, secs.
8.4 (A)-(F).
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project, within the expenditure limits set forth in the COPN.
If an applicant violates the conditions of a COPN, or if a
facility owner/operator fails to obtain a COPN prior to
commencing a project, that individual or organization may be
subject to sanction.

Any project that is commenced without a

COPN may be subject to the revocation of, or the refusal to grant
a license for the facility in question.

In addition, the Health

Commissioner, the State Board of Health, or the Attorney General
may petition the circuit court having jurisdiction to enjoin the
completion of a project, or to enjoin the utilization of a
completed project.46
the COPN program.

These provisions represent the "teeth" of

While they do not provide for monetary

penalties as the original statute did, the potential for
injunctive penalties would still seem to be a credible punishment
for violators, and may even serve as a deterrent against
potential violators.

Regulatory Promulgation

A number of health care issues relating to COPN in Virginia
have arisen over the last sixteen years.

However the central

themes of access, cost containment and quality control are still
of paramount importance, as they were in 1973. 47

Even so, issues

46certificate of Public Need Rules and Regulations, secs.
10.1-10.2.
47west interview.
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emerge that require attention, and may necessitate regulatory
changes in the COPN program.

When such situations arise, there

is an opportunity for input from a variety of public and private
sector sources.

Just as the review and appeal processes are

characterized by bargaining and negotiation between various
interests, so too, is the process of writing regulations often
influenced by political conflict.48
Public input into the regulatory promulgation process is
permitted and even encouraged by Virginia officials.
such participation is required by law.

In fact,

The Virginia

Administrative Process Act governs the promulgation of
regulations.49

The SHCC has developed guidelines in accordance

with the Act for facilitating public participation in the
development of its regulations, which are generally located in
the State Health Plan. These guidelines pertain to the
identification and notification of Interested Parties, as well as
the solicitation of input from those parties.

For instance,

Interested Parties may submit written comments concerning
proposed regulations, or they may serve on ad hoc advisory panels
that are established by the SHCC from time to time.SO
48Drew Altman, "The Politics of Health Care Regulation:
The Case of the National Health Planning and Resources Development
Act," Journal of Health Politics, Policy, and Law (2) 4 (Winter
1978), p. 567.
49code of Virginia, (1950) Title 9, ch. 1.1, sec. 9-6.14:
7.1.
50statewide Health Coordinating Council, "Guidelines for
Public Participation in the Development of Regulations," Adopted
on 19 September 1984 by the Virginia Statewide Health Coordinating
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Although the SHP contains much non-regulatory information,
there are particular provisions within it that specify standards
for review or methods for need determination for particular types
of projects are considered regulatory material.51

When the SHCC

desires to make changes in its regulations, there are a number of
steps that it follows.

Some of these steps are mandated by the

Administrative Process Act, while the SHCC may also institute
formal requirements on its own.
The initial step in the regulatory development process
involves a determination by the SHCC that a change in the COPN
regulations is necessary. The SHCC may arrive at this decision
solely of its own accord, or it may receive suggestions from
other parties, such as government agencies or health care providers. 52

Once the SHCC determines that a change in its regulations

is warranted, it notifies the public.53
The designation and notification of Interested Parties
occurs in the same manner for regulatory changes as it does for
the IFFC.

The SHCC also publishes a Notice of Intended

Regulatory Action in a major Richmond newspaper, and in the
Council (Richmond, Virginia), pp. 2-3.
Slstatewide Health Coordinating Council, "Standards for
Evaluating Certificate of Public Need Applications to Establish
or Expand Nursing Horne Services," Adopted 19 September 1984, by
the Virginia Statewide Health Coordinating Council (Richmond,
Virginia),p. 1.
52John P. English, Health Planning Consultant, Division of
Health Planning, Virginia Department of Health, interview by
author, 25 August 1988, Richmond, Virginia.
53English interview.
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Virginia Register. This notice includes the title of the
regulation in question, a brief description of the proposed
change or new regulation, the identification of a SHCC contact
person, and the deadline for notifying the SHCC of a desire to
participate in the process.

The SHCC maintains a list of parties

who have been active in the regulatory process in the past, and
at least once each biennium it publishes an open invitation to
persons or parties who may wish to participate in the regulatory
development process to so notify the SHCC of their desire to
participate. 54
Once the SHCC has provided appropriate notification of its
intent to make regulatory changes, it proceeds to develop the
proposed new regulations or regulatory changes.

It is also at

this stage that the SHCC compiles a Regulatory Review Summary.
This summary contains the proposed new regulations or regulatory
changes, as well as a notice of a hearing date and a public
comment period.

After the hearing is held, and the public

comment period has expired, the SHCC considers the results of the
oral and written public comments that it has received and decides
on the final form that the regulatory change should take.55
Having decided on the final form that the regulation is to
take, the SHCC publishes a Final Regulatory Review Summary.
There are a number of components to this final summary.

A

54 11 Guidelines for Public Participation in the Development of
Regulations," sec. 3.02.
55English interview.
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Summary of Comments, which includes the oral and written comments
that the SHCC has received is incorporated into the Final
Regulatory Review summary.
Each Summary of Comments includes general comments on the
overall proposal, as well as questions that were raised by the
various interested parties during the hearing.

Some of the

persons who chose to comment on changes to the regulations
governing CT and MRI scanners, and nursing homes include Governor
Baliles, health facility administrators from around the state, as
well as officials from Blue Cross-Blue Shield.56

A SHCC response

to each question raised is also included in the Summary of
Comments. This format provides anyone who is interested with an
overview of the exchanges that took place during the hearing.
Such information may be useful to parties attempting to gauge the
political climate at a given time.

For instance, prospective

COPN applicants and Health Department officials might be able to
use. these comments as a way to test the acceptability of a
particular type of facility, service, or piece of equipment.
A statement of purpose for the proposed regulation, and an
impact assessment statement are incorporated into the Final
Regulatory Review Summary.57

The impact assessment statement

56 11 List of Persons That Commented on Proposed Standards for
Evaluating Certificate of Public Need Applications to Expand CT
or MRI Services," Final Regulatory Review Summary, pp. 1-2. Also
memo from John P. English, Acting Director, Division of Health
Planning, to the Virginia Statewide Health Coordinating Council,
re Nursing Homes, 26 March 1987.
57English interview.
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projects the anticipated effect that the proposed regulation will
have on the service or services in question.

If approved, the

regulation becomes effective no earlier than thirty days after
the final regulations are published in the Virginia Register.
This signifies the conclusion of the regulatory promulgation
process.

As with the decision-making process, the promulgation

of regulations governing review standards permits considerable
public input into this aspect of the COPN program, and may permit
certain groups or individuals to manipulate this aspect of the
COPN program. However the influence of such groups may be
mitigated by the presence of the SHCC which, acting as a
committee, may be less susceptible to political pressure than the
Health Commissioner.

Conclusion

Virginia's COPN program has a number of points of entry for
public participation.

The actual decision-making process, as

well as the regulatory promulgation process offer opportunities
for public access, and for political pressure to be brought to
bear upon Health Department officials.

The concentration of

decision-making authority in the hands of the Health Commissioner
make him especially susceptible to political pressure.

Need

criteria and regulations are also influenced by public input,
since hearings are held prior to their implementation.

Through

these avenues, health care providers and other interested parties
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have helped to shape the COPN program by influencing the daily
decision-making process as well as the rule-making process that
governs the COPN program.

CHAPTER 4
THE VIRGINIA CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC NEED ENVIRONMENT
The health care environment is considerably more complex
today than it was fifteen years ago when Virginia's COPN statute
was enacted.

Technological advances have revolutionized

diagnostic and surgical medicine, and the concepts of health
maintenance organizations, home health care, and ambulatory
(outpatient) surgicenters are just a few examples of the changes
that have taken place with respect to the provision of health
care in the U.S.
Health care reimbursement practices have also changed during
this period.

Until fairly recently, third-party payers paid

whatever providers charged for services rendered.

In response to

rapidly escalating medical bills however, public and private
sector insurers have begun to introduce their own brands of cost
control.

one such effort is Medicare's prospective payment

system, which pays providers according to negotiated fee ceilings
for specific services.
National and state political developments have also impacted
upon Virginia's COPN program.

Throughout much of the 1970's

regulation was viewed as a reasonable response to perceived
deficiencies in the economy.

With the ascension of the Reagan

administration, national public policy assumed a decidedly procompetitive posture.

This philosophy appears to have been a

significant factor in the ultimate demise of federal health
106
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planning.

Confusion emerged over the proper relationships

between the federal, state, and local institutions that were
developed under the federal health planning program (P.L. 93641). Not long after the passage of P.L. 93-641, North Carolina
challenged the constitutionality of the health planning program
on the grounds that the statute infringed upon states' rights by
requiring a CON program. Although the state's case was upheld by
the North Carolina Supreme Court, the federal district court
hearing the case ruled that the law's CON provision was not a
violation of state sovereignty since states could elect to forego
the federal funds that would be at stake. The court also found
that the federal government had a legitimate interest in pursuing
a national health program.1

Intergovernmental tensions were

further exacerbated by the fact that state and local government
officials believed that the federal government was insensitive to
their concerns.2
In Virginia, the notion of health planning and regulation
through COPN has also undergone change.

Lawmakers and health

department officials altered the program in response to federal
initiatives, as well as changes that were occurring in the health
care environment.

Health care providers, public and private

lNorth Carolina ex rel Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp.
(E.D.N.C. 1977), 435 U.S. 962 (1978). For a more complete discussion
of this case, see Roberta Roos, "Certificate of Need for Health
Care Facilities: a Time for Reexamination," Pace Law Review, (7)
2 (winter 1987), pp. 491-530.
2Institute of Medicine, Health Planning in the United States:
Selected Policy Issues, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C. : National
Academy Press, Inc., 1981), pp. 38-40.
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insurers, governmental agencies, and citizens' groups are
examples of the types of groups that have entered the fray
surrounding COPN.
Medical, political, and regulatory issues have been at the
forefront of these discussions.

Yet it is cost control, in light

of massive public and private expenditures, that has been the
dominant issue.

Indeed, Virginia officials, including Governor

Baliles, have regarded the continuing efficacy of COPN as a
function of its effect on health care costs.
National Health Planning and Resources Development
Amendments of 1979
The first major development to impact upon Virginia's COPN
actually was the result of federal government action.

Even

though federal regulations pertaining to the implementation of
the P.L. 93-641 program were not finally issued until 1978,
Congress had, by 1978, become dissatisfied with the progress that
was being made toward the goal of a national health planning
system.3
There were several issues that were of particular concern to
members of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, which
held hearings on proposed amendments to P.L. 93-641.

First there

was the continuing problem of consumer representation on HSA
boards.

Various consumer groups began to bring suit on the issue

of underrepresentaton of population segments on HSA boards short3Budrys, p. 20.
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ly after the national health planning program had been
implemented. In Texas ACORN v. Texas Area 5 Health systems
Agency, Inc., the plaintiffs argued that low-income groups were
inadequately represented on HSA boards.

The federal district

court held that low-income groups must be proportionally
represented.

However the Circuit Court reversed the District

Court opinion, but ordered HEW to develop HSA selection
regulations.4
The Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee felt that
consumers were still inadequately represented on HSA boards, even
though P.L. 93-641 mandated that between fifty and sixty percent
of a board's membership be comprised of consumers (see chapter 1
for the definitions of consumers and providers). While "mirroring
the community", the Committee believed that consumers on the HSA
boards should also reflect more fully specific population
segments, such as low income groups. 5

However, Marmor and Morone

argue that there was no relationship between HSA representational
structure and the HSAs' health planning duties. 6
In addition to concerns about consumer representation, the
4Texas Association of Community Organizations for Reform
Now v. Texas Area 5 HSA, U.C.A. No. S-76-102-CA (E.D. Texas,
Sherman Div., 1 March 1977).
5west Publishing co.,National Health Planning and Resources
Development Amendments of 1979, U.S. Code Congressional and
Administrative News, 93d Congress, 1st sess. (1979) (St. Paul,
MN: West Publishing Co.), pp. 1361-1368.
6James Morone and Theodore R. Marmor, "Representing Consumer
Interests: The Case of American Health Planning," in Citizens
and Health care, Participation and Planning for Social Change,
Barry Checkoway, ed. (New York: Pergamom Press, 1981), p. 27.
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Committee also believe that consumers possessed insufficient
information about the highly complex issues surrounding the
provision of health care.7

As a result, Congress still

considered consumers to be at a disadvantage relative to provider
HSA board members.

In an effort to address this inadequacy, the

1979 Amendments provided for the education of HSA members on
health concepts and issues.a
Lastly, the Committee wanted to make the health planning
program more responsive to changes that were taking place in the
health care industry.

Of particular concern was the notion that

health planning should recognize and encourage the emergence of
competitive forces whenever possible.9

To that end, specific

mention is made in the 1979 Amendments of the need to encourage
competition.lo

For example, the 1979 Amendments call for the

exclusion of health maintenance organizations (HMO) from CON
reviewll, since HMOs are considered to be organizations that
encourage competition, and respond to classic market forces of
supply and demand.
7west Publishing co., National Health Planning and Resources
Development Amendments of 1979, p. 1312.
8National Health Planning and Resources Development Amendments
of 1979, statutes at Large, vol. 93, sec. 149, p. 620 (1979).
9west Publishing Co., National Health Planning and Resources
Development Amendments of 1979, p. 1358.
lONational Health Planning and Resources Development Amendments
of 1979, statutes at Large, sec. 103, pp. 594-595 (1979).
llNational Health Planning and Resources Development Amendments
of 1979, Statutes at Large, (1979), sec. 117 (b) (1), p. 615.
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This provision is significant for a number of reasons.

It

was a tacit acknowledgement that economic regulation of health
services is neither the norm nor the ideal, as far as Congress
was concerned.

Secondly, this declaration in favor of

competition laid the conceptual foundation for the eventual
dismantling of the national health planning program.
There were other important provisions of the 1979
Amendments.

For instance, the minimum federal grant level for

HSAs was raised from $150,000 to $250,000 in an attempt to lessen
the burden on smaller, less populous HSAs.12

Also, Congress

added medical facility accessibility and quality control to the
list of national health planning priorities. 13

In a further

attempt to reduce excess capacity in the interests of
constraining costs, Congress included in the 1979 Amendments a
program to encourage the voluntary discontinuance or conversion
of unneeded services.14
The National Health Planning and Resources Development
Amendments of 1979 represent some conflicting themes.

On the one

hand, it seems clear that Congress was generally supportive of
the health planning program.

The 1979 Amendments represented a

congressional attempt to strengthen and improve the effectiveness
of the HSAs.

At the same time, the provision encouraging the

12west Publishing Co., National Health PLanning and Resources
Development Amendments of 1979, p. 1375.
1342 u.s.c., sec. 300m-l(c) (E) (14).
14National Health Planning and Resources Development Amendments
of 1979, sec. 301, p. 636.
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facilitation of competition suggests that Congress yearned for
non-regulatory solutions to the problems of medical facility
accessibility, quality control, and especially, high cost that
still beset the health care industry.
Even with the changes mandated by the 1979 Amendments, it
would not be long before the national health planning program
would come under political attack at the national level.

As

noted earlier, the Reagan Administration entered office
proclaiming an anti-regulatory, pro-competitive economic
philosophy that included the health care industry.

The enactment

of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 exemplified this
anti-regulatory approach by slashing health planning
appropriations.

Federal grants to HSAs fell from $120 million to

$65 million.15
Then in 1982, the federal government dealt the national
health planning program a devastating blow.

In that year,

Congress discontinued formal health planning appropriations.16
Also, each year thereafter, Congress attached a rider to the
appropriations bill that prohibited the Secretary of Health and
Human services from penalizing states that failed to comply with

15omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Statutes at
Large, (P. L. 97-35) vol. 95, Title 9, Subtitle E, sec. 1537, p.
570 (1981).
1642

u.s.c.

(1982) sec. 300n-6.
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P.L. 93-641. 17

Congress maintained partial funding for the P.L.

93-641 program through the passage of continuing resolutions.18
The national health planning program eventually expired on
September 30, 1986 when Congress failed to renew appropriations
for the program.
With the demise of national health planning, states were
left to decide for themselves the value of maintaining a CON
program.

Some states have chosen to modify their CON programs to

more effectively address special concerns, while other states
discontinued CON altogether.

Since Virginia's COPN program pre-

dated P.L. 93-641, Virginia has maintained its program.
The sudden absence of the federal health planning program
did impact upon Virginia's COPN program.

The federal government

had been funding Virginia's HSAs at a rate of 30 cents per
capita, prior to its significant cutback in 1981.

When the

federal government discontinued its program, the Commonwealth and
the HSAs were compelled to find alternative funding sources.

The

HSAs' initial reaction to the loss of federal funds was to reduce
their staffing complements.

Three

Virginia HSAs, such as the

Northern Virginia HSA, had financial reserves or nonfederal
funding sources, such as private sector or local government
17James B. Simpson, "Full Circle: the Return of CON Regulation
of Health Facilities to state Control," Indiana Law Journal, 19
(Fall 1986), p. 1056.
18Monroe Lerner, Ph.D., Davids. Salkever, Ph.D., Stephen
s. Mick Ph.D. and Gregory V. de Lissovoy, Ph.D., Investigation
of Cert~in Iss~es in Connection With the Virginia Certificate of
Public Need Program, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University
School of Public Health and Hygiene, 1987), ch. 2, p. 8.
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contributions. 19

However, the Southwest and Eastern HSAs were

unable to continue their operations.

Therefore, from the fall of

1986 to the present, the ORD staff has had to assume health
planning responsibilities for those two regions.20
Virginia has since increased its HSA funding from three
cents per capita to nine cents per capita in an effort to
compensate for the loss of federal funding.21

And as noted in

chapters 2 and 3, Virginia lawmakers have altered the scope and
threshold levels of the program over time. While the Virginia
health planning program lost its federal financial support, the
Commonwealth did have greater flexibility to develop its COPN
program to meet Virginia's needs.

The COPN review process is now

shorter overall, and the program's scope is somewhat narrower
than in the statute.22
The cessation of federal health planning, and Virginia's
efforts to adjust to this change are but one facet of the
volatile environment in which COPN has existed in Virginia.

The

interplay among various private and public sector groups, and the
changes that have taken place within the health care economy have
all contributed to the development of COPN in Virginia.

19English interview.
20Biennial Report 1985-1986, p.3.
21virginia Acts of Assembly, (1985) vol. 1, ch. 513, sec.
32.1-102.1 (11).
22west interview.
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Group Positions Regarding Certificate of Public Need

Throughout COPN's fifteen year history, numerous groups have
commented on the worthiness of COPN.

To simplify the forthcoming

discussion, and to allow for more meaningful comparisons among
various groups, the groups to be discussed below shall be
organized according to the following headings:
(institutional and professional);
government agencies;

providers

third-party payers;

citizens' groups.

These headings are

consistent with relevant literature in the health policy field.
Before examining and comparing group positions, some rather
general comments are in order.

A group's perception of COPN may

be motivated by economic self-interest, or economic or political
ideology.23

However this observation assumes that there is

unanimity within a group.
necessarily the case.

And as shall be seen, this is not

While a group may be outwardly

homogeneous, it may be inwardly heterogeneous. 24

There may also

be instances where a group's perceptions of COPN and a group's
goals my be in conflict.25

This tension may threaten the unity

23Governor's commission on Medical Care Facilities Certificate
of Public Need, Report of the Governor's Commission on Medical
Facility Certificate of Public Need to the Governor and General
Assembly of Virginia, (Richmond, VA: Commonwealth of Virginia,
1987), p.13.
24Alford, p. 192.
25Monroe Lerner, Ph.D. and George Vlasak, Ph.D., "The Political
Theory Aspects of CON in Virginia," presented at the Annual
Convention of the American Pubic Health Association, New Orleans,
LA, October 19, 1987, p.6.
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of a group or weaken its resolve.

Providers

Health care providers are the most important and most
powerful of the groups concerned with health care facility
policy. 2 6

Within the health care community there are different

types of providers.

Primary care physicians and surgeons, and

hospital and nursing home administrators are some of the more
obvious examples of health care provider groups.

Largely as a

result of the highly complex, technical nature of many medical
services, providers have been the dominant actors within the
health care policy arena, although there may be divisions within
each category stemming from differences in type of ownership,
location, or services rendered.27

That health care providers

have a direct stake in health care policy developments because
these individuals depend upon the provision of services for their
income enhances the likelihood that they will be active in health
planning activities.28

26Alford, p. 194.
27Lerner and Vlasak, p.3.
28Lawrence o. Brown, "Some Structural Issues in the Health
Planning Program," in Institute ~f Medicine, Health Planning in
the United states: Selected Policy Issues, vol. 2, (Washington,
D.c.: National Academy Press, Inc., 1981), p. 15.
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Institutional providers

Differences among health facility representatives regarding
their organizations' opinions on COPN provide an example of such
diversity.

At first blush, one might easily assume that

hospitals and nursing homes would be unified in their opinions
regarding COPN.

Such is not the case, however.

Due largely to

differences in reimbursement practices and the nature and scope
of services rendered, hospitals in Virginia have generally
opposed COPN while nursing homes have supported the program.
The principal group representing hospitals in Virginia is
the Virginia Hospital Association (VHA).

The VHA's views toward

COPN have fluctuated considerably over the last fifteen years.
COPN

was initially supported and promoted by the VHA because it

was seen as a useful cost containment mechanism in the face of
cost-based reimbursement.29

This reimbursement practice results

in the payment of health providers after a service is rendered,
based on to the fee charged by the provider.

However, the VHA

became "philosophically and ideologically opposed" to COPN in the
late 1970's as the scope of the program was "deliberately"
expanded with little regard for the initial legislation. 30
The VHA modified its position on COPN yet again in the early
29Katharine M. Webb, Vice President for Government Relations,
Virginia Hospital Association, statement, Governor's Commission
on Medical Care Facilities Certificate of Public Need, hearing,
Minutes, 9 March 1987, (Richmond, Virginia), p. 2
30webb Governor's commission on Medical Care Facilities
.
Certificate ' of Public Need, hearing, Minutes,
9 March 1987, p. 2.
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1980's.

By this time, competition within the industry was on the

rise, but the VHA saw COPN as a way to protect hospitals.

Since

November 1986, however, the VHA has opposed COPN on the grounds
that the program favors physicians by allowing them to purchase
some medical equipment without first obtaining a COPN.31

More

recently, the VHA has assumed a decidedly pro-competitive
posture.

It is the VHA's position that " .•. competition can

produce the optimal mix of price, quality, and variety for
consumers. 11 32
Nursing homes in Virginia, on the other hand, have generally
supported COPN.

Whereas hospital leaders tend to regard COPN as

having a stifling effect on competition within the industry,
nursing home administrators feel that COPN is beneficial, and
helps ensure that beds and facilities are located according to
need.33

The Virginia Health Care Association (VHCA), which

represents 130 nursing homes in Virginia, has been active in the
debate surrounding COPN.

The VHCA believes that the elimination

of COPN would have adverse consequences for quality control,
accessibility concerns and Medicaid costs. 34
31Lerner, Salkever, Mick, and de Lissovoy, ch. 5, p. 8.
32Katharine M. Webb, Vice President for Government Relations,
Virginia Hospital Association, statement, Governor's Commission
on Medical Care Facilities Certificate of Public Need, hearing,
Minutes, 13 April 1987, (Richmond, Virginia), p. 10.
33peter Clendinin, Director, Virginia Health Care Association,
statement , Governor's commission on Medical
Care Facilities
.
.
Certificate of Public Need, hearing, Minutes, 13 April 1987
(Richmond, Virginia) p. 6.
34Lerner, Salkever, Mick, and de Lissovoy, ch. 5, p. 13.
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Non-profit nursing homes in Virginia also support COPN but,
with some reservations.

The Virginia Association of Non-Profit

Homes for the Aging (VANHA) seems to have a less unified stance
toward COPN than the VHCA.

There is little unanimity among its

members, except on the feeling that the COPN process is
"inequitable and inefficient. 11 35

The VANHA is in favor of the

simultaneous review of similar applications ("batching") and of
vesting final decision-making authority for COPN applications in
a commission rather than the Health Commissioner.36

The VANHA

believes that new construction is unnecessarily restrained by
COPN, since institutions lending capital for such projects would
require that marketing and feasibility studies be conducted in
advance.37

Medical professional societies

Because physicians are often dependent upon unrestrained
access to hospitals in order to sustain their practices, they
tend to favor maintaining as much control over health care
resources as possible.38

Both Virginia Medical Society and the

35Nathan Bushnell, III, Chairman, Virginia Association of
Non-Profit Homes for the Aging, statement, Governor's Commission
on Medical care Facilities Certificate of Public Need, hearing,
Minutes, 11 May 1987, (Richmond, Virginia), p.1.
36Report of the Governor's Commission on Medical Facilities
Certificate of Public Need, p. 16.
37Lerner, salkever, Mick, and de Lissovoy, ch.5, p. 12.
38Alford, p. 191.
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Old Dominion Medical Society favor the discontinuation or
dilution of COPN.

Citing the highly volatile and complex nature

of the health care industry, Virginia Medical society (VMS) and
the Old Dominion Medical Society (ODMS) feel that COPN is illequipped to operate effectively in such an environment.39

These

societies argue that COPN stifles creativity and technological
innovation by making it difficult for new technologies and new
providers to enter the market.40

On the basis of these

arguments, the VMS favors total repeal of COPN, while the ODMS
would like to see medical services and equipment that have become
standards of care exempted from COPN requirements. 41

Third-Party Payers

This category is composed of private health insurance
companies, Blue cross/Blue Shield, Medicare and Medicaid.

For

the most part, organizations in this category favor COPN.

There

is a sense within the insurance industry that COPN acts as a
restraint on wasteful, unnecessary spending by health
facilities.42

Largely due to a shift toward a more price-

sensitive health care market, Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Virginia
39Lerner, Salkever, Mick, and de Lissovoy, ch. 5, p. 10.
40c.M. Kinloch, M.D., Governor's Commission on Medical
Facilities certificate of Public Need,statement, hearing, Minutes,
11 May 1987, (Richmond, Virginia), p.3.
41Lerner, Salkever, Mick, and de Lissovoy, ch.5, p. 16.
42Lerner, salkever, Mick, and de Lissovoy, ch.5, p. 30.
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does not believe that COPN has much impact overall on the
insurance industry.43
Third-party payer support of COPN is hardly universal.

The

Virginia Association of Health Maintenance Organizations favors
the weakening or total repeal of COPN.

This association's

objections stem from the view that, contrary to the competitive
philosophy underlying HMOs, COPN hinders competition among
medical facilities by creating state-sanctioned franchises or
cartels.44

There is thus some diversity among third-party payer

organizations with respect to their views on COPN.

All of these

organizations share a desire to constrain costs but, they differ
according to the means by which they feel such a goal should be
achieved.

Government Agencies

Another significant class of participants in the COPN debate
is comprised of public agencies.

Government's role in health

care is unique in that it may act as a payer, provider, or planner/regulator of health care services.

Government agencies

concerned with health care in Virginia generally view COPN as a
means of rationalizing and stabilizing the medical facility
market.
43Blue cross-Blue Shield, statement, Governor's Commission
on Medical care Facilities Certificate of Public Need, hearing,
Minutes, 11 May 1987, (Richmond, Virginia), P· 9.
44Lerner and Vlasak, p.9.
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Concerns about quality control, distribution of facilities
and services, and cost containment are of paramount importance to
those governmental agencies concerned with the provision of
health care.

The Statewide Health Coordinating council believes

that the health care industry cannot be self-regulating, and that
COPN is sufficiently flexible to deal with an ever-changing
health care market.45

The state Board of Health sees COPN as

being especially important for ensuring that remote or
impoverished areas have adequate facilities and services.46

The

Health Services Cost Review Commission recognizes a need to
balance competition and regulation and, the Commission sees COPN
as an important planning too1.47
Other public sector organizations in Virginia are less
sanguine about COPN.

The Board of Medical Assistance Services

holds the position that, while providers are still not overly
concerned about excess capacity and costs, COPN does little to
reduce existing excess capacity.
about the total repeal of COPN.48

Yet the Board is apprehensive
The Virginia Association of

Health Systems Agencies believes that there is an "inevitable"
45Lerner, Salkever, Mick, and de Lissovoy, ch.5, p. 20.
46Lerner, Salkever, Mick, and de Lissovoy, ch.5, p. 23.
47virginia Health Servi~es Cost Revi7w,c~uncil, ~t~tement,
Governor's commission on Medical Care Facilities Certificate of
Public Need, hearing, Minutes, 11 May 1987, (Richmond, Virginia),
p. 12.
48Robert Lambeth Virginia Board of Medical Assistance
Services, statement, Governor's Commission on Medical Care Facilities
Certificate of Public Need, hearing, Minutes, 8 June 1987, (Richmond,
Virginia), p.l.
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tension between the regulator and the industry being regulated.
VAHSA members also feel that COPN administration at the state
level is ineffective and unenthusiastic.49

Here too, there

appears to be a marked difference of opinion within one of the
major classes of groups interested in COPN.

One gets the

impression that these state agency groups view COPN as the best
available response to the problems that beset the health care
industry, but that they long for a more optimal solution.

Consumer Organizations

The last class of organizations that interact within the
COPN arena is, in many ways, the most diffuse.

Consumer

organizations, such as common Cause and the American Association
of Retired Persons generally represent a wide range of concerns,
such as consumers' rights issues and policy issues affecting
retirees and the elderly.

Health care issues do not tend to

attract much attention from these groups.

Indeed, Merone found

that narrowly focused provider groups were more likely to be
politically active in health planning than more diverse consumer
organizations.50

Schlozman and Tierney believe that

49oean Montgomery, Executive Director, Virginia A:so~iation
of Health systems Agencies, statement, Governor's Commission on
Medical care Facilities Certificate of Public Need, hearing,
Minutes, 8 June 1987 (Richmond, Virginia), P· 6.
50James A. Merone "Models of Representation: Consumers
and the HSAs" in Institute of Medicine, Health Planning in the
United states; selected Policy Issues, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.:
National Academy Press, 1981), p. 224.
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organizations with narrow, technical political objectives tend to
be more influential politically than those groups with broad
goals. 51

Whelan found that citizens' groups in Virginia tend to

have a fragile organizational base, and that the consumer
movement in Virginia has been in some disarray in recent years.52
There are a number of factors that contribute to the lack
of attention paid to health care issues by consumer
organizations.

Most significant among these factors is the

prominence of third-party reimbursement, which tends to insulate
consumers from the direct costs of their health care.53

Because

individual consumers represent such a wide array of needs, and
have differing priorities it is probably difficult for an
organization to represent very many of them. 54

Another possible

explanation for the lack of consumer group involvement in health
care issues is that many issues and concepts surrounding health
care are so complex that only someone with training in a specific
health field can analyze the highly technical information that is
often associated with health care. 55
There does appear to be some public ambivalence toward
51Kay Lehman schlozman and John T. Tierney, Oraanized Interests
and American Democracy, (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), p. 396.
52John T. Whelan, "Interest Groups in Virginia: a New Look
for a 'Political Museum Piece'," presented at the 1986 Annual
Meeting of the southern Political Science Association, Atlanta,
Georgia, 6-8 November 1986.
53Morone, p. 224.
54Lerner and Vlasak, P· 5.
55arown, p. 18.
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health care.

On the one hand, consumers want a full range of

services that is readily available to them.

on the other hand,

this desire is tempered by concern about high costs.56
Even in the face of such obstacles to group unity, a few
consumer groups have been active in the discussion about COPN.
Two of these groups are based in Richmond, and the third is a
national citizens' group. The National Alliance of Senior
Citizens favors a competitive, free-market to the health care
industry, and is, therefore, opposed to COPN on principle.57

The

Richmond Chamber of Commerce is also ideologically committed to
free-enterprise and those of its members who were knowledgeable
about COPN opposed it.58

It may seem odd that a group

representing business leaders is categorized with consumer
organizations.

However business leaders purchase health

insurance for their employees, and are thus quite interested in
policies that may affect the cost of their employees' health
care.

In this way, businesses are themselves purchaser of health

care.

The Richmond Area Business Group on Health, on the other

hand, has consistently supported COPN, but its support has begun
to waver more recently as members are uncertain whether they will
56Don Colburn, "Hospital Regulation.Giving Way to.competition
as a Means of Determining Growth of Hospitals and Services,"
Washington Post, 9 December 1986, HE-8.
57Report of the Governor's Commission on Medical Care Facilities
Certificate of Public Need, p. 17.
58Report of the Governor's Commission on Medical Care Facilities
£ertificate of Public Need, p. 17.
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benefit more from regulation, or from a free-market approach.59
The views of these consumer groups tend to stress the potential
economic impact of COPN over questions of access and quality,
suggesting once again that it is the issue of cost control which
has the most political salience for the public.
The foregoing discussion illustrates the diverse societal
groups which, to varying degrees, affect or are affected by COPN.
This is not to say that each group articulates its position with
equal conviction relative to other groups.

On the contrary, it

stands to reason that institutional and professional providers
would be the most vocal groups on this issue since their
livelihood is at least partly dependent upon the availability of
services and facilities for their patients.
Since third-party payers directly pay providers for much of
the medical care rendered nationally and in Virginia, it is not
difficult to understand this group's preoccupation with cost
control.

The positions of the government agencies noted above,

while emphasizing cost control also stress the need for the
rational distribution and control of health facilities by way of
planning and regulation through COPN.

Even agencies not entirely

satisfied with COPN are reluctant to dismantle the program.
The reactions (or lack thereof) from consumer groups provide
an interesting contrast to the other types of organizations that
have been discussed.

While it is true that we place great value

on our health, there is also some truth to the notion that we do
59Lerner, salkever, Mick, and de Lissovoy, ch. 5, p. 19.
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not generally concern ourselves with health care until we are in
need of it.

The other types of groups can afford to be more

myopic with respect to health care issues because this is their
primary area of concern.

For most consumers, however, health

care is but an intermittent concern as opposed to a number of
concerns ( family, education, occupation) that must be confronted
daily.

This fact helps to validate the notion that groups with

narrow goals tend to be more effective than groups with broad
goals.60

Regardless of their positions on COPN, these groups and

society at large have been influenced by changes occurring within
the health care industry.

It is to these changes that the next

section shall be devoted.

Changes in the Health Care Industry

Since the enactment of the Virginia COPN statute in 1973, a
number of changes have taken place in the health facility sector
of the health care industry.

These changes have altered the

complexion of the industry and, have provided the impetus for the
current debate among Virginia lawmakers over the continued
efficacy of COPN in the current health care environment.

Over

the last fifteen years health facility costs have risen
dramatically, while occupancy rates have tapered off, due in part
to the emergence of outpatient care.

National expenditures for

medical facility care have risen from $28 billion in 1970, to
60schlozman and Tierney, P· 396.
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$179 billion in 1986. 61 Third-party payers have also taken a more
active role than they had previously, often questioning the need
for services as well as the fees charged for those services.
Changes have not been limited to the supply side of the care
equation.

The elderly population has increasingly required

greater levels of sophisticated care, while the indigent
population has strained hospital resources through a substantial
uncompensated care burden.

The total Medicaid bill in Virginia

for FY 1989 is $908 million, with the Commonwealth paying
approximately 50 percent of these costs.

For FY 1990, Virginia

has appropriated $520 million for Medicaid care. All of these
factors have compelled many facilities to enter health "systems"
or large, proprietary hospital chains in order to strengthen
their financial positions.

It is in this environment that COPN

currently exists.

Health care costs

Rising health care costs have overshadowed the issues of
access and quality control for some time. Medical facility care
costs in Virginia have risen from an average of $184.10 per day
in 1979 to $434.75 per day in 1987. 62 The underlying theme that
emerges from the debate over the reasons for the high cost of
611988 u.s. statistical Abstract, no. 131, p. 88.
62virginia Health services Cost Review cou~cil, Annual
Report, 1984-85, and Annual Report, 1986-87, (Richmond, VA:
Commonwealth of Virginia).
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health care and, how best to control these costs ultimately turns
on the issue of competition versus regulation.
Proponents of the position that competition will address the
inequities and inefficiencies within the health care industry
base their argument on the assumption that the marketplace is a
better allocator of health care resources than the
regulatory/planning arena.

Free-market advocates maintain that

the rise in health care costs emanates not from a lack of
competition but, from a lack of price competition.63

As a

result, prices are artificially high, since hospitals are often
not compelled to restructure because COPN is said to protect
existing providers from market forces.64

Advocates of

deregulation also point to econometric studies which indicate
that CON has little or no effect on costs.65
Advocates of CON and other forms of regulation argue that
the health facility marketplace does not respond to the
63James A. Bacon and James Schultz,"Gridlock," Virginia
Business, (3) 6 (July 1988), p. 45.
64James A. Bacon and James Schultz, "Competition or Compassion?," Virginia Business (3) 8 (August 1988), p. 8.
65John Ashby, Jr., "The Impact of Hospital Regulatory Reforms
on Per Capita costs, Utilization, and Capital Investment," Inquiry,
(21) 1 (Spring 1984), pp. 50-58. See also Salkever and Bice,
Hospital Certificate of Need controls: Impact on Investment,
Cost and Use, (Washington, D.C.: A~erican.Ente:prise ~nstitute, 1978)
and; Virginia General Assembly, Joint Legislative Audit and
Review Commission 1 certificate-of-Need In Virginia, (Richmond,
Virginia 1979).; Lerner, Monroe, Ph.D., Salkever, David, Ph.D.,
Mick, st~phen, s., Ph.D., and de ~issovoy, .Gr7g~ry V. . I~vestigation
Qf Certain Issues in Connection With the V1rg1n1a Certificate of
Public Need Program, (Baltimore! MD: The Johns Hopkins University
School of Public Health and Hygiene,1987).
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traditional market forces of supply and demand.

The prevalence

of third-party reimbursement, and the highly technical nature of
many medical services mitigate market forces.66

According to Dr.

Robert G. Petersdorf, dean of the University of California-San
Diego School of Medicine, the "duplication of services is often
motivated by nothing more than a drive for prestige and the
preservation of the professional or administrative ego. 11 67

This

comment illustrates some of the justification for CON regulation.
However Louis Rossiter, professor of Medical Economics at the
Medical College of Virginia, is not sure that "anyone's
unequivocally shown the link between equipment and health care
costs. 11 68
By the early 1980 1 s it had been well established by
insurers, scholars, and providers that the excess capacity and
concomitant rise in health care costs were at least partly due to
the retrospective, fee-for-service reimbursement practices that
insulated consumers from high costs, and provided incentives to
health care facilities to expand, since facilities were
reimbursed whatever they were charged. 69

Under such a practice,

66west Publishing co., u. s. congress. Senate Report on s 2994,
U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 93d Congress,
2nd sess., vol. 4, (1978) p. 7878.
67Don Colburn, "Technology's High Price," The Washington
Post, 26 December 1984, B-7.
68James A. Bacon and James Schultz, "Competition Anxiety,"
Virginia Business, (June 1988), P· 38.
69Elaine A Anderson and Mark R. Ginsberg, "The Health Care
Marketplace: P~rspectives on a System in Transition," Policy
Studies Review, (5) 3 (Fall 1986), P· 656.
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hospitals were free to expand their facilities and services
knowing that they could expect full payment for services
rendered, without having to be concerned about efficiency of
operation.

There was little incentive for health facilities to

economize.
Before long, third-party payers began to take matters into
their own hands.

The development of Medicare's prospective

payment system, the expansion of HMOs, and the creation of
preferred provider organizations (PPO) heralded a new,
competitive approach to solving the problem of escalating health
care costs.
1970's.

HMOs have actually been in existence since the early

However, they have become a prominent part of the health

care landscape only since the early 1980's.

HMOs are attractive

to consumers because they hold down prices by charging plan
members a single, flat, annual rate that covers all medical
services rendered, provided the member utilizes providers
affiliated with the HMO.

HMOs may enter into contractual

arrangements with individual providers, or they may establish a
system of their own facilities and providers.

In any event, the

emphasis is on cost effectiveness, and on minimizing the
utilization of hospital services as much as possible.70
A second third-party initiative in the war on health care
costs is known as the preferred provider organization (PPO).
Under these plans, consumers are provided incentives by their
insurer to utilize providers who are part of the plan.
70Anderson and Ginsberg, p. 658.
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consumer may enter such a plan through an employer and, the plan
pays nearly all of the costs that are incurred if the consumer
visits a participating provider.

Should a consumer go to a non-

participating provider, the consumer is obligated to pay a
certain percentage of the bill - perhaps twenty percent - and the
plan pays the remainder of the bill.

The ultimate goal of PPOs

is to reduce the out-of-pocket expenditures for its membership.71
The reimbursement mechanisms just discussed are both private
sector responses to high health care costs.

The federal

government has also taken some steps to hold down hospital care
costs.
In 1983 the federal government enacted significant
legislation designed to rein in the spiralling costs of its
Medicare program by introducing a prospective payment system
(PPS).

This new wrinkle in the Medicare program is significant

for two reasons. PPS is significant simply because it is
associated with Medicare, which is the largest public sector
source of medical insurance funds in the nation.

In 1986 alone,

Medicare accounted for $77.7 billion in public health insurance
expenditures.72

PPS is also significant because it represents a

fundamental change in medical reimbursement philosophy.
Previously, providers routinely submitted their charges to
Medicare and collected their fees, often encountering little
resistance from Medicare.

Under this new system however,

71Anderson and Ginsberg, p. 658.
721988 U.S. Statistical Abstract, no. 130, p. 88.
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Medicare negotiates an acceptable fee ceiling with providers for
specific kinds of services, which are referred to as diagnosisrelated groups (DRG).

Providers whose bills exceed these limits

are not reimbursed for that portion of the bill which exceeds the
DRG ceiling.73

This new reimbursement structure has prompted

providers to become more cost-conscious and efficiency-oriented.

Delivery systems

Changes in health care reimbursement practices seem to have
occurred at about the same time as the transformation in health
care delivery was occurring.

For much of this century, hospitals

have been the dominant force in health facility care in the U.S.
However there has been a relatively recent shift away from
inpatient facility care, toward medical care that is provided in
an outpatient or ambulatory setting.74

Outpatient facilities are

attractive to consumers because these facilities do not have the
overhead that would be found at a hospital, and can, therefore
offer many services at rates that are less expensive than those
charged by hospitals.
This surge toward outpatient care has also provided
hospitals with the opportunity to improve their standing in this
new market.

Not long after the movement toward outpatient care

73Anderson and Ginsberg, pp. 656-657.
74Joyce Riffer, "Can Surgicenters Stand Alone?,'' Hospitals 60
(20 July 1986), p. 44.

134
began in the early 1970 1 s, hospitals themselves entered the
market as a way to accommodate consumer and insurer demands for
less expensive care, and also to react to what may have been
perceived by hospital administrators as a threat to their
institutions.

In Virginia and elsewhere, for example, outpatient

facilities are often owned by hospitals.75

Hospital entry into

the outpatient market gave these institutions flexibility in the
face of declining occupancy.76
As a reaction to the trend toward outpatient care, health
facilities, especially hospitals, began to merge with one another
under the banner of health "systems".

Increasing competition

among health facilities has prompted proprietary, for-profit
institutions as well as non-profit facilities to consolidate
their resources.77

such resource consolidation does help to

reduce service duplication but, it also permits system member
institutions to dominate local markets. 78

Some of the more

prominent hospital systems in Virginia include Inova Health
Systems (Fairfax), Sentara Health Systems (Hampton Roads), and
Carillon Health System (Roanoke).79
Concentrations of market power also have implications for
the COPN program.

The length of the process is a financial

75Bacon and Schultz, "Gridlock," p.54.
76Lerner, Salkever, Mick and de Lissovoy, ch. 8, p. 10.
77Anderson and Ginsburg, p. 657.
78Bacon and Schultz, "Gridlock," p. 46.
79Bacon and Schultz,"Gridlock," p. 47.
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hardship for many institutions because of the financial resources
that facilities they may expend during the process. Large
institutions do have an advantage over small institutions.BO
Large institutions, or those affiliated with health care systems
tend to have greater resources, and are thus better able to
endure the length of the process, even in a protracted appeal
situation.

Bacon and Schultz contend that institutions with

large financial resources and a great deal of political clout are
able to apply pressure, and manipulate the COPN system.
institutions are at a disadvantage in such instances;

Smaller
especially

where COPN applications are competing.Bl
Hospitals have also sought entry into another major health
care market - that of extended care.

As their occupancy rates

have fallen in recent years, hospitals have looked longingly
toward the market for extended, skilled nursing care beds, which
has traditionally been the exclusive domain of nursing homes.
The ability of hospitals to convert unused acute (general) bed
space has been a source of some contention between hospitals and
nursing homes.
On the one hand, hospitals want the flexibility to be able
to convert general, acute care beds to skilled nursing care beds
without having to undergo a COPN review.

For their part, both

proprietary and non-profit nursing home associations are willing
to allow hospitals to convert bed space, so long as they are
BOwest interview.
BlBacon and Schultz, "Gridlock," p. 52.
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still required to undergo a COPN review before doing so.82
Critics of COPN charge that, in instances such as this, COPN acts
as a state-sponsored nursing home carte1.83

Whichever position

is taken, one thing is certain - the changing face of health face
of medical facility care is affected by COPN.

Demographic influences

Two recurring themes that are evident in the current
discussion surrounding COPN, and the provision of health care in
Virginia generally, are the needs of the elderly and medically
indigent segments of Virginia's population.

The special needs

and financial vulnerability of the elderly and the indigent mean
that any drastic alteration of the health care industry should
not be undertaken without first assessing the probable impact
that such change might have on these groups.

While the elderly

and the indigent often require special kinds of care, or
financial assistance, these needs place various demands on
Virginia's health care system.
The questions of COPN's franchising effect and its
implications for the distribution of health facilities pose
difficult problems for Virginia lawmakers.

While certainly not a

new concern, the provision of health care for the indigent has
82Lerner, Salkever, Mick, and de Lissovoy, ch. 5, pp. 12-14.
83Karl Rhodes,"In the Pink," Virginia Business, (2) 2 (February
1987), pp.23-24.
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become a major health priority under Governor Baliles.

In 1986,

$576 million was either spent by the Commonwealth on indigent
health care, or assumed as uncompensated care by health care
facilities.84

Not all of those who are medically indigent are

impoverished, however.

As insurance rates have risen, small-

business employers and low-paid working people find it
increasingly difficult to afford health insurance.85

The Joint

Subcommittee on Health Care For All Virginians reported that many
of the working uninsured are employed in the retail,
construction, and service industries, or for small businesses
(those with fewer than 51 employees) because many of these
employers do not offer health insurance, in spite of state
mandated benefits.86
Also contributing to the problems that the indigent have in
obtaining health facility care is the population shift away from
cities.

With Virginia's affluent population gravitating toward

the suburbs, hospitals find it increasingly difficult to operate
in cities and rural areas where a greater proportion of indigent
are likely to be found.87

Through its capacity to influence the

84Bacon and Schultz, "Competition or Compassion?," p. 8.
85James A. Bacon and James Schultz, "Metastasis," Virginia
Business (July 1988), p. 55.
86virginia General Assembly, Joint Subcommittee on Health
Care for All Virginians, Interim Report of the Joint Subcommittee
on Health Care For All Virginians to the Governor and the General
Assembly of Virginia, Senate Document No. 18, (Richmond, VA:
Commonwealth of Virginia, 1989), p. 12.
87Bacon and Schultz, "Metastasis," p. 56.
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location and services offered by facilities, COPN can have some
influence on indigent health care.

Health Department officials

may use COPN to prevent a facility from moving out of an area
where there may be a medically needy population to an area where
there may be a greater number of paying patients.
Even though uncompensated indigent care is a strain on all
hospitals, it is especially burdensome on small, non-profit
hospitals.

While all non-profit health facilities receive tax

exemptions, many smaller facilities are in dire need of immediate
reimbursement.88

Since Medicaid negotiates per diem charges with

institutional providers, facilities are constrained in the amount
that they may charge Medicaid recipients.

While individual

hospitals do not write off uncompensated care, they usually
absorb uncompensated care costs by shifting costs to services for
which they can receive full reimbursement.89

Uncompensated care

thus poses a special problem for hospitals, since they must find
alternative sources of revenue to compensate for uncompensated
care.
A program has existed in Virginia for more than forty years
that is designed to assist medical facilities that provide
uncompensated care.

In 1946 the Virginia General Assembly

enacted the State-Local Hospitalization Program to provide funds

88Bacon and Schultz, "Metastasis," p. 55.
89steve Fargis, Vice President for Operations, Virginia
Hospital Association, 16 March 1989, telephone interview by
author, Richmond, Virginia.
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for the hospital care of the medically indigent.90

This program

involves a state-local partnership such that the state enters
into voluntary agreements with localities wishing to receive
state funding for indigent health care.

The state appropriates

funds to participating localities on a per capita basis,
sufficient to cover 75 percent of the program cost, and
participating localities contribute the remaining 25 percent.
The state develops recommended eligibility standards as a guide
for localities to follow, but each locality is actually
responsible for establishing its own eligibility criteria.91

The

Department of Social Services is responsible for administering
the Hospitalization Program at the state level.

The Department

of Social Services has developed an income scale for determining
medical indigency, as well as an income scale for determining the
extent of coverage that each individual who is accepted into the
program should receive.

For instance, if a person's income

exceeds the amount that is specified in the scale ($850 per
month), then that individual may only be eligible for partial
coverage.

If an individual's income exceeds the income scale

ceiling by at least $600 but not more than $1200, coverage for
that individual would not begin until after the third day of
hospitalization.

Individuals whose income exceeds the income

scale ceiling by $4000 or more are ineligible for coverage under
90virginia Acts of Assembly, (1946) ch. 197, pp. 336-338.
91virginia Department of Social Services, Assistance Programs
Manual. Revised, vol. 2, part 5, ch. A, (Richmond, VA: Commonwealth
of Virginia, 1986), p. 3.
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the program.92
Those localities wishing to participate in the
Hospitalization Program designate an authorizing agent who
develops the locality's eligibility criteria, and determines the
eligibility of individual applicants.

The authorizing agent also

determines the appeal process to be followed in those instances
when an applicant is denied inclusion into the program.93

It is

up to localities to enter into contracts with area medical
facilities, although these contracts are subject to state
approval.

Localities are also responsible for documenting each

individual case, and submitting copies of this documentation to
the state and the facility providing the care in each individual
case.
Although the State-Local Hospitalization Program has
operated in the manner described above since its inception, the
General Assembly passed legislation in 1989 that will
significantly alter the character of the program.

Under the new

law, the Department of Medical Assistance Services will assume
administrative responsibility for the program, and localities
will be required to participate. 9 4

The Director of Medical

Assistance Services shall also be responsible establishing
9 2Assistance Programs Manual, Revised, vol. 2, part 5, ch.
B, p. 3.
93Assistance Programs Manual, Revised, vol. 2, part 5, ch.
A, p. 3.
94virginia Acts of Assembly, (1984), (HB 1854), secs. 32.1333-334, (Uncertified Copy).
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uniform eligibility standards, in addition to defining the scope
of services to be covered under the program.95

By mandating

local government participation in the State-Local Hospitalization
Program, the General Assembly is sending a clear signal that the
problem of indigent health care requires participation not only
by institutional providers and the state, but localities, as
well.
Just as indigent health care issues are related to COPN, so
too, is health care for the elderly.

Indeed the elderly

population's demands will continue to be an important factor
influencing health care in Virginia, and COPN.9 6

The elderly's

demands for health care have implications for hospitals and
nursing homes alike.

With hospitals facing declining occupancy

rates, many wish to convert unused beds to skilled nursing (longterm) beds.

In order to undertake such conversions, hospitals

must first secure a COPN.

This would seem to be a significant

factor contributing to the divergence of opinion between nursing
homes and hospitals regarding the future of COPN in Virginia.
Hospitals seeking to adapt their facilities in response to the
growing need for nursing care beds probably view COPN as a
needless constraint, while nursing homes need COPN to protect
their status in the market.
It is evident from this discussion that COPN has become part
of an increasingly complex health care environment.

A

95virginia Acts of Assembly, (1989), secs. 32.1-335-336.
96west interview.
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fundamental shift in the philosophy behind reimbursement
practices now places greater emphasis on prospective
reimbursement than on fee-for-service reimbursement, thereby
compelling health facilities to become more efficient and
competitive.

This philosophical shift occurred at approximately

the same time that consumers and insurers began searching for
less costly alternatives to hospital care, such as ambulatory
surgical clinics.

Renewed concern among Virginia government

officials for the health care needs of the elderly and the
indigent mandates that Health Department officials and lawmakers
consider the ramifications of future health policy shifts on
these vulnerable segments of the population.
Within the policy arena a number of public and private
sector groups have interacted with one another to influence the
direction of the COPN program.

Along the way, these provider,

payor, governmental and consumer organizations were surely
influenced by changes taking place in Virginia's health care
industry.

The most conspicuous case in point is the 120-member

Virginia Hospital Association, headquartered in Richmond, which
had originally supported COPN but, because of increased
competition within the industry and the shift toward prospective
reimbursement, the VHA now opposes COPN.97

All of these factors

contributed to the creation of a state-level commission in 1986

97 Katharine M. Webb, Vice President for Government Relations,
Virginia Hospital Association, statement, Governor's Commission on
Medical Facilities Certificate of Public Need, hearing, Minutes,
13 April 1987 (Richmond, Virginia), p. 14.
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to study and make recommendations regarding COPN.

The Governor's Commission on Medical Care Facilities
Certificate of Public Need

Much of the recent discussion among Virginia lawmakers is
rooted in political developments that actually occurred in 1986.
In that year two separate but related investigative efforts were
initiated by Governor Baliles and the General Assembly.

During

the 1986 General Assembly session, legislators created the Task
Force on Indigent Health Care, which was directed to undertake a
comprehensive study of the problems and issues surrounding health
care for the indigent.97
A second study commission was created in 1986 by Governor
Baliles.

The Governor established the Commission on Medical

·Facilities Certificate of Public Need to undertake a
comprehensive study of COPN, and to make recommendations as to
whether the program was still serving a useful purpose.

If the

Commission's investigation determined that COPN was no longer
effectively controlling medical facility costs, or ensuring
quality and accessibility, then the Commission was to make
recommendations to the Governor and the General Assembly

97 Virginia Acts of Assembly,
Resolution 32, pp. 2070-2071.

(1986) vol. 2, Senate Joint
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regarding the future of COPN.98
In reaching his decision to form_ a COPN study commission,
Governor Baliles appears to have been motivated by a recognition
of the many changes in the health care environment that have
occurred within the last decade, such as were noted in the
previous section.

Speaking before the Virginia Health Care

Association in February 1987, Governor Baliles acknowledged the
vulnerability of the medical facility industry to society's
philosophical mood swings, such as the current emphasis on freemarket solutions to economic problems.

The Governor stated that

"··· if we attempt to apply yesterday's remedies to future
problems - then we do a disservice to our people."

Suggesting

that COPN had outlived its usefulness Governor Baliles said, "I
am increasingly concerned that Virginia's regulatory apparatus called the certificate of need process - may be falling short of
its desired ends. 11 99

The increased level of economic competition

and changes in the delivery of medical facility care undoubtedly
helped to influence the Governor's decision to investigate COPN.
However the Governor was not alone in sensing that the
medical facility industry might be ready for some degree of
deregulation.

By this time, there was a general feeling within

98Gerald L. Baliles, Governor of Virginia, Executive Order
Thirty-One, 19 December 1986, in Report of the Governor's Commission
on Medical Care Facilities Certificate of Public Need (Richmond,
VA:
Commonwealth of Virginia, 1987), pp. 1-2.
99Gerald L. Baliles, Governor of Virginia, "The Remarks of
the Honorable Gerald L. Baliles, Governor of Virginia, Virginia
Health Care Association, Richmond, Virginia, 4 February 1987, p.
2
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the health facility policy community in Virginia that the health
care industry had changed considerably since COPN's inception,
and that perhaps some degree of deregulation was appropriate in
light of the prevailing deregulatory atmosphere at the time.
However, this desire to deregulate the health facility industry
was tempered by concerns over the effect that deregulation would
have on inner-city hospitals that provide a great deal of
uncompensated care to the medically indigent.100

While state

level policymakers were interested in giving health facilities as
much freedom from regulation as possible, there was still a
lingering fear that complete reliance on the marketplace would
leave inner city facilities with a declining pool of paying
patients.

These concerns underscore the linkage between COPN and

the indigent care issue and illustrate the common threads that
bound the work of the two commissions together.
The COPN Commission's membership reflected a cross-section
of legislators, health care providers, third-party insurers,
state health department officials, and the general public.101
lOOc. M. G. Buttery, M. D., Commissioner of Health, Virginia
Department of Health, telephone interview with author, 28 March
1989, Richmond, Virginia.

101The Governor's Commission on Medical Care Facilities
Certificate of Public Need consisted of the following individuals:
Chairman, Maston T. Jacks, Esq., Deputy Secretary of Human Resources;
Senator Stanley C. Walker CD-Lynchburg); Senator Elliot s. Schewel
(D-Norfolk); Delegate J. Samuel Glasscock CD-Suffolk); Delegate
Warren c. Stambaugh CD-Arlington); Delegate Mary Marshall (DArlington); c. M. G. Buttery, M. D., M. P.H., commissioner of
Health; Ray T. sorrel!, Director, Department of Medical Assistance
Services; George T. Drumwright, Jr., Virginia State Board of
Health; Ann Y. McGee, Director, Virginia Health Services Cost
Review Council; Mrs. Samuel J. Ailor, Virginia Statewie Health
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During the course of its investigation, the Commission
established formal relations with health care provider and
insurer groups, health regulatory and planning bodies, and other
organizations "which have an interest in the orderly growth and
development of the Commonwealth's health care system. 11 102

With

such a wide range of participants in the commission's work, it is
clear that Governor intended to have the Commission engage in
wide-ranging dialogue with those interests most concerned with
medical facility care issues.
Throughout 1987 the Commission held twelve monthly hearings
across the state in Salem, Abingdon, Harrisonburg, Norfolk and
Richmond.

To aid in its deliberations, the Commission contracted

with The Johns Hopkins University School of Hygiene and Public
Health to conduct a comprehensive study of COPN in Virginia.

The

team of researchers from Johns Hopkins conducted a detailed
analysis of the COPN program with the goal of ascertaining the
program's impact on the costs, quality, and accessibility of
medical services.

The Commission also directed the Johns Hopkins

researchers to consider alternative means that Virginia might
employ to pursue "the public interest in the area of medical
services delivery today. 11 103
Coordinating Council; Richard S. Blanton, Cumberland, Virginia;
The Reverend Carl T. Tinsley, Roanoke, Virginia; Rhoda Whiteacre
Maddox, Winchester, Virginia; Delores Zachary Pretlow, Ed. D.,
Richmond, Virginia; Drew B. Williams, Richmond, Virginia.
102Baliles, Executive Order Thirty-One, p.2.
103Report of the Governor's Commission on Certificate of
Public Need, p. 11.
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With input from the Johns Hopkins study, as well as
testimony gathered from the Commission's hearings, the Commission
had a wealth of information from which to draw conclusions
regarding COPN.

In December the Commission published its

findings, and submitted its report to the Governor and the
General Assembly in time for the 1988 legislative session.
The Commission came to several conclusions regarding the
effectiveness of COPN.

The data pertaining to COPN's effect on

health care costs were found to be inconclusive, but the
Commission considered COPN to be an inappropriate cost
containment mechanism for hospital care.104

Likewise, the

Commission did not find that COPN had much impact on the
accessibility of hospital care, and that COPN's effect on the
quality of hospital care was inconclusive.105
The Commission reached rather different conclusions
regarding COPN's relationship to the nursing home industry.

The

Commission deemed COPN necessary to prevent a rapid increase in
long-term beds, which would then drive up Medicaid costs.
Conversely, too few beds would limit consumer choice and inhibit
competition.106

In the face of such findings, the Commission

recommended that the hospital industry be substantially
104Report of the Governor's Commission on Certificate of
Public Need, p. 20.
105Report of the Governor's Commission on Medical Care
Facilities Certificate of Public Need, pp. 22-23.
106Report of the Governor's Commission on Medical Facilities
Certificate of Public Need, p. 23.

14R

deregulated while COPN should be retained for the nursing home
industry.107
During the course of its investigation, the Commission
became aware of the relationship between its work and that of the
Governor's Task Force on Indigent Health Care.

These two

investigative bodies determined that COPN and the problems facing
the indigent impact upon one another in a number of ways.

For

instance, the provision of health care for the indigent places a
considerable burden on providers in the form of uncompensated
care.

on the other hand, COPN affects the indigent population to

the extent that it influences the location and mix of services
provided by hospitals and other facilities.108

As the financial

costs of providing health care for the indigent population grows,
so does Commonwealth's stake in ensuring the continued
availability of health care for the medically indigent.

Certificate of Public Need Moratorium

The Governor's Commission on Medical Care Facilities
Certificate of Public Need published its findings just in time
107Eva s. Teig, Secretary of Human Resources, and Maston T.
Jacks, Deputy Secretary of Human Resources, letter to Governor
Gerald L. Baliles and the General Assembly, 1 December 1987, Richmond,
Virginia, in Report of the Governor's Commission on Certificate
of Public Need.
108Eva s. Teig, Secretary of Human Resources, and Maston T.
Jacks, Deputy Secretary of Human Resources, letter to Governor
Gerald L. Baliles and the General Assembly, Richmond, Virginia, 1
December 1987.
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for the 1988 General Assembly session.

As in 1973, opponents and

supporters of COPN lined up for the confrontation early.

One

important difference between the debate over COPN that took place
in 1973 and the one that occurred in 1988 concerns the role of
the Office of the Governor.
In 1973, Governor Holton did not play a very active role in
the development of the COPN statute.

Governor Baliles, on the

.other hand, took a very active role in the effort to repeal COPN.
Indeed, his participation in the activity surrounding COPN was
characteristic of the manner in which he governed.

By the end

the first General Assembly session during his term, Governor
Baliles had established a reputation as a very active official,
who worked hard behind the scenes to advocate his agenda.109

His

industriousness has helped him to establish an impressive record
of legislative successes. Indeed, it is this style that the
Governor employed during the 1987, 1988 and 1989 sessions in
pursuit of his health care policy goals.
The renewed controversy over COPN stemmed, in part, from
Virginia lawmakers' attempts to grapple with the state's Medicaid
expenditures.

Shortly before the start of the session, the

Baliles Administration proposed that a bed tax be levied on
Virginia hospitals and nursing homes.

Hospitals were to be taxed

at a rate of $5 per bed per day, and nursing homes would have
been subject to a tax of $1 per bed per day.

These revenues were

109R. H. Melton, "Lawmakers, Governor Tally Achievements,"
The Washington Post, 2 March 1987, E-1.
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then to be earmarked for the State's Medicaid budget.110
On December 30, 1987, the Secretary of Human Resources
briefed hospital and nursing home representatives on the
Governor's proposa1.lll

Thus, by the time the 1988 General

Assembly session began, the hospital and nursing home lobbies had
mobilized their forces in opposition to the proposal.
other side of the issue, Senator Dudley J. Emick, Jr.

On the
(D-

Botetourt) argued that without the bed tax, the General Assembly
would be compelled to raise taxes in order to fund Medicaid.112
A rather acrimonious confrontation developed between Governor
Baliles and the hospital industry over COPN and the Governor's
bed-tax proposal.

Governor Baliles accused the health care

industry of being more concerned with profits than with providing
care.

The Governor tried to instill a sense of obligation on the

hospital industry by differentiating between these institutions
and manufacturing corporations.

"Hospitals and nursing homes

should adhere to a distinctly different and more rigorous
standard [of moral obligation than most corporations]. 11 113
The hospital lobbying efforts proved to be decisive.

Having

initiated an intensive letter-writing campaign, these groups were
llOMichael Hardy, "Emick Sees Tax Rise Unless Assembly Acts
on Medicaid", Richmond Times-Dispatch, 24 January 1988, p. A-6.
lllR. H. Melton, "Hospitals Outflank Baliles on Hospital
Plan," The Washington Post, 31 December 1988, p. B-1.
112Hardy, A-6.
113Bill Wasson, "Baliles Aims to Force Bed-Tax Issue With
Two Proposals," Richmond News Leader, 11 February 1988, p. 6.

able to mount such a potent political offensive that the Governor
withdrew his proposal before it had been formally introduced in
the General Assembly.11 4

This defeat was particularly irksome to

the Governor, because he had wanted to have a free-flowing
discussion of health care financing issues.

Although this defeat

of the Governor's bed-tax plan represented a setback to his
health care agenda, it was not the final chapter of the unfolding
saga.
Not long after he withdrew his bed tax proposal, Governor
Baliles countered with yet another proposal for dealing with the
Medicaid crisis.
COPN.

This time the Governor's proposal centered on

Sponsored by Senator Emick, the proposal called for a one-

year moratorium on granting new certificates of need while a
legislative subcommittee considered alternative solutions to the
Medicaid funding dilemma.

After the defeat of his bed tax

proposal, Governor Baliles seemed more determined that this
second proposal should pass, commenting that he planned to "force
•
the issue. 11 115 The measure received early endorsements from
Delegate Richard

c.

Cranwell (D-Roanoke Co.), House Finance

Committee Chairman, and Delegate Samuel Glasscock (D-Suffolk),
House Health, Welfare, and Institutions Committee chairman.116
In order to help ensure passage of the moratorium-and-study
1 1 4 Hardy, A-6.
115Bonnie V. Winston, "Baliles Likely to Win Lull in Hospital
Construction," Richmond News Leader 11 February 1988, A-11.
116winston, A-11.
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plan, the Governor included the measure as an amendment to the
fiscal 1990 budget.

By doing so, he circumvented normal

procedures, since budgetary matters are generally not open to
public hearings.117

Partly as a result of this maneuvering, and

partly as a result of the nature of the moratorium itself, the
moratorium proposal encountered resistance from within the
General Assembly and the health facility community.

Senator

Emick, who introduced the Governor's proposal, was especially
disenchanted with the Governor's move to include the moratorium
in the budget.

Senator Wiley F. Mitchell, Jr. (R-Alexandria)

contended that the Governor was trying "to browbeat the hospitals
into submission", and existing nursing homes would be "able to
profit under the moratorium."

For their part, hospital and

nursing home representatives objected to provisions that would
have prevented facilities from replacing defective equipment or
from purchasing new high-tech equipment.11 8

While these

questions surrounding the moratorium were difficult, they were
not insurmountable.
By early March 1988, a compromise was in sight.

The

conference committee report on the budget included provisions in
the moratorium plan that addressed the health facility lobby's
concerns.

Exempt from the moratorium were projects for the

replacement or renovation of existing facilities or equipment;
117Betty Booker, "Hospitals, Regulators Reach Truce," Richmond
Times-Dispatch, 6 March 1988, B-5.
118 Booker, B-1, 5.
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projects necessary for compliance with federal research grants;
projects needed to meet emergency situations; and non-clinical
projects, such as parking lots.119

Having reached this

compromise, Laurens Sartoris, president of the VHA indicated that
the VHA would give its "full support" to the study.120
While the moratorium essentially suspended the COPN program,
the Division of Resources Development was deluged by a flood of
applications submitted by health facilities in the hope of
attaining approval prior to the initiation of the moratorium on
July 1, 1988.

The deadline for filing Standard Review

applications was March 5, 1988, while the filing deadlines for
Administrative and Exemption Review applications were May 24 and
June 14, respectively.121
As one might suspect, health facility administrators rushed
to file their applications before the moratorium went into
effect.

From March through June 1988, 193 hospital and nursing

home applications were submitted to the DRD.122

By comparison,

health facilities submitted 157 projects in all of 1986.123

This

119Acts of Assembly (1988) Joint Conference Committee Report
on House Bill No. 30, 11 March 1988, p. 123.
120wasson, p. 6.
121Marilyn H. West, Director, Division of Resources Development,
Memorandum to Chief Executive Officers and Administrators of
Virginia Medical Facilities Subject to Certificate of Public Need
Requirements, 22 April 1988, Richmond, Virginia.
122sandra Evans, "Health Plans Beat Deadline," Washington
Post, 8 July 1988, D-1,4.
123certificate of Public Need Biennial Report, 1985-1986,p.
14.
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deluge of applications prompted some observers, such as Dean
Montgomery, executive director of the Northern Virginia Health
Systems Agency, to charge that the Department of Health would
rush approval of applications in order to meet the July 1
deadline.124

Of 193 applications submitted to the Health

Department, 153 were approved, including 26 of 58 nursing home
project requests.125

Of course the COPN moratorium was but one

facet of lawmakers' attempts to address the Medicaid funding
issue.

The General Assembly also created a joint subcommittee to

study a wide range of health care issues, including COPN.

The Joint Subcommittee to Study Health Care For All Virginians

Introduced by Senator Stanley Walker (D-Norfolk), Senate
Joint Resolution 99 (SJR 99) established the Joint Subcommittee
to study Health Care For All Virginians.126

Of particular

importance was the continued escalation of health care costs
generally, and the burden that these costs place on the public
and private sectors.

The language of SJR 99 also directed the

Subcommittee to consider the accessibility of health care,
especially for the elderly and the medically indigent.
The Subcommittee consisted of seventeen individuals
124Evans, D-1.
125Evans, D-4.
126virginia Acts of Assembly,
Resolution 99, pp. 258-261.

(1988) vol. 2, Senate Joint
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representing a broad spectrum of interests.127

Four Senators,

appointed by the Privileges and Elections Committee, and five
Delegates appointed by the Speaker of the House represented the
General Assembly.

The Governor appointed six individuals to the

Subcommittee representing physicians, hospitals and nursing
homes, the commercial health insurance industry, and the Virginia
Board of Medical Assistance Services.

The joint resolution

stipulated that the Subcommittee consider alternative policy
mechanisms to alleviate the State's Medicaid woes, such as
stronger rate setting and a fund to equalize the indigent care
burden currently assumed by providers.128

The joint resolution

also instructed the Subcommittee to study "other related matters
that the joint subcommittee may deem appropriate. 11 129

It was

under this rather broad grant of responsibility that the
Subcommittee also examined COPN during the course of its
deliberations.

The Subcommittee transmitted its findings and

recommendations to the Governor and the General Assembly in time
for the 1989 legislative session.
127The following individuals served on the Subcommittee:
Senator Stanley C. Walker, chairman; Delegate Ford c. Quillen,
vice chairman; Senator Hunter B. Andrews; Senator Clarence A.
Holland; Delegate Roberts. Ball, Sr.; Delegate George H. Heilig,
Jr.; s. Wallace stieffen; Samuel B. Hunter, M.D.; Robert G.
Jackson II; Bette o. Kramer; Charles B. Walker; Gerald L. Good;
Eva s. Teig, Secretary of Health and Human Resources; Stuart W.
Connock; Elliot s. Schewel; Delegate J. Samuel Glasscock; J.
Bland Burkhardt, Jr.
128virqinia Acts of Assembly,
99, p. 259.

(1988) Senate Joint Resolution

129virginia Acts of Assembly,
99, p. 3.

(1988), Senate Joint Resolution

156
The Subcommittee held meetings throughout 1988.

At the

initial meeting in August, Delegate Robert B. Ball, Sr.

(D-

Henrico) urged the Subcommittee to totally deregulate the health
care facility industry.

Said he, "Eliminate the certificate of

need and let free enterprise solve the problem of high medical
costs."

However, Delegate Samuel Glasscock (D-Suffolk) sounded a

more cautionary note, suggesting, "Let's not vote on it yet,
let's get all the facts. 11 130

In September, Deputy Secretary of

Health and Human Resources, Maston T. Jacks presented the
Governor's Commission study to the Subcommittee.

In his summary

of the report, Jacks noted its generally deregulatory tone.131
The Subcommittee did in fact ultimately advocate substantial
deregulation of the health care industry.

Deregulation of the Virginia Health Care Industry

The Walker Subcommittee recommendations played a significant
role in the 1989 General Assembly session.

The Subcommittee did

incorporate COPN into its examination of health care in Virginia.
The SJR 99 combined its work with that of the House Joint
Resolution Subcommittee which was studying Medicaid eligibility

130olivia Winslow, "Ball Offers Health Care Suggestion,"
Richmond Times-Dispatch, 4 August 1988, B-3.
131olivia Winslow, "Cost Study Backs Less Regulation,"
Richmond Tmes-Dispatch, 21 September 1988, B-1.
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requirements.132

The fundamental issue for the Commission to

decide was whether or not COPN was still an appropriate
regulatory mechanism in the current health care environment.133
In its report to the Governor and the General Assembly, the
Subcommittee adopted an essentially deregulatory posture.

The

report recommended that medical facilities, except for
psychiatric and rehabilitative facilities be deregulated from
COPN.

The Subcommittee drew a distinction between most health

care facilities and psychiatric and rehabilitative facilities
because these facilities are reimbursed differently from most
medical facilities.

The Subcommittee also proposed the

continuation of the nursing home bed moratorium, as well as the
creation of an indigent care trust fund to alleviate the
financial burden that many hospitals now face.134
Reactions to the Subcommittee report were varied.

The VHA

advocated deregulation except for bed use conversions.1 3 5
Hospitals had guarded enthusiasm for the Subcommittee's plan,
although they felt that business should also be required to
132virginia General Assembly, Joint Subcommittee on Health
Care for All Virginians. Interim Report of the Joint Subcommittee
on Health Care For All Virginians to the Governor and the General
Assembly of Virginia, Senate Document No. 18, (Richmond, VA:
Commonwealth of Virginia, 1989), p. 2.
133Joint Subcommittee on Health Care for All Virginians,Interim
Report, p. 3.
134Joint Subcommittee on Health Care for All Virginians,
Interim Report, p. 10.
135Joint Subcommittee on Health Care for All Virginians,
Interim Report, p. 40.
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contribute to the trust fund, since many do not provide health
insurance for their employees.136 The Hospital Corporation of
America(HCA) adopted a neutral position on the COPN recommendations, but suggested that if alterations to the program were to
be made, the HCA wanted COPN requirements for new facilities and
bed relocations to remain intact.137

The Humana hospital chain

did not express an opinion on COPN, but did feel that it would be
unfair to have tax-paying hospitals contribute to the indigent
trust fund, since they already paid taxes that went toward
Medicaid.138
There were several groups that opposed deregulation. Freestanding dialysis centers believed that to deregulate hospitals
while continuing to regulate non-hospital facilities would be
discriminatory.139

Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Virginia felt that

deregulation would lead to higher health care costs.140

The

Virginia Association of Health Systems Agencies feared that
deregulation would lead to higher health care costs because of
continued expansionist incentives.

These organizations were also

136Bonnie v. Winston, "Health Care Pay Plan for Poor Proposed,"
The Virginia-Pilot and Ledger-Star, 17 December 1988, B-5.
137Joint Subcommittee on Health Care for All Virginians,
Interim Report, p.42.
138Joint Subcommittee on Health Care for All Virginians,
Interim Report, p. 41.
139Joint Subcommittee on Health Care for All Virginians,
Interim Report, p. 44.
140Joint Subcommittee on Health Care for All Virginians,
Interim Report, p. 42.
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concerned that unregulated facility, equipment, and service
expansion would lower quality, since a high volume of service per
procedure helps to maintain quality.141
Even within its own ranks, the Subcommittee's
recommendations did not receive unanimous support.

Delegate

Samuel Glasscock wrote a dissent in which he argued that
facilities which provide large amounts of indigent care would be
at a competitive disadvantage in an unregulated market, relative
to those facilities which did not provide much indigent care.

He

was also fearful that, left to their own devices, hospitals would
abandon needy, inner-city areas in search of paying patients.142
Subcommittee member J. Bland Burkhardt also dissented from the
report.

Most of his objections centered on the implementation of

the indigent trust fund.

However he favored deregulation for new

beds and relocation of existing facilities, a continued nursing
home bed moratorium, and allowing hospitals to convert beds to
skilled nursing care beds to meet the growing demand.143
At the outset of the session, Governor Baliles made plain
his stand on the COPN and indigent health care issues. Delivering
his state of the Commonwealth address to the General Assembly,
Governor Baliles stated that:
141Joint Subcommittee on Health Care for All Virginians,
Interim Report, pp. 43-44.
1 42 Joint Subcommittee on Health Care for All Virginians,
Interim Report, p. 33.
143Joint Subcommittee on Health Care for All Virginians,
Interim Report, pp. 36-38.
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Medical costs continue to skyrocket, placing new
burdens on families, businesses, and governments . . . . I
urge you to review the Joint Subcommittee on Health
Care's interim report, which proposes that a new pubic
and private partnership be established to set up a
trust fund for indigent health care. I agree .
.•. the subcommittee recommends that regulation of
hospitals under the Certificate of Public Need program
be ended •.. and that the moratorium on nursing home
expansions be continued until January 1, 1991. I
concur with that as we11.144
The Governor's remarks suggest a deregulatory position on the
COPN program, stressing medical costs and the impact that medical
facility costs have had on Virginians trying to obtain health
care.

Cost control was clearly the predominant consideration,

since health care costs would affect whatever measures would be
devised to alleviate the indigent health care crisis.
During the course of the 1989 session, legislators dealt
with

several bills that pertained to COPN.

Delegate Ford

c.

Quillan (D-Scott) introduced a bill on behalf of the Governor
that would have deregulated the medical facility industry, except
for psychiatric and rehabilitative facilities.145

A carryover

bill originally introduced by Senator Wiley F. Mitchell (RAlexandria), that would have totally deregulated the health care
industry, died in committee, and Senator Johnny

s.

Joannou (D-

Portsmouth) introduced SB 373 to deregulate the industry for bed
relocations, while continuing to regulate hospital size,
144nportions of the Governor's Speech to Legislators,"
Richmond Times-Dispatch, 12 January 1989, A-8.
145Betty Booker, "Health Care Trust For Poor is Aim," Richmond
Times-Dispatch, 25 January 1989, A-5.
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location, and services.

Delegate Glasscock also introduced a

bill that would have continued to regulate hospital construction,
expansion, and bed additions, while deregulating equipment and
services (HB 1975).146
In the end, legislators from these competing pro and antiregulation factions were able to reach a compromise, however the
path to that compromise was not a smooth one.

In early February

the House Health, Welfare, and Institutions Committee voted
unanimously to send the Glasscock measure to the House floor
while the Senate approved the Joannou proposal to deregulate the
medical facility industry only for bed relocations.147

The

Governor's proposal to deregulate the medical facility industry
was defeated in the House, Health, Welfare, and Institutions
Committee.

Having waged a protracted struggle over COPN that

spanned three General Assembly sessions, the defeat of the
Governor's proposal to deregulate the medical facility industry
represented an uncharacteristically harsh def eat for a governor
who tended to enjoy considerable success in enacting his
legislative agenda.

It may also have been a sign that the

General Assembly was not yet ready to completely deregulate the
health facility industry.
146commonwealth of Virginia,Cumulative Index of Senate and
House Bills, Resolutions, and Joint Resolutions Introduced in the
1989 Session of the Virginia General Assembly, (Richmond, VA:
Commonwealth of Virginia, 1989), p. 139.
147Jeane Cummings and Michael Martz, "Move to Deregulate
Loses Favor in Committee Discussion," Richmond News Leader, 3
February 1989, A-4.
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There were two central issues that overshadowed the General
Assembly's activities in this area.

Members of the General

Assembly were concerned that medical facilities would abandon
inner-city areas in a deregulated market.

Secondly, there was a

feeling among legislators that the Health Care for All Virginians
Subcommittee had not completed its work.148

Without a final set

of recommendations from the Subcommittee, many members may well
have been reluctant to opt for a completely deregulatory solution
to the medical care industry dilemma.

In the face of such

uncertainty, a compromise was inevitable.
That compromise came in the form of a bill introduced by
Senator Stanley
Subcommittee.

c.

Walker (D-Norfolk), who also chaired the

He introduced SB 762, which deregulated medical

facilities services and equipment while continuing to regulate
new facility construction, expansion and bed relocation.

The

bill also included an expiration date for the COPN program on
July 1, 1991, at which time the General Assembly will determine
whether or not the program continues to serve the public's interests.149
Lawmakers reached a compromise that appears to satisfy many
of the concerns of parties on both sides of this issue. The
stipulation that will continue COPN regulation for much of the
industry should assuage the fears of those individuals who feared
148Buttery interview.
149R. H. Melton and Donald P. Baker, "Most in Virginia
Assembly Going Home Happy," The Washington Post, 26 February
1989, D-1,8.
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that total deregulation would lead to the curtailment of hospital
services in needy inner-city areas.
the industry may be short-lived.

However this restraint on

Should the General Assembly

decide in 1991 that COPN no longer serves a useful purpose, then
the medical care industry may well be free of this form of state
regulation.
By simultaneously passing legislation to create an indigent
care trust fund, the General Assembly has created a program that
will help to mitigate the effects of deregulation on facilities
that serve large numbers of indigent patients.

For his part,

Governor Baliles' efforts in the health facility policy area have
yielded him a significant achievement at the expense of a modest
setback.

Even though he was unable to secure the immediate

deregulation of the medical facility industry, the General
Assembly's creation of an indigent care trust fund represents a
significant achievement.

Advocates of regulation have bought

themselves a little more time to come up with alternative
solutions to the health care cost and indigent health care
issues.

Although opponents of COPN may not have gotten the

complete package that they had sought, the door toward a
substantially deregulated health care industry has been left
open.
Conclusion

Regardless of the General Assembly's eventual decision
concerning COPN, it is clear that the environment in which the
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program now operates is vastly different from the health care
environment that existed fifteen years ago when lawmakers created
COPN.

Indeed, it is these very differences which have prompted

Virginia lawmakers to once again examine COPN in the broad
context of Virginia health care policy.

Of particular concern to

the Governor and the General Assembly are the State's burgeoning
Medicaid bill, and the provision of health care for the medically
indigent.

Since the medically indigent are often dependent upon

Medicaid, the Commonwealth has a vested financial interest, as
well as a humanitarian concern, in alleviating their plight.
Both of these concerns are affected by the rising costs of
medical care generally, which precludes many individuals from
obtaining adequate health care, and which serves to inflate
Virginia's Medicaid budget.

This increase in the state's

Medicaid budget and the general rise in medical facility care
costs have prompted lawmakers and the Governor to tie the fate of
COPN directly to its ability to constrain medical facility care
costs.
In fact it is the cost of health care that has overshadowed
concerns about health care quality and accessibility.

Even

though state lawmakers have elevated the prominence of Medicaid,
this development is as much a function of the program's cost as
it is a function of lawmakers' concern for the plight of the
medically indigent.
The changing face of health care delivery and medical
technology have accentuated cost control concerns, as officials
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have altered the program in an effort to address the challenges
posed by these changes.

Just as the health planning and

regulatory community has striven to address new health care
issues and concepts, public and private sector organizations have
introduced measures of their own (such as prospective payment) as
a means of enhancing the competitiveness of the health care
industry.
Throughout COPN's history, a variety of public and private
sector organizations have been active in the discussion
concerning COPN.

Whether motivated by economic, professional, or

ideological factors, providers, insurers, government agencies,
and consumers have all taken positions on COPN.

This is not to

say that there has always been unanimity within a group, or that
a group's position has remained consistent with respect to the
efficacy of COPN.

Nonetheless, the interaction among these

groups has contributed to the evolution of COPN in Virginia.
These groups will doubtless assume an active role in the coming
deliberations regarding certificate of public need in Virginia.
The pattern that emerges from the interaction of various
groups on the COPN issue is consistent with more general
observations regarding the interaction of groups in American
politics.

All groups do not fair equally well in American

politics.

Those groups with narrow goals and substantial

resources tend to be more influential than groups with broad,
diffuse goals.150

Those groups that represent business or

150schlozman and Tierney, p. 400.
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economic interests are more likely to be influential than
citizens' groups.151

These observations help explain the

dominance of medical provider groups on the Virginia political
scene in comparison to the more broad-based, diffuse consumer groups.

151Ronald J. Hrebenar and Ruth K. Scott, Interest Group
Politics in America, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1982), p. 197.

CONCLUSION
Health facility public policy is in the midst of a
transitionary phase.

This transition is driven by the three

separate but related impulses of cost, access, and quality.

With

the federal government altering its role in this policy area,
state and local governments must redefine individually the proper
level and nature of intervention that they will pursue.
Lawmakers are also currently redefining other salient health
issues that require attention.

While health care costs still

dominate health care policy discussions, officials in Virginia
have become increasingly concerned about the availability and
affordability of health care for the elderly and medically
indigent.

Central to these concerns is the issue of government's

proper role in the health care facility industry.
During the sixteen years that Certificate of Public Need has
existed in Virginia, Health Department officials have relied on
the three basic issues of quality, and especially, the
accessibility and cost of medical facility services as
justification for the program.

Accessibility and quality of

medical facility services have long been significant policy
considerations. More recently, cost control has grown to
overshadow these longer-standing concerns.

It was not until the

late 1960's and early 1970's that health care costs became a
significant issue on the national political landscape.

Mirroring
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this phenomenon, Virginia lawmakers began to closely scrutinize
health care costs in Virginia during the early 1970 1 s.
To meet the new challenge posed by rapidly rising health
care costs, lawmakers in Congress and the states revised health
facility policy prescriptions.

New York and several other states

experimented with certificate of need controls during the early
1960's as a means of achieving achieving health planning
objectives.

By 1972 almost half of the states had established

capital expenditure review programs.

Relying heavily on the

experiences of these states, the Virginia General Assembly
created a certificate of need program in 1973.

A year later,

Congress enacted a federal health planning statute that all but
required states to develop capital expenditure review programs.
The passage of this federal statute signalled a clear shift away
from simply the provision of medical facility resources toward
the rational planning and utilization of medical facility
resources.
As certificate of need gained prominence, some analysts,
political leaders, and health care providers questioned the
desirability of CON regulation in the health facility industry.
In fact, Virginia's COPN statute was quite controversial when it
was introduced.

At issue was the proper role of government in

the medical facility industry.

Proponents of a free-market

approach to medical facility care, such as the Richmond Metro
Chamber of Commerce have taken the stance on ideological and
economic grounds that the free market is a better allocator of
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health care resources than regulation.

By subjecting prospective

capital expenditure decisions to CON review, the decision became
highly politicized, as the review process has often been marked
by negotiation between the applicant, competing applicants, and
the state agency having final decision-making authority. 1

Other

groups, such as the Virginia Health Care Association and Virginia
Blue Cross have supported COPN as a reasonable response to the
problems within the health care facility industry.

The Virginia

Hospital Association has altered its position on COPN several
times in response to the perceived effect that COPN has had on
its member institutions.

Initially supportive of the program,

the VHA currently opposes COPN on ideological and economic
grounds.
Group interaction has played an important role in the
development of COPN in Virginia.

It is often the case in

American politics that groups which are well-organized and wellfinanced, and have narrow concerns are more active politically
than those groups which are not.

Health care provider and payer

groups in Virginia have been much more active in the COPN
dialogue than citizens' groups.

The Virginia Hospital

Association and the Virginia Health.Care Association have been
two of the most active groups on the COPN issue.

Groups have not

only been active in the formulation of legislation pertaining to
COPN, but also in the daily operation of the program.

Interested

1Roberta M. Roos, "Certificate of Need for Health Care
Facilities: a Time for Reexamination," Pace Law Review (7) 2
(Winter 1987), p. 509.
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parties participate in the decision-making process on COPN
applications, as well as in the promulgation of the regulations
that govern the program.
Over the period of fifty or sixty years that government has
been active in this policy area, the locus of activity shifted
from the private sector, to local and state governments, and then
to the federal government. Tensions arose under the federal
health planning program between the various levels of government
and the quasi-public HSAs. The focal point of these disagreements
concerned the proper role of each level of government and the
HSAs.
More recently, states and localities have resumed the
dominant role in health planning in the wake of the dismantling
of the federal health planning program.

The absence of a federal

health planning program has provided Virginia and other states
with the opportunity to redefine their health planning goals.

In

Virginia, this development has meant that lawmakers have been
able to give the needs of the medically indigent a much more
prominent position on the political agenda than had previously
been the case.
The indigent health care issue has accentuated concern about
medical facility care costs in Virginia.

Virginia lawmakers have

tied COPN's fate to its ability to constrain costs.

That

Virginia's Medicaid budget has grown considerably has heightened
officials' concerns about health care costs, since these costs
influence the state's Medicaid budget.

It is the effect that
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health care costs have on Virginia's Medicaid budget which has
prompted lawmakers to partially deregulate the health facility
industry while creating a trust fund to assist institutions that
provide substantial amounts of indigent care.
The federal government impacts upon the health care
facility industry in a number of ways.

The federal government

provides incentives to employers to provide employee health
insurance.

Broad Medicare and Medicaid eligibility requirements

are established by the federal government as are standards for
nursing home care.2
state and local governments continue to be active in the
health facility industry.

Virginia and thirty-eight other states

maintain active health planning and CON programs.

states and

localities are also responsible for health care facility
licensing and, health and safety inspections.

There are rate

regulation programs in Virginia and elsewhere.

Under a rate

regulation plan, facilities work together with regulators to
reach an agreement on revenue limits while regulators attempt to
distribute equitably the indigent care burden among facilities. 3
Virginia also continues to maintain its State and Local
Hospitalization Program as a way to help ensure health care for
the medically indigent.
2John F.Hoadley, "Health Care in the U. s.:
Quality," PS (20) 2 (Spring 1987), p. 198.

Access, Costs,

3carl J. Schramm, Steven c. Renn, and Brian Biles, "Controlling
Hospital Cost Inflation: New Approaches to Rate Setting", Health
Affairs (Fall 1986), p.30.

1n

Reduced to its most fundamental elements, the question of
government intervention in the medical facility industry really
reverts back to the long-standing debate over the relative merits
of regulation and the free market.

This question is still as

hotly contested today as it was fifteen or twenty years
ago. Yet today, there is a new wrinkle in this issue.

Since all

levels of government are, to varying degrees, involved in the
medical facility industry, the current dilemma centers on the
character that such intervention should take.
Medical facility public policy in this country is clearly at
a crossroads.

Public and private sector leaders continue to

search for solutions to the deficiencies in the health care
industry. Sixteen years ago the Virginia General Assembly enacted
a certificate of need program in the hope that it would address
the problems of access, cost, and quality.

Access and cost are

still at the forefront of political discussions sixteen years
later, as the General Assembly has decided to scale back
Virginia's COPN program in an effort to allow competitive market
forces to work to achieve the Commonwealth's health care policy
objectives.

The quality of medical facilities is not as

prominent a factor in the COPN program as it was originally,
however.

As the Governor and the General Assembly have struggled

to deal with these issues and the fate of COPN they have received
input from a variety of groups representing various segments of
the health care industry and society at large.

These groups have
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played an important role in the development of medical facility
policy in Virginia.
Governor Baliles and the General Assembly have made the
issue of access to affordable health care for all Virginians a
high priority, however concern over the cost of this care still
overshadows the issue of the accessibility of medical facility
care for many Virginians.

Lawmakers' decisions regarding the

continued efficacy of COPN are also motivated by these two
issues.

As long as these concerns remain high political

priorities in Virginia, the Commonwealth will continue to play an
active role in this ever-changing industry.
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